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NOTE
Soviet International Law: An Exemplar for

Optimal Decision Theory Analysis
I.

INTRODUCTION

the formation of international
law in Russia amounted only to a passive social aggrandizement of the bourgeois institutions which were at that time actively
fostered by the Western Nations. Nonetheless, by the early eighteenth century Russia had been accepted in the world community;
and she continued to act under those institutions of international
law which were, by then, as much a part of her legal system as they
were of any other nation. With the Revolution in 1917 and the
complete reversal of the social stratification within Russia, the
dilemma arose as to how the Soviet Union should participate in
international affairs without accepting the bourgeois institutions of
international law that the deposed Czars had helped to establish.
During the first half of the twentieth century, many attempts
were made by the leading Soviet legal theorists to reconcile international law with Marxist doctrine. First Korovin, then Pashukanis, later Vyshinskii, and finally Tunkin tried to solve this dilemma.
With Khrushchev backing the theme of peaceful coexistence, in
1956, a compromise of the divergent legal systems was acknowledged by the Soviet government. The latest shift in Soviet international legal policy has been from Khrushchev's coexistence theme
to Brezhnev and Kosygin's theme of co-operation - a significant
change in terminology and approach. Indeed, the current EastWest ddtente era has created a "new" international law made up of
consensually-based rules. Through all of these shifts in international legal theory, Soviet national interest has been the guideline
for change.1
HE CZARIST CONTRIBUTION to

1The [Sloviet theory of international law has undergone dramatic and farreaching changes from the inception of the [S]oviet State until now. By far
the largest part of this change is inextricably interwoven into the fabric of
U.S.S.R. foreign and domestic policy. It is a remarkable record of tortuous
weavings between the Scylla of reality and the Charybdis of theory. Snyder
& Bracht, Coexistence and International Law, 7 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 54
(1958).
See also Snyder, The Communist Theory of International Law, 2 VA. J. INT'L L. 80

(1962).
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The Soviet's pragmatic use of international law, when compared
with the United States own foreign policy justifications, provides
an exemplar for current optimal decision theory analysis. Such
analysis attempts to determine the appropriate evaluative method
for policy determination when information levels are imperfect and
varied. The ideological glasses through which the East and the
West view the world give distorted, if not false, pictures of international conflict situations. However, optimal decision theory
analysis may provide the understanding for a mutual reevaluation
of the espoused opposing ideological outlooks and may establish
the basis for the necessary mankind perspective in this pluralistic international society.
The purpose of this Note is to delineate: (1) the Soviet heritage of Czarist Russia's contributions to traditional international
law; (2) the theoretical concepts which give rise to the Soviet
dilemma of reconciling Marxist doctrine with international law;
(3) the attempts by certain Soviet legal theorists to shorten the
horns of the dilemma; and (4) the recent changes in the dominant
theory of public Soviet international law. Modern evaluation and
decision-making theory will be employed as a vehicle to explain
differing approaches to international conflicts resolution, including
the Soviet Union's recent intervention in Czechoslovakia. A brief
critical comparison will then be made between the Soviet "hangups" in effectuating a valid theory of international law and the
inconsistency between the United States democratic ideals and
American international relations. Finally, an operational sociological approach based on a trans-cultural consensus will be suggested as a potential solution to the dilemmas in international
jurisprudence which have been created by a world of polarized
ideological beliefs.
II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Russia was slow coming into full intercourse with the Western
Nations due to the continuance in the seventeenth century of her
serfdom 2 society and her ingrained isolationism, which in part was
2 The Russian serfs were the mass body of unemancipated tillers of the soil. The
expression "feudalistic society" is often used, or rather misused, by American writers
to denote a society which is aristocratic and not democratic. Russia, unlike most of
Europe, never knew the feudal system; and therefore, in the strict sense, there never
was a feudalistic society in Russia. There was, however, a serfdom society. Compare
J. CLARKSON, A HISTORY OF RussrA 71, 203 (1962), with B. PAREs, THE FALL OF
THE RussiAN MONARCHY

2-4 (6th ed. 1963).

40 (1961).

See also J.

BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS
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a reaction to the early Tartar domination and Teuton oppression.'
However, by the early eighteenth century, Russia had been received
as a great power in the "family of nations." This recognition
preceded that of the United States by only a little more than 70
years and was due largely to Peter the Great's innovations both in
internal government and in international relations. 5
A.

InternationalLaw Under the Czars

In the sixteenth century, Ivan III "the Great" (1462-1505) and
Ivan IV "the Terrible" (1533-1584) 6 attempted to gain recognition for Russia, but these rulers lacked not only Peter the Great's
genius and energy but also the proper Zeitgeist - the external
"time spirit"7 - and the internal means of production and coercive
strength which would later allow Russia to change her position
from that of a backward state to that of a recognized world power.
Russia's slow ascendancy to the family of nations did not mean
that the Czars were slow to learn about the subjects of international law. First the Kiev government of southwestern Russia and
then the Muscovy government, further north, maintained treaty
relations with neighboring empires, kingdoms, and cities.8 The
Czars had "sent and received ambassadors, drawn boundaries, negotiated rights of navigation and commerce, even insisted on occasion
upon formal and substantive rules of war."9 The increase of inter3

36 (1944).
(3d ed. 1948). The "family of
nations" is that group of nations recognized as having equal status under international
law.
5W. WALSH, RussiA AND THE SOVIET UNION 107-08, 113-14 (1958); J.CLARK4

P. SOROKIN, RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES
See C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 102

SON,supra note 2, at 187-204.

But compare note 10 infra.

6The dates in parentheses refer to periods of reign. See J.CLARKSON, supra note
2, at 815-17.
7
Zeitgeist can be defined as a deterministic causal factor, "some quintessential
spirit of the time, some intellectual atmosphere or 'climate' of opinion, some unitary
force ...... R. WELLEK & A. WARuEN, THEORY OF LITERATURE 62 (1956). See
note 10 infra. Compare with Weltanschauung as defined in R. WELLEK & A. WARREN, supra at 106 and note 134 infra.
8F.CORBETr, LAW IN DIPLOMACY 83 (1959).

For a discussion of Kievan Rus

and the Muscovite State, see J.CLARKSON, supra note 2, at 46-48, 84-90.
In this early period nationalism was still very disjointed and cities could be considered subjects of what might then have been accepted as "international law," at least
insofar as it was within the "sovereignty" of these cities to make trade and protection
agreements. -See C. FENWIcK, supra note 4, at 10; J. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL AR-

BITRATION PROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 177 (1929).
For a discussion of present day "communities" not having the character of states
as subjects of international law, see H. KELSEN, PRINcIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

158-88, 264-79 (1952).
9 P. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 83.
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national trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries eventually
brought the now centralized Moscow government into relationship
with all the European States.
Peter the Great (1682-1725), now referred to as "the first
Bolshevik," did much to Europeanize Russia.10 He concentrated
his expansionist energies in a series of successful aggressive wars
which were concluded in treaties favorable to the growing Russian
trade with other countries. "In one reign, Russia, a backward and
ignored country, became a major power and a member of the European community of states - a historical development unparalleled
until the rise of Japan in the late nineteenth century.""
Despite the fact that the earlier Czarist governments appear at
first glance to have done relatively little to further developments
of international law, the Marxist interpretation of the history and
origins of international law is greatly tainted with nationalistic
pride and attributes many of the advances in this field, as in the
10 Some historians, however, prefer to give more credit to the Zeitgeist of that time
than to Peter the Great:
Although for propaganda purposes the legendary figure of Peter I has
been kept alive, costumed anew as "the first Bolshevik," it has long since
become obvious that the continuity of Russian history was unbroken by the
reign of Peter. Irresistible forces, which owed little or nothing to the efforts
of outstanding individuals, had before Peter's birth given form to an autocracy
rooted in peasant bondage, to a Church wholly subordinate to the state, to a
state-directed economy struggling to make headway against unfavorable geographic conditions, to the problem of progressive expansion of the limits of
Russian power, and to the steady permeation of Russian life by the manners and customs of the more civilized West.
All these fundamental tendencies continued their development through
and long after the reign of Peter, without change of direction. J. CLARKSON, supra note 2, at 187-88.
One is struck by the similarity of Clarkson's "irresistible forces" and Alfred Korzybski's
"time-binding" principle:
[Bly nature we are time-binders and.., the effectiveness of our time-binding
capacity is not only a function of time but is . . . a logarithmic or exponential function of time - a function in which time (T) enters as an exponent, as in the expression PR', so that we humans are, unlike animals,
naturally qualified not only to progress, but to progress more and more
rapidly, with an always accelerating acceleration, as the generations pass. A.
KORZYBSKI, MANHOOD OF HUMANITY 91-92 (1921).
The rational morality inherent in man's time-binding ability is discussed in text accompanying notes 345-85 infra.
Symbolic of Peter the Great's reforms was the enforced shaving of beards of the
Russian nobility. J. CLARKSON, supra note 2, at 193; Ulam, The Russian Political
System, in PATTERNS OF GOVERNMENT 593, 604 (2d ed., S. Beer & A. Ulam eds.
1964). Peter I also imposed a tax on beards - "those evidences that man is made
in the image of God." J. CLARKSON, supra at 201-02. "This tax was established as
early as 1705 at rates graduated to the social importance of the wearer and in the case
of peasants, contingent on whether they brought their beards to town or were content
to remain at home ...."

Id. at 202.

11 Ulam, supra note 10, at 604; but see discussion in note 10 supra.
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area of physical science, to the Czarists." By the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, however, there did occur incidents of Russian
foreign practice which bear some resemblance to the patterns of
modern international intercourse. It is in these centuries that we
find some substance to the exaggerated claims of the Soviet legal
historians. For example, Catherine II (1762-1796) first formulated the principle of armed neutrality in the Act of 1780.18 This
was the first practical step toward establishing principles of maritime warfare. Because of political circumstances, the neutrality
was abandoned in 1793, only to be revived again under different
pressures by Catherine's deranged successor, Paul I (1796-1801).
Paul's successor, Alexander I (1801-1825) reaffirmed the principles
of armed neutrality and from then on they were advocated by the
Russian governments. 4
Alexander I also made several proposals concerning international codification, disarmament, and control of the slave trade. 5
In 1818 the United States and England turned to him for the
arbitration of their dispute over the ownership of slaves in American territory which had been occupied by English troops. 6 This
was the first of a series of nineteenth century arbitrations that were
held with Russian umpires. Alexander 11 (1855-1881) and Alexander III (1881-1894) figured in the determination of many other
disputes, and some of these proceedings served as models for later
7
international conventions.'
In the nineteenth century, Russia displayed one of the first
classic examples of the repudiation of treaty obligations on the
grounds of rebus sic stantibus - "a material or fundamental
In 1870 Russia declared herself no
change of circumstances."'"
12"Recent Soviet writers have been at great pains to emphasize prerevolutionary
Russian contributions of doctrine and practice to the development of international law."
P. CORBET, supra note 8, at 83-84.
13J. CLARKSON, supra note 2, at 250; 1 P. JESSUP & F. DEAK, NEUTRALITY 160
(1935); B. SUMNBR, A SHORT IHISTORY OF RUSSIA 385-86 (1949). See generally
J. ScOTt, THE ARMED NEuTALiTY OF 1780 AND 1800 (1918).
14 See 2 W. PHILLIPS & A. REEDE, NEUTRAL=rr 107-11 (1936).
I5 P. CORBErr, supra note 8, at 87.
16See J. RALSTON, supra note 8, at 87.

17For example: "Proceedings under Professor F.F. Martens of the University of St.
Petersburg led in 1896 to a unanimous award in the famous boundary dispute between

Great Britain and Venezuela, and served as model for the Convention on the Peaceful
Settlement of International Disputes adopted at The Hague in 1899." P. CORBETr,
supra note 8, at 87.
' 8 For a discussion of this doctrine, see J. BRIERLY, supra note 2, at 335-39; G.
VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 442-45 (1965); Hill, The Doctrine of Rebus
Sic Stantibus in International Law, 9 UNIV. OF MSSOURI STUDMS, No. 3 (1934).
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longer bound by certain parts of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, which
related to the neutralization of the Black Sea and placed restrictions
on Russia keeping armed vessels in that area. 19 Invoking the principle of rebus sic stantibus, Russia argued that "a material change
in the conditions contemplated by the treaty had been brought

about by the subsequent union of the Danubian principalities, acquiesced in by the Great Powers, as well as by the changes in the
conditions of naval warfare incident to the use of iron-clad ves-

sels."2 o
B.

The Failure of the Brussels and Hague Conferences

On the initiative of Alexander II of Russia, the Brussels Conference of 1874 was held to establish a comprehensive set of rules
for land warfare."- Because this Conference failed to establish any
definite body of rules, Nicholas 11 (1894-1917), the grandson of
Alexander II, brought together the Hague Peace Conference for
See also The Free Zones of Savoy and Gex, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46, at 156-58,
reproduced iu 2 M. HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 448, 553 (1953), and W.
BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 198-208 (2d ed. 1962).
For a specific Soviet example of the use of this doctrine, see text accompanying note
36 infra. Derivation of the doctrine itself may be attributed to either Machiavelli or
Gentili:
Machiavelli's ideas may be linked to international law in so far as his perfect
and cynical disregard of any political morality (not of morality in general)
contrasted sharply with, and formed an extreme reaction to, the scholastic
teaching which purported to subordinate the whole province of politics and
especially the relations among rulers to the demands of moral theology. A.
NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 56 (1947).
See N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (circa 1513); N. MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON
THE FIRST DECADE OF TITUS LmIUS (circa 1513).
Gentili's most important contribution to the [law of treaties] consists in his
tenet that one has to read into a (peace) treaty always a tacit condition to
the effect that the treaty is binding only as long as conditions remain unchanged. The far-reaching consequences of this so-called clausula rebus sic
stantibus are evident. Ancient Roman law had not known that clausula.
Gentili relies on the authority of Alciatus (1492-1550), an outstanding Italian writer on civil law, but the clausula rebus sic stantibus doctrine was several centuries older. It originated most probably in canon law, which tended
to temper with considerations of equity the rigor of the Roman private law.
The new tenet was adopted by the "civilians," and Gentili introduced it into
international law. There it has stood its ground down to the present, whereas
it has generally disappeared in its original province, private law. A. NUSSBAUM, supra at 78.

See generally A. GENTILI, ON THE LAW OF WAR (circa 1598). See also H. GROTIUS,
DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS [ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] (1646) ch. XVI, §
XXV (The Classics of International Law ed. 1925), citing POLYBiUS, HISTORIES ch.
III, § XXV (3) (circa 120 B.C.).
19 C. FENWICK, supra note 4, at 455-56.
201d. at 456.
21 p. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 87-88.
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the same purpose on May 18, 1899.22 - There the Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land23 was drawn up,
embodying most of the unratified Brussels' draft. This convention
was eventually accepted by most of the world community.
But further attempts to outdo its predecessor destroyed the
semblance of efficacy which the Peace Conference of 1899 might
have enjoyed. The proof of such a conclusion is best exemplified
in the establishment of the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration,24 which was instituted so that sovereign states could submit
their disputes to arbitration by a selected panel of impartial jurists.
Aside from public opinion and a feeling of moral responsibility,
there proved to be no sanctions which could compel nations to
submit their disputes to this impartial tribunal, nor did this "court"
have any means by which it could enforce its decisions.2 5
The irony of establishing an idealistic body of rules which were
to serve a court powerless to enforce theni was" commensurate with
the personal inducement.-of the man who had convened the Conference. Nicholas II had publicly announced the objective of the
Hague Conference of 1899 to be world peace.2 6 However, due to
the relative weakness of the Russian army, fear of Germany's rising
military strength, and the need to modernize armaments and to
secure Russia's claims in the Far EastP7 Nicholas' real motivating
interests were international disarmament and a general limitation
of armed forces.
Like the first Hague Conference,, the Second International Peace
Conference, which met on June 15, 1907, failed to strengthen the
22 C. FBNwICK, supra note 4, at 19-20, 82. See also C. DAvIs, TBE UNITED STATES
AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE (1962).
23
For the text of the convention, see THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, at 100 (J. Scott ed. 1918).
24
See J. BRIERLY, supra note 2, at 350; C. FENWICK, supra note 4, at 514-15.
25
The Hague Court was superseded by the Permanent Court of International Justice which was established in 1920 in association with the League of Nations. This
tribunal has now permanently been replaced by the International Court of Justice as
part of the general framework established by the Charter of the United Nations in 1945.
See W. BISHOP, supra note 18, at 62; H. LAuTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL CouRT (1958).
For a discussion of the Soviets' attitude toward international tribunals, see Grzy-

bowski, Socialist Judges in the International Court of Justice, 1964 DUKE LJ. 536.
See also Grzybowski, International Organizations From the Soviet Point of View, 29
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 882 (1964).
26J. CLARKSON, supra note 2, at 347; P. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 87.
27
In 1899 the occupation of Port Arthur by the Russians was having dangerous
repercussions. P. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 88. See also J. CLARKSON, supra note
2, at 347-48.
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political structure of the international community. 8 The convention drafted at the Hague Conference of 1899 was still in effect,
but it was obviously lacking importance and some states felt that
it was obsolete.2 9 Codification of several customary international
practices in the multilateral treaties of the Hague Convention of
1907 resulted in only slight actual enhancement of those existing
rules for world government.8 0
While failing in their overall and idealistic objectives, these
conferences and successive ones have had a mitigating effect upon
belligerent practices,"' and credit must go in considerable measure
to Russia for what these conferences have been worth. The fact
that they were prompted by Russia's political or material needs
does not make the contribution any less real. Governments, both
Eastern and Western, seldom act upon motives of pure altruism.
C. The Revolution (1917)
The revolutionary government of Russia, contrary to what
might have been expected, incorporated the bourgeois institutions
relating to international norms which the deposed Czars had helped
to establish and which were based upon the "old" social structure of
Russia.32 From its beginning, in November 1917, the Communist
government used the existing system, including the terminology
and forms that went under the heading of internationallaw.8 But
28 By this time . . .the humanitarian aspect of the codification of the laws of
war had become subordinated to the political; and the leading military and
naval powers were primarily concerned with adopting rules from which they
might derive a relative advantage in the coming war which they looked upon
as inevitable. C. FENWICK, supra note 4, at 82.
See also id. at 20.
29
H. JACOBINI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEXT 231 (1962).
For a Soviet interpretation of the subsequent failure of the Hague Conference of 1922, see L. FISCHER,
THE SOVIETS IN WORLD AFFAIRS 268-69 (1960).

30 The Hague Conference of 1907 carried on the work of codification, extending it to include the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in maritime war. At the same time the Conference adopted a number of other
conventions relative to the conduct of hostilities and the mutual relations
of the belligerents. C. FENWICK, supra note 4, at 82.
For the text of these conventions, see THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS

OP 1899 AND 1907, supra note 23, at 41. See also W. BISHOP, supra note 18, at 80204, 815-17; text accompanying note 135 infra.
31 P. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 88; C. FENWICK, supra note 4, at 545-46.
32 This incorporation, which gives rise to the Soviet Dilemma, is discussed in text
accompanying notes 57-66 infra.
33 p. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 88. See, e.g., Preliminary Treaty between the German Reich and the Russian Socialistic Federative Soviet Republic regarding the Enlargement of the Activities of the Delegations for the Care of Prisoners of War of Both
Countries (May 5, 1921), in 2 REICHGESETZBLATT 929, art. VI (1921): "Both dele-
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the political use to which that system was assigned, in this new
regime, illustrated what would soon prove to be a manifest change
in the Soviet interpretation of world community jurisprudence.
Almost immediately the new government complained of international law violations by capitalist countries against the Soviet
Union t
In the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs 5 an elaborate legal
argument, based on the principle of rebus sic stantibus - "a
material change in circumstances," 3 6 was devised to avoid the claims
for payment of the Czarist debts. The Marxists claimed that there
had not only been a shift in government, but that the entire social
doctrine and structure of the nation had changed so greatly that
all rules of state succession were not now applicable.
Marxian
theorists did not admit, however, that such a change would logically also bring into question the state's succession to the rights and
recognition of the former government. 8 In fact, it was not until
after the completion in 1933 of the Litvinov Assignment, which
transferred certain Russian assets in final settlement of claims to
the United States government, that the United States recognized
the new government of the Soviet Union.3 9

gations have to take care of the interests of their citizens according to traditional international law," cited in Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 55 n.1.
34 The revolutionary government of Russia complained of violations of international law by the capitalist states via military intervention. See generally J. CUDABY, ARCHANGEL: THE AMERICAN WAR WITH RussiA (1924).
They also complained of such minor violations as the unauthorized entry of warships into Russian
territorial waters. T. TARACoUZIo, THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
61, 63-64 (1935); also cited in P. CORBETr, supra note 8, at 88 n.8.
3
5 This political unit is roughly comparable to the British Foreign Office and the
United States Department of State.
3
6 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
370n January 28, 1918, Lenin publicly declared that the new Soviet state would
not accept any pre-war obligations signed by the Imperial government. See Snyder &
Bracht, supra note 1, at 55 n.2. They also refused to adhere to treaties signed by the
former Imperial and Kerensky governments. Id. at 55.
38
1t is true, nevertheless, that most of these "rights and recognitions" were based
on territorialcontrol which would not necessarily be affected by an ideological change
in government. An obvious analogy can be drawn to the United States refusal to recognize the revolutionary government of Communist China today.
39
See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Latvian State Cargo & Passenger
S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951). For a discussion of the preLitvinov Assignment (1933) cases in the United States courts where the "unrecognized"
Soviet government was a party, see Aldler, The Unrecognized Government in the Courts
of the United States, 5 VA. J. IN'r'L L. 36, 38-42 (1966). See generally D. BISHOP,
THE ROOSEvELT-ITrVINOV AGREEMENTS: THE AMERICAN VmW (1965).
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THEORETICAL CONCEPTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW

AND THE MARXIST DOCTRINE

From the start, the Soviet jurists were faced with the task of
theoretically reconciling Marxist doctrine with the existing bourgeois institutions of international law.40 Vladimir I. Lenin epitomized his thinking on legal systems in 1916 with the statement:
"A law is a political measure, it is politics."'" As was stated in the
Communist Manifesto (1848): "Political power, properly so called,
is merely the organized power [or means] of one class for oppressing
another. '42 Accordingly, the Leninist interpretation of the Marxist
view regarding bourgeois law4 3 appeared as follows: "Law is the
regulation of the relations between the classes of human society corresponding to the interests of the ruling class and sustained by its
organized force."4 4
A Marxist might define international law as the superstructure
of norms and procedures, in any given society, that are based upon
the economic organization of production and enter into the relationship of this given society with some other state.45 Marx him40 Such a reconciliation was made more difficult by the somewhat obvious tendency
of "bourgeois" institutions, such as capitalistically oriented trade agreements and typically "Western" international laws, to be teleologically self-perpetuating. Note that
"[f]eleology need not necessarily imply that an ultimate end-out-of-view directs change,
but generally the concept is associated with the doctrine that 'goals or ends of activity
are dynamic agents in their own realizations."' 0. LEwIS, MODERN SYSTEMS THEORY
AND JUDICIAL BEHAVIORALISM 20 n.114 (tent. ed. 1968), citing E. NAGEL, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 402 (1961). See also C. HALL & G. LINDzEY, THEORIES
OF PERSONALITY 96 (1957).
41 1 J.HAZARD & I. SHAPIRO, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (1962).
4 K. MARX & F. ENGLES, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 32 (S.Beer ed. 1955).
43 But do not quarrel with us measuring the abolition of civil property by your

bourgeois ideas about freedom, education, law, etc. Your very ideas are products of the bourgeois relations of production and property, just as your law
is but the will of your class raised to a legal norm, a will the contents of which
reflect the material conditions of life of your class. F. BORKENAU, KARL
MARX 112 (German ed. 1956), cited in Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at
56 n.3.
44 Ordinance on Penal Law of the People's Commissar for Justice of the R.S.F.S.R.
of 1919, § 1, cited in Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 56 n.4.
45 p. CORBETr, supra note 8, at 89-90. See also T. TARACOUZlO, supra note 34,
at 12-13; J.HAZARD & I. SHAPIRO, supra note 41, vol. 1, at 3-6, vol. 3, at 3.
A comparative Western definition of international law might be:
[That] system of jurisprudence consisting of general principles of right,
equity, and humanitarianism, founded upon established customs and acts of
states and upon international agreements not inconsistent with standards of
justice which Christian and civilized states recognize as obligatory in their
relations and dealings with each other as well as with the citizens and subjects
of each. A. THOMAS, COMMUNISM VERSUS INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1953).
For a series of definitions of international law, see 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
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self defined the "state" as the instrument of, the political power
with which the dominant class controls the other classes,46 but
he claimed that this definition applied only to "bourgeois" states.
Perhaps, however, it applies in an even greater sense to communist
47
states.
The Soviet view that the dominant class creates and sustains
law as an instrument of the state for controlling the- subordinate
class or classes is decidedly in conflict with the general theory of
law avowed by most states.4 To the more developed Western
Nations, as opposed to the "have-nots" or less developed countries,
it seems obvious that there is no such thing as an international
society divided, across national lines, into exploiting and exploited
classes.49 Therefore,. the second part of the above suggested Marxist definition of international law, using Marx's own definition
of "state," seems to resist application to a law of nations, for in
reality - albeit Western reality - the norms and principles of
international law apply to the conduct of persons acting for states
regardless of their class background.
The Marxist-Leninist theory of international law"0 is basically
that of the sociological school of jurisprudence. 5 ' Marx and Lenin
INTERNATIONAL LAw 1-3 (1940).
See also von
national Law, 43 AM. J. INTL L. 435 (1949).
46

Verdross, On the Concept of Inter-

K. MARx, THE GENERAL LAW OF CAPITALIST ACCUMULATION 92 (S. Beer

ed. 1955).
Communism has, in fact, taken on precisely the form of state capitalism that Marx so bitterly criticized. The political leaders determine both
the nature of the economy and the purposes for which it is to be used; the'
economy does not function independently of the political sector in response
to the consumer demand on the market. That is why the Soviet Union is
usually referred to as a totalitarian state. The Communist Party controls all
phases of life: economic, social, cultural, scientific, and spiritual. In this
system, there are - as Marx foresaw - no political channels through which
the subjected masses can seek amelioration of their political, economic, and
social grievances. J. SPANIER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD
WAR II at 267 (2d rev. ed. 1965).
48p. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 90; T. TARAcOUZIO, supra note 34, at 12.
49 p. CORBTTr, supra note 8, at 90.
50
See A. THOMAS, supra note 45, at 48-49. See generally T. TARAcouzio, supra
note 34, at 12-25.
51
In this school of jurisprudence are the "positivists," or those who regard the practice of the states as the only source of law. Opposed to these theorists are the "naturalists," who regard some fundamental norms of right conduct appealing to the mentality
of mankind as the source of law. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 2, at 36-37, 49-54; T.
TARAcouzio, supra note 34, at 12-14; A. THOMAS, supra note 45, at 15, citing W.
ROBSON, CIVLIZATION AND GROWTH OF LAW 25 (1935).
For a brief general discussion of the early naturalists and positivists, see A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 18, at
112-25. See also Kelsen, Plato and the Doctrine of Natural Law, 14 VAND. L. REV.
47 Soviet
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were concerned with the ends of laws, the underlying functions,
rather than the means, or in more Marxian terminology, the end
justifying the means. This school of jurisprudence views law as an
institution requiring a society; and that society is itself, by habit
or avoidance of anarchy, a compulsion for its members to obey
the law. The Marxist-Leninists go along with this theory, for they
view social stratification and class structure as the basis of bourgeois
society and feel that law is the product of the ruling class. For example, a societal-progression might be as follows: first, individuals
group for some purpose (food gathering, common shelter, mutual
protection) ;52 second, the way in which the persons within this "society" interact establishes rules and "laws"; then, once the laws are
established, they are perpetuated by the "rulers" of the group in
order to maintain the on-going function of the society as such and
also to maintain their own position as the "ruling class." In the
pure communist state, which has progressed beyond mere socialism," there would be no classes and therefore no class antagonisms
and therefore no need for the "bourgeois" laws to maintain the ruling class.Paradoxically, Soviet international law, in its attempt to achieve
a pure communist state, has relied more on the customary international practices of the rest of the world than on inherent Soviet
ideological constructs. As a new government the Soviets used the
bourgeois institutions of international law to their own benefit,
and yet theoretically they could not accept these institutions in
toto for they were derived from, and structured toward, a class
society. Logically, in the true communist state there should be no
23 (1960); Book Review, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 349 (1965). See generally A.
D'ENTR-VES, NATURAL LAW: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY (1952).
Since a Marxist cannot conceive of an ideal law uniform for all classes, the naturalist theory is fundamentally incompatible with the Marxian political philosophy.
Hence, the Soviets appear to have accepted the positivist theory by way of compromise.
T. TARAcouzIo, supra note 34, at 12.
52 "Man can not fight or live outside of society. This is his immutable characteristic, one which Aristotle noted and explained, calling it 'political being.'" M. DJILAS,
THE NEW CLASS 157 (1957); see THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 111 (E.Barker trans.
& ed. 1962).
53 See note 56 infra.
54 But note: "Ideological exclusiveness and intolerance are intensified after the [social] revolution. Even when it is able to reduce physical oppression, the tendency of
the ruling party [that is, the new class of ruling bureaucrats] is to strengthen the prescribed ideology - Marxism-Leninism." M. DJILAS, supra note 52, at 27. "[A] more
detailed analysis will show that only a special stratum of bureaucrats, those who are
not administrative officials, make up the core of the governing bureaucracy, or, in my
terminology, of the new class." Id. at 43. For a discussion of this new class, see note
59 infra & accompanying text.
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need for law enforcement because there will be no class antagonism, but the capitalist states with their inherent class antagonism
must have strong enforcement in order to secure obedience to the
law. 55 Therefore, almost in a manner of justification, Lenin
expressed the belief that law was an instrument to be used in
stabilizing society. Once the society had been stabilized, law was
to be transferred from a means to an achieved end, there no longer
being a need for law enforcement. 56 All too obvious in Lenin's
construct is the nationalistic assumption that Russia is politically
capable of implementing the means, derived essentially from bourgeois institutions, and that the capitalist states are not capable of
such implementation. This leads us to the Soviet Dilemma, which
is the result of the polarization of Western and Soviet views of
international law, each differing in values and approaches due to
the opposing ideological beliefs.
IV.

THE SOVIET DILEMMA

Since the Revolution of 1917, Soviet legal theorists have attempted to solve the dilemma of a world community of diametri55 One need only reflect on the recent race riots and poverty marches in the United

States and the working men's strikes in France, all of which can be viewed as manifestations of the inherent class antagonisms and insensitivities of capitalist oriented
sodo-political systems.
"The war in Vietnam has brought to the surface the latent ugliness in American
life - the scorn for the weak and racially diverse, the acceptance of violence as something normal, the lack of imagination about the suffering of others - in short, a profound emotional and ethical insensitivity." Hughes, in Symposium: What's Happening
to America, 34 PARTISAN REV. 13, 26 (1967). See also Hoover, Violence in American Society - A Problem of Critical Concern, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 407 (1967).
56
Lenin believed the new state would go through two stages towards stabilization
after the revolution of the proletariat The first stage would be that of socialism. In
this stage the state would be reconstructed using the old machinery of bourgeois institutions. The nation would be one big workshop and office of controlled production,
where each man's pay would equal the amount of work he did. The second stage, that
of true communism, would occur after some prosperity when controls could be eased.
There would be more abundance, the affect of capitalists would be nil, and, therefore,
prices would not need to be high. In this second phase a man's pay would now equal
his needs, and since theoretically this would alleviate all want, there would be no economic deprivation and no need for a police state. Lenin and Marx's only error was,
perhaps, in misjudging man's basically aggressive nature. See R. HEILBRONER, THB
WORLDLY PHLOSOPHERS 119-23, 129-42 (rev. ed. 1961). For a discussion of man's
aggressive nature, see note 240 infra & accompanying text.
To date, Soviet Communism . . . has passed through three phases....
The three phases are: revolutionary, dogmatic, and non-dogmatic Communism. Roughly speaking, the principal catch-words, aims, and personalities
corresponding to these various phases are: Revolution, or the usurpation of
power - Lenin. "Socialism," or the building of the system - Stalin.
"Legality," or stabilization of the system - "collective leadership." M.
DJIAS, supra note 52, at 167-68.
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cally opposed social orders having a typically "bourgeois" or Western class origin for the international law of that world community.
The functional problem with international law, which has caused
the Soviet's dilemma, arose in the attempt to co-ordinate different
social systems, namely the Western and the Communist, into a
single working international order. One writer has succinctly stated
the Soviet dilemma as follows:
Theoretically the communist conception of law as a law of inequality, of the state as a struggle of classes, and of international relations as a mutual cooperation of toiling masses in their common
opposition to capitalism, results in a novel interpretation of international law as a provisional inter-class law which aims to further
the interests of organized national laboring classes in their common
struggle for proletarian world supremacy. Thus defined, interna-

tional law does not fall within the scope of so-called natural law,
nor is it a strictly legal science. It is not applicable to the intercourse of states exclusively, yet it does not allow individuals to become the sole persons in international law.58

The new social order in communist states, as in the Soviet
Union, has set these nations apart from the other members of the
international community.59 The Bolshevists have been too real57 p. CORBE=r,
58
59

supra note 8, at 90.
T. TARAcouzio, supra note 34, at 12.

But note:
[The Communist revolution] was the first revolution in history in which the
revolutionaries not only remain on the political scene after victory but, in
the most practical sense build social relationships completely contrary to those
in which they believed and which they promised. The Communist revolution, in the course of its later industrial duration and transformation, converts
the revolutionaries themselves into creators and masters of a new social state.
M. DJILAS, supra note 52, at 33.
"Ownership is nothing other than the right of profit and control. If one defines class
benefits by this right, the Communist states have seen, in the final analysis, the origin
of a new form of ownership or of a new -rulingand exploiting class." Id. at 35 (emphasis added). "More than anything else, the essential aspect of contemporary Communism is the new class of owners and exploiters." Id. at 58 (emphasis added). See
also N. Popovic, YUGOSLAVIA: THE NEw CLASS IN CRISIS (1968).
After 9 years in prison for publishing his political ideas and criticisms of the Communist state, Milovan Djilas was released in 1967. The following is an excerpt from
an interview after his release:
[Djilas] was asked if his thinking had changed.
"My ideas are not so black and white as before," he said, in clear but
hesitant English. "Even 'The New Class' - I find something dogmatic about
it. When I wrote it I had a vision of people fighting with banners and helmets to eliminate the evils that had grown up here and to restore a perfect
society."
And now? ...
"When I write a book about my ideas ['The Imperfect Society'] is what
I will call it. 'The Imperfect Society' - that is, the ideal, imperfect, normal,
with free development, with conflicts and troubles." ...
"What is the way in which change must occur in Yugoslavia?" He
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istic to openly deny the possibility (and often desirability) of compromise with the Western powers and the Western bourgeois concepts of international law. Hence, the dilemma has been whether
to boycott or to collaborate with the Western Nations, or in legal
terms, whether international law should be "regarded as essentially
bound to certain general principles of internal order which are
characteristic of the majority of states, or interpretated as 'systemneutral' so that there is a place within its framework for any social
structure known at the present time." 60 More simply stated, the
problem for the Soviets has, been whether to initiate their' own
principles of international law or to go along with the standards
accepted by those states which differ from their own fundamental
socio-political outlook.6
Some sociologists rather abstractly contend that there are certain standards of municipal order which provide the only firm
basis for that' economic intercourse upon which the international
community exists as an inter-related entity. 62 While this statement
summed up in a manner quite unlike that of the impetuous rebel of 10 years
ago.
"We cannot think of a revolution for democracy here. I would put it
this way: society must go nervously forward." N.Y. Times, April 2, 1967,
at 20, cols. 1-4 (city ed.).
The recent developments in Czechoslovakia and other Soviet satellite countries have
certainly been "nervous" steps in some 'direction. See Djilas, Yugoslovia Determined
to Defy New Soviet Pressure, Times, London, Oct. 11, 1968, at 11, cols. 4-6; Schuster,
Djilas is Hopeful on LiberalTrend, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1968, at 7, col. 1.
00 R. SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY 273 (1946).
61
Itcould be questioned at this point whether the Soviet Union tacitly recognizes
the soundness of (or lack of a workable alternative to) bourgeois institutions when it
".refuses" to initiate its own principles which could lead more readily into that true
communist state. Perhaps the Soviets are merely recognizing the sociological nature
of man and the similarity of that nature throughout the world. But see critique of
Marx's sociological theory in note 62 infra.
62
See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 60, at 274.
Although stressing the [Hegelian] idea of the Reality of Change, Marx,
and especially Engels, stated that the laws of the objective or material world
were unchangeable and independent of human beings. Marx was certain that
he could discover the basic laws governing life and society, just as Darwin
[and Lamarck] had discovered the laws governing living creatures.... [But,
h]uman society cannot be compared to species of animals or to inanimate objects; it is composed of individuals and groups which are continuously and
consciously active in it, growing and changing. M. DJILAS, supra note 52,
at 2.
Compare with the following statement:
It is thus possible for us to differentiate for purposes of our man-made system of systems, varying levels of systems, and to recognize that the complex
person system is an adaptive system [possessing the ability to interact with
the environment in a manner that is eufunctional for the system's survival]
that exhibits ultrastability [which constitutes the capacity to persist during
"throughput" even though there occurs a change of structure and behavior]
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is perhaps too general, it is apparent that there are many typically
Western standards, such as the principle of private ownership of
property, 63 that are completely unacceptable to Soviet-Marxian theory. The difficulty is that if we were to restrict international legal
concepts to the few firm and general principles which are acceptable to both the capitalist and the communist states, we would
probably find that these general rules would not be definite enough
to regulate even the most unimportant issues of present-day international intercourse. e4
Although the horns of the dilemma are apparent from both
the capitalist and the communist viewpoints, the West sees that
most of the world with which it trades is still basically capitalistic,
and therefore the problem in the Western context is not as immediate as it is in the Soviet context. Within Soviet ideology the
difficulty arises as to how international law as a "superstructure 65
can have a common existence upon fundamentally different social
foundations. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the earlier
Russian theorists were careful to avoid the obvious trap of creating
too many absolute concepts as the basis for their jurisprudence. For
example, the Marxist-Leninist description of the state as a social
institution, an inst'ument of class rule,6 6 does not necessarily describe the state as a subject of international law, or as a class organization dealing, in its international relations, with other class organizations of a different type.
During the last 50 years, many attempts have been made by
the leading Soviet legal theorists to reconcile traditional internaduring interaction with various systems operating at different levels of organization . . . . 0. LEwis, supra note 40, at 17 (footnotes omitted).
Ralph Gerard has used a three-by-seven matrix of "Being," "Behaving," "Becoming,"
and "Society," "Community," "Group," "Individual," "Organ," "Cell," "Molecule,"
as a useful scheme for reflecting the complexity in the systems model needed at differing emergence levels. See Gerard, Units and Concepts of Biology, 125 SCIENcE 429
(1957). See also note 64 infra (general criticism of nomothetic rules) and note 10
supra (Korzybski's "time-binding" principle).
63
See Maggs, The Security of Individually-Owned Property Under Soviet Law, 1961
DuKE L.J. 525 (1961).
64 This may be true, however, only because these nomothetic rules are not founded
upon the most basic empirical standards that allow men to interact within a group.
This conceptual approach is developed more fully in text accompanying notes 357-85
infra. See note 62 supra.
The terms "nomothetic" and "idiographic," originally coined by W. Windelband,
are now frequently used to differentiate the general or law-like from the individual or
unique. See G. ALLPoRT, PATERN AND GROWTH IN PERSONALITY 8-9 (1961).
65 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
66
K. MARX & F. ENGELS, supra note 42, at 32; see note 44 supra & accompanying
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tional law with Marxian doctrine. First Yevgeni A. Korovin,
then Yevgenii B. Pashukanis, later Andrei Ya. Vyshinskii, and
finally Grigori I. Tunkin tried to solve this dilemma.
A. Yevgeni A. Korovin: The Transitional Period and Constant
Compromise
Following the Revolution, the first phase in the development
of Soviet international jurisprudence was a realistic conception of
state sovereignty, with the exception that ruling classes were taken
to be characteristic of the state "personality" instead of the ruling
figures or the prevalent ideology.67 Professor Yevgeni A. Korovin, the Soviet spokesman for international law in the post-revolutionary period, published a short monograph in 1924 entitled The
International Law of the Transitional Period.68 Therein, Korovin
pointed out that from a Marxist view natural law theory69 is inappropriate as a basis for international law, since a communist can
neither recognize a law constituting a "supra-class" order, nor a
compromise sanctioning the exploitation of labor by capitalists in
non-communist countries.70
This first phase of development can be termed realistic, for
the Soviet jurists did feel that a partial international legal community was possible if based upon the common recognition of
values that were not limited by sharply defined political and social
forms.71 Under Marxist ideology, the new Soviet state would pass
67

A monarchical king and in some circumstances a nation's president would constitute the ruling personalities or figures, while, on the other hand, "democracy" could
be taken as an ideology that is characteristic of a state personality.
68
YE. KOROVIN, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO PEREXHODNOGO VREMENI (2d ed.
1924), cited in P. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 91 n.11; J. TRiSKA & D. FINLEY, SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY 396 n.4 (1968); Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 56 n.5.
The transitional period was roughly from the end of the Czarist regime to the beginning of the governing proletariat (1905 to 1924 or thereabouts).
69 See note 51 supra & accompanying text.
70
T. TARACOuZIO, supra note 34, at 278. Korovin, in speaking of the International Labor Office, stated:
An organization believing in an illusory possibility of peaceful co6peration between [different] classes (the exploited and the exploiting) and in the
possibility of solving social problems of a capitalistic economic order by an
evolutionary process, is nothing but a bridge between the bourgeoisie and the
"heads" of the bureaucratic professional unions, and [as such] a means to
overshadow the class consciousness of the toiling masses. Id. at 278, citing

YE.

KOROviN, SOVREMENNOE MUZHDUNARODNOE PUBLICHNOE PRAVO
[CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAw) 128 (1926); also cited in
J. TRISKA & D. FINLEY, supra note 68, at 404 n.16.

For an extensive treatise on "functionalism" and the International Labor Organization,

see E.

HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION STATE
71 p. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 91.

(1964).
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through a series of phases: from the capitalist system to socialism
and finally on to true communism.72 It is in this respect that the
principles underlying the first Soviet view of international law
were necessarily transitional in character. Korovin tried to fit
theoretical practices of Soviet relations with the outside Western
world into a workable program that would not be "too patently
heretical for Marxists. ' 73 His attempts ultimately led him to an
audacious pluralistic theory, in which he hypothesized that international law was nothing but the sum of several circles, differing
among themselves and almost wholly separated from one another.
The first circle consisted of that law controlling the reciprocal relations of the European states; the second circle was that of American
international law; the third circle was made up of both the sum of
several smaller circles destined for the second-class states (for example, the regime of national minorities) and that subcircle of legal
systems governing relations between the capitalist states and their
colonies or semi-colonies; and, lastly, the fourth circle consisted of
those special relations between "the socialist state and its bourgeois
74
partners."
Being politically unable to openly admit the subjection of the
new socialist state to an established capitalistic law of nations,
Korovin ran into a conceptualistic iceberg. He was now forced to
substantiate the existence of what would basically be a Soviet system
of international law. Through his pluralistic theory, the Soviet
spokesman specified four different systems of international law:
European, American, imperial-colonial and their colonies, and the
Soviet-capitalist system. In each of the first three systems, a general solidarity of ideas and interests existed between the dominant
classes which were essentially identical in nature, the states being,
from the Marxist view, the temporary form of class domination. 75
However, such a solidarity of concepts and interests did not exist
between the fourth circle and any of the other circles. Korovin's
insurmountable task was to make the Soviet sphere of international
law a separate but distinct part of the overall international legal
system.
72

See note 56 supra.

P. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 92. "[Korovinj justified application of the traditional rules of international law to relations between the [Soviet State and its capitalistic
neighbours by saying, 'The proletariat did not destroy the old principles of international law but reformed them for its own use.'
Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at
56, citing YE. KOROVIN, supra note 68, at 2.
74 1. LAPENNA, STATE AND LAW: SOVIET AND YUGOSLAV THEORY 22-23 (1964).
75 p. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 92.
73
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Since the state to the Marxist was only the personification of the
dominant class - and it was this class, which, according to Korovin, constituted a person of international law7 6 - the state necessarily becomes a new person of international law each time a new
7
class takes control. 1
Besides the dominant class, personified as the state, Korovin
also recognized worker's associations, some proletarian organizations, the Vatican, the League of Nations, international unions
and commissions, the Red Cross, and primitive peoples as persons
of international law.7 8 It was this generous view that got Korovin
into trouble, for Stalin was at that time trying to increase the
stature of the Soviet state. Korovin's view of the state, as only the
personification of the dominant class and as only one of the many
persons of international law, greatly reduced, by Marxist standards, the importance of the Soviet state.79
According to Korovin, Soviet international law - which constituted the fourth circle in his spheres of influence theory - during the transitional period was that "system of rules governing
relations between the new [S]oviet State and its capitalistic neighbours"8 0 in the period when the Soviet ruling proletariat would continue to maintain the powerful position of the prior bourgeois
state and its compulsive force in order to suppress the former class
of suppressors.81 The Soviet government used the traditional theory
Id. at 93; see note 78 infra & accompanying text.
this argument Korovin attempted to legally justify the Soviet government's
refusal to pay the debts of the deposed Czars. The Soviets declared that the Czarist
debts were res inter alios gesta - "business among other parties" - and did not have
to be paid because the Revolution had changed Russia's ruling class and had terminated the state's continuity of personality. P. CORBETr, supra note 8, at 92; Snyder &
Bracht, supra note 1, at 58, citing YE. KOROViN, supra note 68, at 112. See notes
35-39 supra & accompanying text. For a thorough explanation of res inter alios gesta
76
7

7 With

as a traditional principle of international law, see R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 60, at
276.
However, this negation of a continuous state personality did not correspond to the

actual political practice of the Soviet government in concurrently attempting to preserve
most of the rights and privileges that had been acquired by the former Russian regime.
The new government even preserved some of the rights which were blatantly incompatible with the principles of Marxist-Leninist theory, as in the case of capitulations in
Iran and China. See J. CuRTIs, EssAYS IN RussIAN AND SOVIT IsTORY 270-82
(J. Curds ed. 1963).
78p. CORBETr, supra note 8, at 93, citing YE. KOROVIN, supra note 68, at 33-34;
YE. KOROVlN, supra note 70, at 19-23.

79 p. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 93.
80 Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 57, citing YE. KOROvIN, supra note 68, at 8.

81 Snyder & Brachr, supra note 1, at 56-57, citing V. LENIN, State and Revolution,
in 2 COLLECTED WORS 175 (German ed. 1947). See notes 52-53 supra & accompanying text.
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of sovereignty as a justification for protecting itself against being
overpowered by its capitalist neighbors. "As long as a bourgeois
encirclement exists outside the boundaries of the Soviet Union,
every limitation of sovereignty would appear as a greater or
smaller victory over the community of the socialistic society." s2
The transitional period and the limited use of strictly Soviet
international law, as outlined by Korovin, would last so long as
there was a "bourgeois encirclement of the Soviet state." Thus, in
an effort to appease Stalin, Korovin went one step beyond Lenin,
who had earlier prophesied that the temporarily incorporated bourgeois institutions of "state" and of "law" would soon fade away in
the Soviet Union.as Korovin now conditioned the fading away of
Soviet international law upon the precedent removal of the existing
capitalistic encirclement. Stalin later employed this same argument
to justify the continued use of the bourgeois legal institutions even
after the state of socialism had been attained by the Soviet Union.
While identifying ruling classes and states as subjects of this
temporary Soviet international law, Korovin assumed a community
of ideology, such as might exist between identical classes in various
countries, to be the necessary basis of international law. 4 Moreover, since he also viewed international law as the means for balancing aggressive powers,88 treaties were stressed as the only reliable
source or indicia of international law.8 6
Korovin's view of legal relations between states as direct relations between the ruling classes of those states was sharply criticized by his successor, Yevgenii B. Pashukanis. Korovin's theory pre82 YE. KOROVIN, supra note 68, at 43, cited in Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 58.
83 See notes 55-56 supra & accompanying text.
84 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
85 "[Rleal international law can only arise where there is one power meeting another power with force." YE. KOROVIN, supra note 68, at 7, cited in Snyder & Bracht,
supra note 1, at 56 n.8.
86
Thus, "customary" sources of international law were relegated to an inferior
position. YE. KOROVIN, supra note 68, at 24.
So much stress was laid on the importance of the treaty as a source of international law that strict obedience to the principle of pacta sunt servanda
was enjoined. There was but one exception to this rule. Just as one legal
order (for example, that of time of peace) might be replaced by one contrary
to it (that of time of war), [e.g., killing a human being in peacetime is a
crime; omission of such a killing, on the other hand, may become a crime in
wartime,) there might come a time in the life of a nation when one legal
order might be replaced by another of an entirely different type. This acknowledgment of clausula rebus sic stantibus was confined, however, to the
sole situation in which a social revolution in a State completely changed the
social order. Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 58 (footnote inserted), citing
YE. KOROVIN, supra note 68, at 112.
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supposed the existence of an ideology common to both the German
capitalists and the Russian working class, 7 and, as Pashukanis was
to point out, this must mean interclass law, "a doctrine which,
after an earlier provisional acceptance, [was] soon recognized as
anti-Marxist.""8
Korovin soon found it necessary to abandon his concept of
multiple systems of international law and the diversity of persons
subject to it. In Korovin's case it was easier for the Soviet government to completely reject his theses and temporarily retire the
theoretician than to reconcile his theories with the shift in Stalin's
political outlook. Thus, he became obliged to disregard his own
theories and interpretations of Soviet international relations during
the transitional period and assume the new theory and interpretation that this period was one of constant compromise between antagonistic classes.89 This new interpretation clearly reflected the
shift in Soviet political and economic tactics of Lenin and Stalin in
their New Economic Policy for reviving the Soviet Union's economy
through close co-operation in trade with capitalistic countries.90
Constant compromise was necessary to effectuate such economic cooperation.
The demise of Korovin was greatly brought about by the criticisms of Yevgenii B. Pashukanis 1
87
For a discussion of "Soviet Foreign Policy 1922-32, Russian-German Relations
after Rapallo," see G. VON RAUcH, A HISTORY OF SovIET RussiA 191-99 (1957).
88 p. CORBETE, supra note 8, at 92-93.
Ironically, Pashukanis himself would later
be attacked for this same reason. See text accompanying note 121 infra.
89
This interpretation corresponds with Crane Brinton's "Rule of the Moderates"
and "Accession of the Extremists" periods. C. BRiNTON, ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION
143-46, 155-84 (1952).
90
See R. SCHLESiNGER, supra note 60, at 279; Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at
58-59.
With the New Economic Policy of 1921 began Russia's Thermidor[ean Reaction]. Lenin's death and the subsequent rivalry between Stalin and Trotsky
led up to a second crisis, or rather relapse during convalescence, which we may
date at the more acute periods of violent enforcement of the First Five Year
Plan [beginning in 1928]. C. BRINTON, supra note 89, at 217.
In Stalin's victory Trotsky saw the Thermidoric reaction against the revolution, actually the bureaucratic corruption of the Soviet government and the
revolutionary cause.... Trotsky was the first, although he was not aware
of it, who in the attempt to save the Communist movement discovered the
essence of contemporary Communism ....
The Soviet Thermidor of Stalin
had not only led to the installation of a government more despotic than the
previous one, but also to the installation of a [new] class. M. DJILAS, supra
note 52, at 51.
See also note 123 infra.
91 For a discussion of other critics of Korovin, mainly Sabanin and Hrabar, see Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 59-60. "However, both Sabanin and Hrabar later suffered the fate of being called 'bourgeois theoreticians.' They were reproached for
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Yevgenii B. Pashukanis: International Law as a Weapon of
Class Struggle

In 1925 Yevgenii B. Pashukanis, a professor of law at Moscow University, published an article on international law in the
Encyclopaedia of State and Law of the Communist Academy in
Moscow. 2 Although he appeared to be a more stringent Marxist
than Korovin, Pashukanis depicted the essence of international law
during the transitional period as that of temporary compromise.
He gained perspective into the historical nature of the transitional
period from the continuing "struggle of the capitalist States among
themselves. '9 3 The appearance of a Soviet state on the political
scene, as he saw it, caused international law to become a constant
compromise between the two antagonistic societies. This compromise, however, would last only so long as "the capitalistic system of
international law was able to maintain a dominant power position
in the community of nations." 4
While Pashukanis was achieving a foothold on the position of
Soviet jurisprudential spokesman, the dominant ruling personality
of Russia was also undergoing a change. After Lenin's death in
1924, Stalin began the development of a new theory of socialism
which greatly influenced political and legal thought in the Soviet
Union and also the Soviet concept of international law."
Stalin maintained that it was no longer necessary to adhere to
the belief that final victory over capitalism could only be brought
about by a world-wide co-operation of all proletarians. Such a view
had been asserted by Trotsky and the left wing of the Russian
Communist Party. In Stalin's opinion experience had proven that
a socialist victory might first be achieved in one country only. For
this reason, he felt it urgently necessary to secure a final socialist
victory in Russia, using every available means.96
having denied any qualitative difference between the international relations of the [S]oviet State and the 'normal' relations between capitalistic countries." Id. at 60, citing
0 burzhuaznykh vlianiakh v sovietskoy literaturye mezhdunarodnovo prava [On Bourgeois Influences in the Soviet Literature of International Law] (1930), in CALvEs,
DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET SOUVERAINkrT EN URSS 99 n.2 (1953).
92 Pashukanis, Mezhdunarodnoye pravo [InternationalLaw], in 2 ENTIsKLOPEDIIA
GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA 857 (1925).
93 Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 61, citing Pashukanis, supra note 92, at 862.
94 Id. See also note 215 infra & accompanying text.
95 In 1924 Stalin developed his theory of new socialism in a series of lectures on
the bases of Leninism given at the Sverdlow University in Moscow. See J. STALIN, On
the Bases of Leninism, in QUESTIONS OF LENINISM (German ed. 1947).
96 Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 61, citing J. STALIN, supra note 95, at 37.
Stalin's theory was embraced in a resolution of the XlVth Party Conference of the Russian Communist Party, On the Task of the Comintern and of the Communist Party in
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Now Soviet theorists of international law were faced with the
task of "finding legal expression for these new ideas and aspirations
of a general [S]oviet policy; and of justifying and rationalising them
in the international relations of the [S]oviet State with its capital97
istic neighbours."
Pashukanis sought to fill the void which had been created by
the development of Stalin's new policy. In 1935 he published a
textbook on international law,98 in which he sharply criticized not
only Korovin's original theories, but his own as well. In this work,
Pashukanis developed a new theory by which international law was
not considered the expression of a common ideology, 9 but rather
it was an instrument used in the struggles between disputing

states, including states differing in economic and social systems. 100
Consonant with this basic tenet, opposing socio-political systems
could avail themselves of international legal forms and principles
in pursuance of their own ends. This strictly pragmatic view was,
perhaps, an overstatement of the national policy arguments that
have been used by all countries to justify their international actions.
Bending under Pashukanis' sharp criticism, Korovin completely
rejected his former theory of an international law of the transitional
period. The deposed Soviet spokesman publicly confessed that
there were "many mistakes in his former theory because of ...bour-

geois influences which at that time were still prevailing."'' 1 Korovin further abased himself for not having realized the essential
characteristics of international law at that stage of its historical development. Recalling that he had developed a theory of "superimperialism," he acknowledged that his greatest oversight had been
in failing to recognize the legal nature of the state as the only subject of international law, and he discredited himself for having supplanted the state as the subject of international law with classes and
other interest groups. 0
Russia, in April 1924. Snyder & Bracht, id. at 61, citing J. STALIN, supra not 95, at
10.
97 Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 61.
98

YE. PASHUKANIS, OCHERKI PO MEZHDUNARODNOMU PRAVU [Treaties on In-

ternational Law) (Moscow 1935), cited in P. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 94 n.17; J.
TRISKA & D. FINLEY, supra note 68, at 397 n.6; Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at
62 n.37.
9
9 See text accompanying note 84 supra.
10o p. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 95.

'0 1 Korovin, Pisma k Redaktsiyu [Letter to the Editor], SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO
[THE SOVIET STATE], May 9, 1935, cited in Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 62 n.35.
102 Snyder & Brach, supra note 1, at 62.
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Korovin's self-purgation at this time would later allow him to
regain much of his jurisprudential eminence in the Soviet Union.
His self-criticism clearly reflected Stalin's new socialistic policies
and added credence to Pashukanis' attempts to conform Soviet international legal theory to the new Soviet policy.
Pashukanis gave a fairly accurate assessment of the role that
legal institutions and norms play in the foreign policy of governments in general. They are used, he said, as weapons in the continuous struggle of both world classes against each other. To express the basic problem of international law enforcement, he reiterated Lenin's proposition that "[llaw is nothing without a mechanism capable of compelling the observance of legal norms."'1 3
Pashukanis syllogized that international law, therefore, must be
regarded as nothing, since no mechanism exists such as would compel obedience to the norms of these laws0 4 - no legal system has
meaning in itself, apart from the forces and sanctions behind that
system. '" But these forces (and lack thereof) can be limitations
on the purposeful functions of international law. 06 Hence, he felt
that the purpose of the Soviet science of international law was to
insure the government a full knowledge of these essential limitations so that Soviet diplomacy 0 7 might have full use of this knowl08
edge as an auxiliary weapon.1
103H. BABB, SOVIET L1EGAL PHILOSOPHY 244 (H. Babb ed. 1951).

104 According to Pashukanis, "[n]o legal formula, however solemnly proclaimed,
has meaning in itself, apart from the relation of forces behind it. Thus, everyone should
know that treaties of nonaggression or neutrality provide no guarantee that the Soviet
Union will not be attacked." P. CoRBETr, supra note 8, at 95. In a sense, this argument underlies the continuing nature of the Russian Revolution and provides the
Soviet rationale for the delay in the attainment of the true Communist state. See note
56 supra; text accompanying note 116 infra.
105 This is a bastardization of the positivist theory discussed in note 51 supra.
106 For example, future-directed functions such as "world peace through world law"
and "self-determination for all peoples."
107 Vyacheslav M. Molotov, for many years Soviet Foreign Minister, wrote in 1913:
"A diplomat's words must have no relation to action - otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the
concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or
iron wood." A. NEvINS, THE GATEWAY TO HISTORY 198 (1962). This same "remarkable skill in duplicity" can also be found in the behavior of the Soviet legal theorists.
108 "Law he insists, is one of the weapons of class struggle, one of the forms of the
politics practiced by the ruling class." P. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 96, citing YE.
PASHUKANIS, supra note 98, at 16.
According to Pashukanis,
[t]he . . . task is the practical one of giving Soviet society a concise account
of the forms and institutions of international law which the organs of the
proletarian government can use. This will arm it for the defense of the in-
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Pashukanis condemned the formal and scholastic international
legal doctrines which were still current in Russia. These, he said,
were the result of the "surviving influences of bourgeois-juristic
methodology, in which law is treated as an independent essence. ' 1' °9
Stressing nationalism, Pashukanis stated that "[i~nstead of abstract
scholastic attempts to construct systems of 'international law of the
transitional period,' Soviet internationalists should make it their
task to learn and publicize the practice of the Soviet State and,
from the basic principles of its foreign policy, formulate its international-law positions."' 10 He rejected Korovin's idea that international intercourse presupposes some community of values or similarity of economic systems and social orders. "In our epoch," he
claimed, "international law is a means of struggle [- a class weapon - not only between competing capitalist States, but between
different and opposing economic and social systems.""'
In sum, Pashukanis believed that the norms of international
law were little more than particular and subjective formulations of
the immediate national interests of the governments concerned.
They are only tentative legal propositions and lack the authority to
make them valid. With this new interpretation, Pashukanis reduced
international law to the expediency of using legal arguments as instruments or weapons of national interests, met the demands of the
Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and avoided the touchy
question of how these instruments of policy become rules or principles which influence (and to some extent control) foreign policy."'
Through Pashukanis, the Soviet government sought to establish
a system of rules which would support its demands without compromising the doctrine it was ostensibly following. At this point
in the political game, Russia could not withstand embarrassment in
the prosecution of its aims. "Ordered to meet incompatible requireterests of the Soviet State in its relations with the capitalist

world.

P. CoR-

B=rr, supra at 95.
109 Id. at 96, citing YE. PASHtJKAWIS, supra note 98, at 16.
10 Id.
"' Id.
".2A government committed to the doctrine that the norms of international law
are only formations of government interests could hardly have maintained that these
norms impose obligations. P. CoRBBTr, supra note 8, at 98. See also T. TARAcouzIo,
supra note 34, at 13.
The danger to the stability of international law resulting from embracing
such a view is manifest. The [S]oviet State must be entitled to abrogate
a treaty as soon as a change in its interests makes it necessary. This was because the [Sloviet State must be considered the standard bearer of ideas
which would inherit the future. Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 63, citing
YE. PASHJKANIS, supra note 98, at 160.
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ments, Soviet jurisprudence still squirms on the horns of this dilemma."" 3 While Pashukanis did much to clarify Soviet international law in practice, he only intensified the existing ambiguity of
an integrated superstructure of international law in concept. On
the one hand, he viewed the substance of traditional international
law as bourgeois and, therefore, totally unacceptable for the Soviet
Union. At the same time, however, he maintained that Russia
could still employ the traditional rules of international jurisprudence, not substantively, but in a formal and superficial sense. This
view was partly the basis for Andrei Ya. Vyshinskii's attack on
' 4
Pashukanis' theories as exercises in "legal nihilism.
C. Andrei Ya. Vyshinskii: Period of Revision
In the late-thirties, Soviet jurists were faced once more with the
task of developing another new theory (or a new revision of an old
theory) to meet the changing policy needs of the Soviet government.
This time the theorists had to put forth a system which would effect
a practicable co-ordination of the principle of "withering away of
the bourgeois state and law" within the Soviet Union, as stated by
Marx and Engels," 5 with the economic and political situation at the
time, which required the continuance of this "bourgeois-juristic
methodology" in the relations of the Soviet government with the
outside world. Pashukanis had said that the bourgeois law would
fade away as the capitalist system was replaced in the Soviet Union
and class antagonism ended." 6 The government now required a new
Marxist interpretation which would recognize the continuation, in
at least some degree, of the bourgeois institutions even after the
7
achievement of socialism."
"In 1936 the [Sjoviet State entrenched itself so that it could
weather the vagaries of a long-continued existence." 8 A new Soviet
Constitution, called the "Stalin Constitution," was proclaimed. This
document solidified the strong state system in the Soviet Union and
introduced the democratic principle, "which had played so large a

113 p. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 98.
114

Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 62; see text accompanying notes 121-23 infra.

115 1. LAPENNA,

supra note 74, at 15, 48.

116 P. CoRBET'r, supra note 8, at 99; see text accompanying notes 109-14 supra.
117 See note 56 supra.

118 Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 63.
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role in the Revolution, of election of the supreme legislative body
by direct, equal, universal, and secret suffrage.""1 9
The most important forces behind the political remodeling of
the Soviet regime at this time were considerations of foreign policy.
At a time when the Soviet Union had lost her basic friendly relations with Germany and was wooing the United States and the
former Entente Powers, the Bolsheviks could not well continue to
flaunt the superiority of the [S]oviet system over "bourgeois democracy." It seemed expedient now to develop the thesis that
there was an impending world struggle to the death between
"fascism" and "democracy." . . . Both at home and abroad there
was everything to gain from a change of facade, and nothing to
lose so long as the building itself was not altered. 2 0

Andrei Ya. Vyshinskii, the new Prosecutor-General of the Soviet
state (later to become its representative at the United Nations), became the new spokesman for the party-line jurists. He condemned
119 J. CL.ARKsoN, supra note 2, at 626. For a discussion of the Stalin Constitution,
see id. at 625-32.
In effect the Stalin Constitution only provided for the democratic election of candidates who had been nominated by organizations in which the Communist Party was
"the directing kernel." Stalin made no bones about the meaning of "democracy" under
the new Constitution:
I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution actually leaves in force
the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it leaves unchanged
the present guiding position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. If
our respected critics think this a fault of the draft of the Constitution, then we
can only regret it. We Bolsheviks think it a merit of the draft of the Constitution. Id. at 627, citing Stalin, Report on the Draft Constitution of the
U.S.S.R., Part IV, Pravda, Nov. 26, 1936.
The Soviet position is not too far distant from Jules Feiffer's dialog on American
elections:
"First there are the primaries. The primaries are an elimination contest."
"You mean whoever loses is out?"
' No. Whoever runs is out. That leaves the field open to the serious
candidates."
"Who are the serious candidates?"
"The serious candidates are the ones who are so strong they don't have to
take a chance on losing in the primaries."
"How do they come to be that strong?"
"By making deals for delegates with the party bosses."
"You mean the party bosses ignore the wishes of the people?"
"Only the meaningless people. The party bosses carry out the wishes of
the serious people."
"You mean the serious people ignore the meaningless people and decide
on a serious candidate for me to vote for?" "What kind of system do you
call that?"
"Free elections." The Village Voice, July 11, 1968, at 4, cols. 1-5; reprinted in TImo, July 19, 1968, at 13.
2
1 0 C. CLARKsoN, supra note 2, at 625. It is interesting to note the use of the word
"democracy" here and the apparent early alignment with typical Western-type political
theory in opposition to "fascism." See text accompanying notes 248-56 infra; note
119 supra.
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as counter-revolutionaryPashukanis' conception of international law
as an interclass law, a compromise between two class systems. 2'
Pashukanis, he felt, had deformed Soviet jurisprudence with the belief that bourgeois law was to prevail in the transitional period, the
period of proletarian dictatorship, before the bourgeois state had
fully withered away. 2 2 On January 20, 1937, an article in Pravda
described Pashukanis as an enemy of the people who professed legal
nihilism, and by 1938 he had been purged. 2 3 But Vyshinskii was
now faced with the awesome task of developing a theory which
would stabilize socialist law and uphold its existence independent of
the narrow concepts encompassed under the bourgeois headings of
economics and politics. Moreover, in order to maintain the fiction
of the continuity of the Russian Revolution, his overriding consider24
ation had to be the adherence to strict Marxist-Leninist principles.
At the same time, Stalin in his speech at the XVIIIth Party Con121 p. CORBETr, supra note 8, at 99, citing Rappoport, Protiv vrazhdebnikh teorii

nzezhdunarodnogo prava [Against Hostile Theories in International Law], SovErSKOE GOSUDARSTVO, Nos. 1-2, at 92 (1937); quoted in I. LAPENNA, CONCEPTIONS
SOVIrTIQUES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 100-01 (Paris ed. 1954); also cited
in Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 63 n.40.
12 2 P. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 99.
123 Id. at 98, citing Hazard, Introduction to SovIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY at xxix
(Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series 1951), and Editorial Comment, 51 AM.
J. INT'L L. 385 (1957).
The period 1936-1939 was called the "Yezhov period" in Russia, after the head
of the secret police at that time. This was a period of terror and purges in the Soviet
Union. C. BRINTON, supra note 89, at 239. See generally F. BECK & W. GODIN,
RUSSIAN PURGE AND THE EXTRACTION OF CONFESSION (1951).

The latent period

of terror contributed to the theory that the Russian Revolution is a permanent revolution.
Yet it is difficult for us to dismiss the Russian Revolution as really finished ....

In Russia ...

there certainly were after 1921 many signs of the

Thermidorean reaction. But there has been no formal restoration of the old
regime...
To put the matter most simply, it looks to an outsider as if in Russia
something like the Reign of Terror and Virtue, especially in the sense of
continuous pressure on the individual to participate in the common thing,
to be always "at the height of revolutionary circumstances," has been recurrent in Russia. The horrors of enforced collectivization in the countryside in
the early thirties, the trials, confessions, and purges in the years 1936-39 ...
even the current [1952] tightening of the line between East and West exemplified in such phenomena as Lysenkoism [belief in the hereditability of acquired characteristics) and the party line in music and painting, all add up
to something that does indeed seem like "permanent revolution." C. BINTON, supra note 89, at 238-39.
See notes 89-90 supra. For a comment on Lysenkoism, see K. LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 289 (W. Wilson trans. 1963); C. CLARKSON, supra note 2, at 718.
It is interesting to note that Pashukanis as a Soviet jurist has been posthumously
rehabilitated by the Soviet government. See Editorial Comment, 51 AM. J. INT'L L.
385 (1957).
24

1

H.

BERMAN, JUSTICE IN RUSSIA 45 (1950).
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ference, in March 1939, explained that although the Soviet state had
attained socialism, the bourgeois institutions would have to be maintained because of the imminent danger from the capitalistic encirclement. 25 Thus, Soviet jurists had to find an interpretation of international law that would not only be acceptable to Soviet foreign
policy but would also correspond to Stalin's newest ideological expression. Hampering their attempts at such a discovery was the
fact that according to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, law can only
exist where there is an apparatus of compulsion to enforce the observation of its rules. Such an apparatus does not exist in international
1 26
law even today.
Vyshinskii asserted that there was a Soviet system of international law; and, after making slight changes in wording and theoretical justifications, he reproduced with the approval of the government the old theories of Pashukanis.127 "Law is, of course, 'a political category,' Vyshinsk[ii] said. 'At the basis of Soviet law lie the
political and economic interests of the workers and peasants.' 'But
nevertheless it is impossible to reduce law to politics, as it is impossible to identify cause and effect.' ",128 Still, when it came to elabo25

' J. STAIiN, Report to the XVilith Party Congress, in QuEsMnoNs OF LENINIsM
728 (German ed. 1947), cited in Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 64. Note the
comparison between this continuing "imminent danger from the capitalistic encirclement" for the Soviet Union and the continuing state of declared "national emergency"
for the United States. The United States has been in a continuing period of declared
national emergency since President Truman's Proclamation No. 2914 of December
16, 1950. 64 Stat 454 (1950). This proclamation referred to the Korean crisis and
the world menace created by the forces of Communist aggression.
A declared national emergency was accepted by the Second Circuit in 1966 as a valid
basis for the freezing of Cuban-owned assets in the United States. Sardino v. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966). In
this case Judge Friendly stated: "While the courts will not review a determination so
peculiarly within the province of the chief executive, there can hardly be doubt as to
the existence of an emergency today when thousands of United States troops are in action and many more are in readiness around the globe." Id. at 109.
126 Snyder & Brach, supra note 1, at 64, citing 2 V. LmN, SELECrED WoRKs 234
(German ed. 1947), and S. KRYLOV, Les Notions Principales du Droit des Gens. La
Doctrine Sovietque du Droit International de la Haye, in 1 REcuEiL DES COtRS DE
L'ACADiEmE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYB 417 (1947) (Krylov was formerly the Soviet judge on the International Court of Justice).
The Diplomatic Dictionary, an international legal publication edited by
Vyshinsky in 1948 in Moscow, visualized such an apparatus in the self-assistance carried out by various States to suit their own ideas and purposes. Thus
it would be possible to enforce rules of international law as long as they
were generally accepted. Snyder & Brach, supra at 64.
327p. CORBE-T, supra note 8, at 99-100.
See Vyshinskii, Mezhdunarodnoe pravo
i mezhdunarodnaya orfanizatsiya [InternationalLaw and International Organizations),
SovETsKoE cOSuDAtSTVO i PRAVO, No. 1 at 22 (1948), cited in P. Co-BETT, supra
at 100 n.27.
128 H. BERMAN, supra note 124, at 46.
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rating a positive theory of law, and not merely renouncing the negative and nihilistic theories of Pashukanis and his predecessors, Vyshinskii could scarcely get beyond platitudes:
"Our law is the embodiment in statutes of the will of the people,"

he wrote. "In capitalist society reference to the will of the people
serves as a screen which covers the exploitational character of the
bourgeois state. In our conditions the matter is in principle otherwise." "Our laws are the expression of the will of our people as
it directs and creates history under the leadership of the working
class. The will of the working class with us is fused with the will
of the whole people."' 2 9
Such generalities hardly constitute a theory of law, but perhaps this
is why Vyshinskii gained popularity in the government. 130
The claim of Vyshinskii that there was a Soviet system of international law was in vain. There was no general recognition of Soviet international law, and recognition of a law or a principle of international law is essential to its functional use.131 Moreover, each
time the Soviet government referred in their diplomatic notes and
negotiations to international law, they were referring (and still are)
to that general system of law recognized by the Western Nations.'
Indeed, it is doubtful whether the Soviet international law would be
acceptable today even to other Communist States, such as Red China
or Czechoslovakia. 3
129 Id. See also 1 J. HAZARD & I. SHAPIRO, supra note 41, at 7.
130 In 1949 Vyshinskii achieved the high rank of Minister of Foreign Affairs. P.
CORBETr, supra note 8, at 100.
131 See J. BRiERLY, supra note 2, at 41-45.
132 See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
133 On Sino-Soviet relations the following excerpts from a recent Soviet foreign
policy speech by Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko to the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) are especially apropos:
The decisions of party congresses and plenary meetings of the Soviet party's
Central Committee contain a profound and principled appraisal of the splitting and adventuristic position of Mao Tse-tung's group in international
affairs, its provocational, anti-Leninist line in the international Communist
and worker's movement.. . . Everything possible is being done from our
side to prevent a deterioration of state relations with China.
This year the Soviet Government presented concrete proposals to the
Chinese Government on questions of trade, on joint utilization of border rivers
for shipping and on some other questions. But Peking remains deaf to any
initiative reflecting concern for the present and future of Soviet-Chinese relations.
Through the fault of the Peking authorities the volume of Soviet-Chinese
trade has shrunk 95 per cent since 1959 and has reached a trifling size. Cultural ties between our countries, not to mention public contacts, have actually
been severed. ...
It has more than once been said from the Soviet side that we are in favor
of good relations with the United States, in favor of cooperation in solving
topical international problems. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1968, at 12, col. 8.
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During the period of revision, Yevgeni A. Korovin had regained
much of his former influence. Seizing upon the proper Weltanschauung,134 he noted that peaceful co-operation between the Soviet
Union and the capitalistic countries was vitally necessary at this time
and that this fact had been acknowledged by the Soviet government
in accepting the humanitarian principles established at the Hague
Convention on the rules of warfare in 1907, even though these conventions had been signed by the representatives of the Imperial Russian government. 3 5
The Soviet view of international law thus changed in two decades "from a mere temporary compromise to a fundamental and
even active co-operation between the two world systems of property."'1 6 Vyshinskii, during this period, defined international law as
"the collection of rules regulating the relations between States in
the course of their struggle and co-operation, expressing the will of
the ruling classes in these States and protected by compulsion carried out by States individually or collectively."' 137 Although this
definition placed stress on the legal sanctions of international law,
the rules of this law were considered by the Soviets to belong to a
socialistic legal system. Therefore, the Soviet Union would now
exclusively apply socialistic norms in its international legal relations.1

8

The basis of these international legal relations lay in important
international treaties.' 39 Legal effect was conceded not only to inOn American-Chinese-Soviet relations, see note 227 infra. On Czech-Soviet relations,
see text accompanying notes 229-34 infra.
134 Weltanschauung is an ideological world view. Compare with Zeitgeist, defined in note 7 supra.
135 Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 64-65, citing 2 YE. KOROVIN, KRATKY KUrRS
MEEHDUNARODNOVA PRAVA [SHORT COURSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw] 10 (Soviet
Union 1944); also cited by Hazard, The Soviet Union and InternationalLaw, in SOVIET
STUDIES 192 (1950). See note 30 supra.
136 Snyder & Brach, supra note 1, at 65.
137Id. at 70, citing A. VYSHINSKII, VOPROSY MEZHDUNARODNOVO PRAVA I
MEZHDUNARODNOI POLITIKI [QuEsTIONs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY] 480 (1949); also cited by Korovin, SovETsKoE GOSUDARSTOV I
PRAVO [SOV. GOS. I PRAvo], No. 6, at 41 (1954).
Compare with S. KRYLOV, supra

note 126, at 417.
138 Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 65, citing Rappoport, Sushchnost sovremennovo mezhdunarodnovo prava [The Essence of Modern International Law], Soy. Gos.
I PRAVO, No. 1, at 139 (1940), as cited by B. MrnssxER, DIE SOWJEruNION, DIE
BALTISCHEN STATTEN uN DAS V6LxmEuciT 150 (1956).
1

39

Kozhevnikov, InternationalLaw, in GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA 636 (1940).

For an excellent, if not also definitive, treatise on the Soviet's use of treaties, see J.
TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES (1962).
Internationaltreaties and agreements, ever since the first Soviet entry into
foreign relations, have remained the fundamental source and prima facie

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20: 141

ternational practice, a relatively stable concept, but also to de facto
relations between States. These were unstable and subject to
change almost from day to day. On the other hand, international
practice was considered to rest mainly on international custom. 140 ...
Most important was the emphasis placed on the role of the
State in international law. Only those relations in which States
took part as bearers of the highest sovereign rights were considered
legally binding.141 This view clearly revealed the great importance
that modern [Sloviet legal theoreticians attribute to State sovereignty. This conception is a consequence of the official [S]oviet
doctrine of the necessity of the continuation of a strong State in
Russia because of capitalistic encirclement. The old idea of class
struggle was not yet abandoned. 142

D. Grigori I. Tunkin: The Modern Political Instrument
of InternationalLaw
After Vyshinskii's death, Grigori I. Tunkin became the official
spokesman for the Soviet jurists, and the fourth period in the development of a theory of international law in the Soviet Union began. 4 '

The basic interpretation of Soviet legal theory went through no
major changes after Vyshinskii. However, shortly after Stalin's
death in 1953, Tunkin revealed an apparent shift and strengthening

of emphasis onto international law as an instrument of politics, a
tool of achievement for the political state. According to the new
Soviet legal spokesman, international law was not merely a fund of
principles and norms binding upon states. Like all law, it was also
an instrument of policy, which both the socialist and capitalist states
could employ in the execution of their foreign policies. "The generally recognized principles and norms being democratic in essence,
[could] only be used as an instrument of policy within limits deter1' 44
mined by the content of these norms.'
foundation of relations between Soviet Russia and other governments. The
practice of the Soviet government abundantly confirms this fact: in the forty
years of its existence, the Soviet government has concluded over 2,100 treaties,
agreements, and conventions with some 85 partners. Id. at 26.
See also W. FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 33336 (1964); J. TRIsKA & D. FINLEY, supra note 68, at 400-27; Triska, Soviet Treaty
Law: A Quantitative Analysis, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 896 (1964).
140
Kozhevnikov, supra note 139, at 636.
141 Id,
142 Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 65 (foomotes renumbered and rewritten).
143 Note, however, that Tunkin was much favored while Vyshinskii was still living,
but at that time he was not greatly in the public eye because the views he expressed generally conformed to Vyshinskii's.
144 p. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 102, citing Tunkin, Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie i
mezhdunarodnoe pravo [Peaceful Coexistence and International Law], Soy. Gos. I
PRAvO, No. 7, at 11 (1956) (emphasis removed).
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Tunkin maintained that Soviet legal thought had remained constant with the theories of Vyshinskii; but he stressed that there was
a general system of international law, with rules that apply to all
states regardless of their particular social systems. 145 Earlier, in
1951, Tunkin and Vyshinskii had defined this law as the "will of
the ruling classes, expressed in a body of norms, treaty or customary,
regulating the legal relations between States, developed in the
process of their struggle and cooperation and guaranteed by individual or collective State compulsion."' 4 This definition can be
recognized to be, in effect, the same as was put forth by Korovin
and then later Pashukanis, only now the evil words interclass and
compromise had been expurgated. Note, however, that there is an
inconsistency in this definition, if it is correctly translated; Tunkin
is evidently a Marxist and, as such, he should not have permitted
himself to define international law as the will of the ruling classes
and as a general system. A true Marxist would refuse to admit that
the Soviet Union also has a ruling class, 4 7 and it is mere polemics
to assert that there is a general system of international law which
is not by its inherent nature an interclass law.
The Soviet dilemma was now to reconcile international law as
an instrument of Soviet politics with international law as "a body of
rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states
in their relations with one another.' '1 48 In reality (Western and
Eastern), 14 this had been the dilemma since the Soviet government's accession in 1917. However, it was not until the 1950's that
Soviet jurists thought it necessary, and perhaps possible, to make the
full reconciliation in their theory.
V. THE SOVIET'S USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A
WEAPON AND A RECONCILIATION
For the Soviet government, international law is not only an instrument of politics but it may be used as a weapon in the struggles
between states. Russia readily admits that all states utilize interna145 Id., citing Tunkin, supra note 144, at 5-6.
146Id. at 99-100, citing AKADEMIYA NAUK SSSR, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO
[International Law) 5 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as MEZHDUNARODNOE
PRAVO].

Of course they have, but this is beside the point. See, e.g., M. DJILAs, THE
NEW CLASS IN CIUSIS (1968).
See also note 59 supra.
147

NEW CLASS (1957); N. Popovic, YUGOsLAVIA: THE
148J. BRIERLY,

supra note 2, at 1.

149 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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tional law as a weapon. From her vantage point, however, there appears to exist a dichotomy in the respective approaches to such utililization: while the Soviet Union employs international law as a
means for strengthening the "democratic principles of law and peace
in international relations," the capitalistic states use it as a "means of
deceiving the peoples, of concealing imperialist designs of expansion
and aggression."' 150 It is difficult to imagine one integrated body a superstructure - of principles that could encompass such opposed
purposes. 151
A brief glance, in retrospect, at the groping and disjointed development of jurisprudential theories in Russia may reveal the probability and necessity of achieving such an integration. Karl Marx
had viewed the means of production as the basis for regulation of the
material life of a society. In his opinion the various relations of this
production were ". . . the real basis upon which is erected a juridical
and political superstructure and to which certain forms of social
consciousness correspond."' 5 2 Then Stalin, in the early 1950's, promoted the concept of international law as part of a superstructure
over both the capitalistic as well as the socialistic economic basis. 5 '
As the integrated superstructure naturally and eclectically evolved,
according to Soviet ideology, the socialistic basis would eventually replace the capitalistic one and there would then be one true international law which would necessarily have a socialistic character. 5 '
In accordance with the present [S]oviet policy regulating international relations three different types of international law are
supposed to exist. First, a capitalistic system regulating relations
between capitalistic States; second, a socialistic system regulating

relations between socialistic States; and finally, a common system
150 P. CoRBEir, supra note 8, at 101, citing MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO, supra
note 146, at 3. See note 151 infra.
151 Recognizing that such an integrated superstructure has not yet been effected, the
Soviets rationalized their dichotomy by asserting merely that: "Economics and policy,
philosophy and law represent at the present time an area of struggle of the two
camps. . . International law also represents such an area." MEZHDUNARODNOE
PRAvo, supra note 146, at 3-4; translated in Grzybowski, Propagandaand the Soviet
Concept of World Order, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 479, 498 (1966). See also
note 181 infra.
52
1 K. MARX, Preface to ZUR KRITIK DER POLITiSCHEN bKoNoMIE 55 (3d ed.
1909), cited in Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 66 n.56 (emphasis added).
153 J. STALIN, MARZISMUS IN DER SPRACHwISSENSCHAFT 7 (German ed. 1951),
cited in Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 67 n.58. See also R. SCHLESINGER, SOVIET
LEGAL THEORY 19 (1951).
154 Kozhevnikov, Nyckotorye voprosy mezhdunarodnovo pravo (Some Questions
on International Law], Soy. GOs. I PRAVO, No. 6, at 29 (1951), cited in Snyder &
Bracht, supra note 1, at 67 n.65.
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regulating international relations between capitalistic and socialistic
States.155

This threefold concept of international law was adhered to by
Korovin in an article published in 1951.158 However, his views
were sharply attacked the next year when the Soviets proclaimed
that there was but one universal system of international law. Under this system there were said to exist two totally different types
of policy, namely, the policy of the capitalistic as opposed to that of
the socialistic states. 57 Korovin revised his thinking accordingly' 58
and enunciated a new Soviet definition of international law: "The
collection of rules regulating relations between States and protected by them, developed in the course of international cooperation
or struggle and aiming at the satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of States in the interests of ruling classes of these States."' 59
Once again Korovin was criticized, this time for ignoring the Marxist doctrine that law could exist only where there was compulsion
and for failing to mention the will of the ruling class in international
law. 160 In effect, Vyshinskii's definition of international law was to
continue as valid according to the Soviet legal theorists. 61
As was noted above, it is in the writings of Tunkin, in 1956,
that we find the first concrete reconciliation of the Soviet dilemma
appearing in Soviet legal theory. This appearance went along with
Khrushchev's conciliatory tone in Soviet international relations
throughout most of 1956.1"2 In a moderate article titled Peaceful
155 Snyder & Brachr, supra note 1, at 68, citing Kozhevnikov, supra note 154, at 33.
6Korovin, Ob obschepriznannykh normakh mezbdunarodnovo pravo [On Generally Recognized Norms of International Law], Sov. Gos. I PRAVO, No. 9, at 17
15

(1951), cited in Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 68 n.67.
157 Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 68, citing as a -eview of this discussion the
comment by Gaidukov, in Sov. Gos. I PRAVO, No. 7, at 69 (1952).
158 Korovin, Nyckotorye osnovnye voprosy sovremyennoi teorii mnezhdunarodnovo
pravo [Some Basic Questions of the Present Theory of International Law), SOV. GOS. I
PRAVO, No. 6, at 34 (1954), cited in Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 68 n.71.
159 Korovin, supra note 158, at 41, cited in Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 69.
160 Snyder & Bracht, supra note 1, at 70.
[Korovin also] was reproached for having ignored the difference between
national and State sovereignty. State sovereignty was defined as: "Independence of a certain State power from the State power of any other State,
expressed in the right of the State to decide its internal and external affairs
freely according to its own wishes without violating the rights of other States
and the generally acknowledged rules of international law." Id., citing Editorial, Soy. Gos. I PRAvo, No. 5, at 49 (1955).
161 See text accompanying note 137 supra.
16 2 See H. SHAFPER, THE SovIET SYSTBM IN THEORY AND PRACrIcE 177-82 (H.
Shaffer ed. 1965) (excerpt from P. Fredenko, Lenin's Views on War and Peaceful Coexistence, BULLETIN, INsnTuTE FOR TmE STUDY OF THE U.S.S.R. 27-36 (March
1963)).
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Coexistence and InternationalLaw, 163 Tunkin rejected the Western
jurists' view that international law can become real law only with
the development of a world government; for this, he claimed, is
contrary to the laws and principles of Soviet development.'" Tunkin conceded that international law cannot consist solely of socialist
principles, for if it did, capitalist states would not be able to carry on
international relations under it. Being a good ideological Russian,
Tunkin therefore claimed that the present development of international law was under the influence of the Soviets. In part he was
correct, for the capitalist states have had to reconcile their positions
with that of the socialists. 165 But Tunkin also attributed to Soviet
initiative two "great advances" of international law: the prohibition
of aggressive war and the reinforcement and extension of the Hegelian principle of national self-determination. 66 The thrust of Tunkin's claims may be interpreted as an attempt to obviate the seeming
necessity of affording capitalist ideologies a substantial place in the
integration of that superstructure which is international law.
In order to justify both its jurisprudential theories and the concurrent political positions, Soviet doctrine has often made much of
sovereignty and self-determination. It is with these terms that the
Soviets rationalized the repression of Hungary in 1956.16' The
Hungarian tragedy stands out as just one among many of the Soviet
Union's uses of international law solely as a tool or weapon for self68
aggrandizement.

From 1956 on, we find the Soviet jurists agreeing more and
more in theory with what occurs in practice. The dilemma of a
world divided between two great socio-political systems is still present; but, due to the conciliatory utilization of international law as a
weapon, the issue of projecting an integrated superstructure of international law has lost its immediacy.'

6

163 Tunkin, supra note 144, at 5. See P. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 102.
164 P. CORBETr, supra note 8, at 102.
165 This is more fully discussed in text accompanying notes 269-95 infra.
166 Tunkin, supra note 163, at 7-8, cited in P. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 103. See
also Korovin, supra note 158, at 38-41, cited in P. CORBETT, supra note 8, at 103 n.34.
167 p. CORBE'T, supra note 8, at 103-04.
168 See W. WALSH, RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION 520, 522 (1958). For an
excellent discussion of a recent attempt by the Soviet Union to use law as an instrument
of revolutionary change in Central Asia, see Massell, Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu: The Case of Soviet Central Asia, 2 LAw &
Soc'Y REv. 179 (1968). See also notes 254 and 284 infra, discussing latent dysfunctionality.
169 In 1957 Milovan Djilas wrote:
Because the present world conflict is unfolding mainly on the basis of op-
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VI.

THE "FIVE PRINCIPLES" OF PANCH SHILA AND
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Tunkin's attempts at a theoretical reconciliation were based on a
new theme for Soviet juristic discussion which was brought forth in

a joint communique issued by Nehru of India and Chou En-lai of
the Chinese People's Republic over the status of Tibet on July 1,
1954Y.70 This Chinese-Indian Treaty of 1954 listed "Five Principles" of Panch Shila which were proposed as the basis for international law. Shortly afterwards, at the Bandoeng Conference of
1955, held by a great number of Afro-Asian countries, including
Communist China and India, these five principles were formally
adopted as representative of their collective aspirations.171
The first, and most important, of the principles is the maintenance of mutual respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty
of other states. From this penultimate guideline, the remaining
four principles naturally follow: nonaggression, that is, the mutual
obligation not to attack other states; the mutual obligation of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states; 72 mutual equality
and the granting of equal advantages; and peaceful coexistence. 73
These five principles are reminiscent of Points III, VI, and XIV of

President Woodrow Wilson's famous "Fourteen Points,"' 74 and,
ironically, they reflect only a verbal identity with the Panch Shila

of Buddhism. 75 In fact, the principles of coexistence enunciated at
position between [sodo-political] systems, it has more of the character of a
class conflict than of opposition between nations and states.... Any future
war would be a world-wide civil war rather than a war between governments
and nations. M. DJILAS, supra note 52, at 196; see note 59 supra.
170 p. CORBETr,

supra note 8, at 106; Editorial Comment, Co-existence Bows Out,

59 AM. J. INT'L L. 59 (1965).
171W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 139, at 322; Editorial Comment, supra note 170,
at 59. See J. TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, supra note 139, at 26 n.68.
172
It has been remarked that:
One of the most complete statements of the mutual duties of noninterference in each other's internal affairs by the Soviet Union and capitalist
governments was the exchange of notes between [Soviet Foreign Commissar]
Maxim Litvino[v] and President Roosevelt of November 16, 1933, preliminary to re-establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and
Russia. Grzybowski, supra note 151, at 485.
The Soviet note, which is identical in substance to the American reply, is reproduced
in id. at 485-86, and in 28 Am. J.INT'L L SuPP. 3-4 (1934).
173 p.

CORBETr, supra note 8, at 106; W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 139, at 322.

See also Editorial Comment, Legal Research on Peaceful Co-existence, 51 AM. J.INT'L
L 63 (1957).
17 4 See 56 CONG. REc., pt. 1, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., 680-81 (1918).
175 The Panch Shila of Buddhism commands abstinence from destroying life, from
theft, from unchastity, from lying, and from the use of intoxicating liquor. Cf. H.
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Bandoeng represent no more than the fundamental tenets of classical international law. The only significance of the Conference
was the emergence of a "political manifesto by nations that believed themselves to be united in their anti-colonialism, their hostility to Western capitalism, and the community of their interests."' 78
The Soviets not only embraced these five principles but also
claimed that they were applicable to both the socialistic and capitalistic states. One may speculate that again Russia was confronted
with what it interpreted to be the proper Weltanschauung and thus
seized upon the pronunciation by her fellow socialistic states as a
means to aid Soviet jurisprudence in its groping development toward practicability. 7 Objectively speaking, this action was logical
in its relation to the background of Soviet politics. As one knowledgeable author has pointed out, the Soviet theory of international relations is grounded upon the Clausewitzian model of politics which views peace as the pursuit of policy by nonmilitary
means.'7 8 After the period of foreign intervention, when Stalin
was forced to rationalize the international position of the Soviet
government, he stated that "the period of the open war was reWARREN, BUDDHISM IN TRANSLATIONS (1922); Bozeman, India's Foreign Policy
Today, 10 WORLD POLITICS 265 (1958), cited in W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 139,
at 322 n.12.
176W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 139, at 322. An account of the Bandoeng Conference, with special reference to the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the
meaning of Panch Shila, is given in J. SYATAUW, SOME NEWLY ESTABLISHED ASIAN
STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 212 (1961).

177 The question for Russia was whether to take or reject the "five principles"; in
the interests of conveniently consolidating socialist states in an amicable way, as well as
putting on face for the capitalist nations in light of Russia's foreign policies and actions
at that time, the Soviets chose to accept the five principles. Significantly, Soviet foreign
policy theorists have recently attributed the proclamation of these five principles to
Lenin's November 8, 1917, Decree on Peace:
The Decree on Peace proclaimed the following genuinely democratic
standards of international intercourse: respect for territorial integrity and national sovereignty of countries and peoples, the right of all nations to an independent political existence, impermissibility of any and all interference in the
internal affairs of peoples and states, equality of nations big and small, repudiation of aggression and territorial annexation, and broad international
economic and cultural co-operation.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 17-18 (Mos-

cow 1967).
It is impossible, however, to find such generalized directives even in the Soviet's own
translation of Lenin's Decree on Peace. See V. LENIN, Report on Peace Delivered at
the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, October
26 (November 8), 1917, in ON PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE 36-44 (Moscow, no copyright date). See also Karpov, The Soviet Concept of Peaceful Coexistence and Its Implications for InternationalLaw, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 858 (1964).
178 Grzybowski, supra note 151, at 497. See generally C. VON CLAUSEWrrZ, ON
WAR (J. Graham trans. 1940).
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placed by a period of peaceful struggle."'17 9 In this context, moreover, it must be kept in mind that coexistence itself necessitates
some form of struggle. Indeed, those inferential expressions in
1918 by Georgi V. Chicherin - the Soviet People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs - that the Soviet regime's raison d'gtre was bound
up with a struggling coexistence which manifests itself most strongly
in anticapitalist propaganda, still remain demonstrative of Russia's
political position.8 0
Once the doctrine of the inevitability of war lost its cogency in
the eyes of Soviet theoreticians, propaganda became the chief vehicular technique in the peaceful ideological struggle between the
two worlds of socialism and capitalism.' 8' Premier Khrushchev, in
1957, stated that the ideological struggle was an indispensable condition to the peaceful relations of socialist countries with capitalist
nations:
Messrs. [C)apitalists accuse us of simultaneously proclaiming the
policy of peaceful coexistence and talking about the struggle between
the communist and bourgeois ideologies. Yes, this struggle goes
on because it expresses the interests of different classes. This is
fully legitimate.

Capitalists ...

defend by all means the private

ownership of the means of production.... We communists ...
are opposed to private ownership of the means of production ....
But the capitalist and socialist countries are situated on the same
means
planet; they cannot depart anywhere from this planet. This
82
we must coexist.... Our ideas will conquer mankind.'

Reflecting the Clausewitzian ideal and stating Khruschev's point a
different way, the following statement had appeared in Pravda:
Peaceful coexistence is not a conflictless life. As long as different
social-political systems continue to exist, the antagonisms between
them are unavoidable. Peaceful coexistence is a struggle - political, economic, and ideological.... Coexistence means that one does
not fight the other, does not attempt to solve international disputes
179 5 J. STALIN, SOCHINENIA [WORKS]

117 (1947).

180 See Grzybowski, supra note 151, at 486-87, 497. On Chicherin, see C. CLARKSON, supra note 2, at 577; J. TRISKA & D. FINLEY, supra note 68, at 36, 419. See also

Lenin's Marginal Notes on a Letter from G.V. Chicherin (March 14, 1922), and Letter
from V.I. Lenin to G.V. Chicherin (March 14, 1922), in V. Lenin, supra note 177,
at 227 and 236.
181 Grzybowski, supra note 151, at 498. "'Peaceful co-existence does not extend to
the sphere of ideology ... ideological struggle between the two social systems cannot
cease because it is part and parcel of the class struggle,' Izvestia said in a leading article
on May 27." Soviet News, June 4, 1968, at 126. For a discussion of the effect of
propaganda in international law, see J. WHITON & A. LARSON, PROPAGANDA: TowARs DISARMAMENT IN THE WAR OF WORDS (1964); Davies, The American Commitment to Public Propaganda,in Symposium on International Control of Propaganda,
31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 452 (1966).
182Pravda, April 16, 1957, cited in Grzybowski, supra note 151, at 498 n.66.
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by arms, but that one competes through peaceful work and cultural
activities. But we would cease to be Marxist-Leninists if we for183
got the elementary laws of social life, the laws of class struggle.

In the Soviet view, peaceful coexistence and ideological struggle represent the inherent and inseparable rudiments of international relations between socialist and capitalist states. 184 In a letter
to the Revue Ggngrale de Droit InternationalPublic (Paris),"85 eight
Soviet professors - among whom was the late Yevgeni A. Korovin -

expressed the opinion that the comprehensive schedule of the

Communist Party must necessarily attribute a large portion of its
policies to the theme of peaceful coexistence. To implement this
general theme in the international arena, according to the eight
theoreticians, different political, economic, and cultural variations
of class struggle are employed by the Party in exclusively peaceful
techniques. The new program of the Communist Party in 1961
ultimately reflected the viewpoint of these Russian intellectuals
when it defined peaceful coexistence as a "peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on an international scale" and as a
1 86
"specific form of class struggle."'
The "Five Principles" of Panch Shila fitted in well with the coexistence theme popular with the Soviet government under Premier
Khrushchev and, therefore, with the Soviet legal theorists of this era
in Soviet foreign policy.' 87 In referring to these principles after the
peaceful resolution of the Cuban Crisis in October 1962,188 Khrush-

chev acknowledged a profound awareness that there can be no ele183 Pravda, Feb. 13, 1957, cited in Grzybowski, supra note 151, at 498 n.67.
184

Grzybowski, supra note 151, at 498.

185 The letter is reprinted in E.MCWHINNEY,

"PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" AND

SOVIET-WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAw 128 (1964), cited in Grzybowski, supra note

151, at 499 n.68, who also lists the following citations:
For a general treatment of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, see WLADYSLAW W. KULsI, PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE (1959). Legal aspects were
discussed by B. RAMUNDO, THE SOCIALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 25-30 (1964); Lapenna, The Legal Aspects and Political Significance
of the Soviet Concept of Co-existence, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. (4th ser.)
737 (1963). For the Soviet point of view, see GEORGn P. ZADOROZHNYI,
MIRNOE, SOSUSHCHESTVOVANIE I MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO [PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw) (1964); Krushchev, On Peace-

Co-existence, 38 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 (1959); Tunkin, Printsip mirnogo
sosushchestvovania [The Principle of Peaceful Coexistence], Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, no. 7, 1963, p. 26, 26-27.
186 Grzybowski, supra note 151, at 499.
187 W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 139, at 330.
188 For a discussion of the immediate problems of international law resulting from
the strained United States-Cuban relations after Castro's take-over in 1959, see Wright,
The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963). See also Meeker, Defensive
Quarantineand the Law, 57 AM. J.INT'L L. 515 (1963).
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ment of trust in the relations among states unless the norms of international law are observed and accepted commitments are fulfilled.
Without trust, he further stated, there can never be true peaceful coexistence. In order to solidify the Soviet position and gain
acceptance in the eyes of the world, the soon-to-be-deposed Premier
concluded his attempt at saving the socialist image by announcing
that Russia had always upheld the principle of peaceful coexistence
and would continue to assert herself in defense of the norms of international law where relations among states were involved. 9
The Soviets had thus attained a new and definitive level of jurisprudence which was now evidenced by the typical statement that:
"Peaceful coexistence was inconceivable without international legality, [for p]eaceful coexistence is international law in action."' 190 In
an article by Korovin, F.I. Kozhevnikov, and G.P. Zadorozhny,
published in 1962 and entitled Peaceful Coexistence and International Law, the following clarification appeared:
Peaceful coexistence means ensuring sovereignty, territorial inviolability, political independence and equality of all peoples and states,
respect for systems chosen by the peoples, and recognition of the
right of every people to choose, in conformity with its sovereign
will, one or another form of government, as well as a new socioeconomic system, without interference in one another's internal affairs and without export of revolution and counterrevolution.'19
The "Five Principles" of Panch Shila are clearly evident in this
statement. In an article by Grigori I. Tunkin, published the same
year, there is a further exegesis of this phase in Soviet international
legal theory:
"Peaceful coexistence," the Party Program states, "presupposes: rejection of war as a means of solution of problems in dispute between states, which are to be solved by negotiations, equality,
mutual understanding and confidence among states, with due consideration for each other's interests

....

,192

189 Korovin, Kozhevnikov & Zadorozhny, Peaceful Coexistence and International
CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS,
May 9, 1962, at 8-9; reprintedin H. SHAFFER, supra note 162, at 193. See also SOVIET
FOREIGN POLIcy, supra note 177, at 266-68.
10'Id.
191 Id. "'Peaceful co-existence' as the Soviet lawyers think of it means as a minimum the condition necessary to keep non-Soviet power from penetrating into the Soviet
orbit It may also mean the relaxation of barriers to Soviet propaganda of her ideas
and influences across the frontiers of her orbit." Editorial Comment, Legal Research
on "Peaceful Co-existence," 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 71 (1957).
92
1 Tunkin, InternationalLaw and Relations, SOVIET LAW & GOVERNMENT, No. 3,
at 18 (1962).

Law, Izvestia, April 18, 1962; translated in
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A CHANGE

IN TERMINOLOGY AND APPROACH

The latest shift in Soviet international legal policy has been
from Khrushchev's coexistence theme to Brezhnev and Kosygin's
theme of co-operation. As was noted above, in 1954 the Soviet
Union began promoting the theme of peaceful coexistence. By
1956 they had succeeded in having the subject placed on the agendas of several international associations of scholars. Many Western
members in these associations wanted to substitute a topic to be
193
called "peaceful co-operation" for the Eastern European favorite.
A.

A Change in Terminology

At the General Conference of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1954, an Indian draft resolution was submitted as a topic for UNESCO-supported research. On this resolution the Conference substituted the
words "peaceful co-operation" for the words "peaceful coexistence."'" 4 A year later, at the round table meeting organized by the
International Political Science Association in Stockholm, August 2030, 1955, the "distinction was drawn between co-existence without
collaboration on the one hand, and active co-operation between
states on the other." But due to the sharp variation in views as to
whether coexistence represented only a compromise between open
conflict and cold war or whether it meant total harmony in the relations among world states, the attempt to arrive at a uniformly acceptable definition was tabled.'"6
The battle of definitions re-emerged when law professors of
East and West met at UNESCO House in Paris, February 17-21,
1956. At this meeting the Eastern European delegates argued to
no avail for the resubstitution of the "coexistence" theme." 6 Yevgeni A. Korovin, the Soviet representative, wrote a report on the
meeting in which he criticized the efforts of the American representative to further establish a theme relating to peaceful co-operation
rather than peaceful coexistence. 197
'
Korovin suggested that the
193 Editorial Comment, Legal Research on "Peaceful Co-existence," 51 AM. J. INT'L
L. 63 (1957).
19 4
See UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, 8th sess., Montevideo, Resolution IV.1.3.411 (1954).
195 Editorial Comment, supra note 193, at 64.
196 For an account of this debate, see Hazard, International Tensions and Legal Research, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 29-30 (1956).
97
1 See Korovin, The UNESCO Jurists Conference, NEw TIMES, No. 15, April 5,
1956, at 20-23.
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American representative was possibly remembering "that Secretary
of State [John Foster) Dulles had said that 'co-existence' was a word
to be shied at, to be on one's guard against." He further argued
that the American was trying to avoid discussion of the relations between nations belonging to different socio-political systems. 19 8 It
was too early at this time, only 3 years after the death of Stalin,
for the Soviets to ideologically embrace the theme of mutual cooperation.
In August 1964, the International Law Association's Tokyo
Conference followed UNESCO's lead, as well as that of the United
Nations, 1 9 and changed the name of an item which had been on
its agenda for 8 years from "Juridical Aspects of Peaceful Coexistence" to "Committee .on Principles of International Security
and Cooperation."200 The Soviets accepted the change as part of a
compromise.
A further compromise was necessary to overcome the fear on the
part of some of the Conference members that the work of the committee, as set forth in its list of sixteen principles of peaceful coexistence in dogmatic form, would be understood as creating the basis for
"new" law. To meet this objection, it was declared by the committee that the change in name was made "without prejudging the issue
of the definitive character of the list of principles contained [in the
committee's report) or the question whether these principles shall be
deemed to be juridical principles of peaceful coexistence or principles of international law." '°0 With this statement the question as
to whether new law was being created was avoided. The proponents of "peaceful coexistence" could continue to call the pronouncements of the committee what they willed, "while the rest of the
198 Editorial Comment, supra note 193, at 65.
19 9
The action of the UNESCO General Conference of 1954 has already been discussed in text accompanying note 194 supra. The United Nations once undertook a
search for juridical aspects of peaceful coexistence, but substituted a study of the law
of "peaceful relations and co-operation among states" in 1961. See REPORT OF THE
SIXTH CoMMrrrnE, U.N. Doc. A/5036, Dec. 15, 1961, cited in Editorial Comment
Co-existence Bows Out, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 59 n.3 (1965). See also W. FRIEDMANN,
supra note 139, at 61-63. See generally McWhinney, The "New" Countries and the
"New" International Law: The United Nations Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Co-operationAmong States, 60 AM. J. INTL L. 1 (1966).
200 Editorial Comment, supra note 199, at 59. This same year the United States
and the Soviet Union entered the Agreement on Exchanges in the Scientific, Technical,
Educational, Cultural and Other Fields in 1964-1965, Feb. 22, 1964, T.LA.S. 5582
(effective Jan. 1, 1964).
201 Editorial Comment, supra note 199, at 61.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:141

world could think of them as burning problems in the field of tradi20 2
tional international law."
B.

The eeNew" Approach and the "New" InternationalLaw
of the D~tente Era

The Tokyo decision was more than a "new move in a wide-ranging dispute over terminology. 2 0 3 It was a manifestation of a change
in the basic approach to international lawmaking. The coexistence
theme of the Cold War era implied a static or quiescent approach to
East-West legal relations. While the Soviets stressed ideological
struggle, class conflict, and fear of capitalistic encirclement, 0 4 the
Americans in this era underwent the purges of McCarthyism and
the Red Scare tactics which instilled mass fear of "monolithic" Communism and "creeping socialism." 20 5 In direct contrast, the co-operation theme of the post Cold War era has implied a dynamic,
mutual, and consensual approach to East-West legal relations. This
latest era, being that of a Soviet-Western d~tente, has established
"new" international law.
In a sense, the international law of the ditente, constructed on a

pragmatic basis of inter-systems agreement or consensus, and demonstrated empirically in the actual record of such de facto accommodations and give-and-take, represents a species of "new" international law.203 At least, it represents a new gloss on the old customary international law, albeit a gloss that is specially concerned,
in the special societal conditions of the contemporary world community, with considerations of security, of stability of settled ex202 Id.
203 Id. at 59.
204 See text accompanying note 182

supra.

205 Thus, domestically, the Communist threat in the early 1950's led to Mc-

Carthyism, a search for heresy in which the end goal of eliminating alleged
un-American attitudes and behavior justified any means, including disregard
for "due process of law," which is the basic guarantee of all our civil liberties.
At times, this hunt went to frightening lengths, as when the United States
Information Agency actually burned books that might be suspect. ...
In
foreign policy, our reaction to the Communist threat to the American way of
life was to support almost any "anti-Communist" regime. Thus, the United
States associated itself with traditional regimes whose days were numbered
because they had alienated mass support: Bao Dai in Indochina and King
Faisal in Iraq were just two examples of such regimes. J. SPANiER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II 191-92 (2d rev. ed. 1965).
For a discussion of Senator Joseph McCarthy's Red Scare tactics, see D. MALONE &
B. RAUcH, AMERICA AND WORLD LEADERSHIP 1940-1965, at 113, 129-30, 160-62
(1965). Compare Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 579-81 (1951), with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 308 (1957).
206

McWhinney, Changing International Law Method and Objectives in the Era of

the Soviet-Western Detente, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1965).
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pectations, and of certainty and the avoidance of surprise in intergroup (more accurately inter-systems)
relations - the old "Watch20 7
man's State" legal virtues.

The "new" international lawmaking, in the pluralistic world of
legal value-systems, concentrates on the pragmatic, empirically
based, problem oriented, step-by-step - or disjointed incrementalistic208 - approach to conflicts resolution.2 0 9 Practical application
of this particular approach requires peaceful, consensual change as
the operational methodology. Nations faced with particular tension-issues of the present-day world community must avoid "temptations to abstract, a priori, natural-law-type exercises in general
acts of codification, uno ictu, of asserted principles of coexistence
[(friendly relations) 1. '21° Any efforts at deductive postulation
from the seemingly self-evident general principles of Soviet-Western juristic relations could only result in a natural law-type absolutism. In view of all the possibilities of semantic confusion and
normative equivocality between the two systems, such exercises
would be of little practical value when contrasted with the actual
21 1
conduct of international relations.
While an attempt to create codified world law and the supranational power necessary to its enforcement would violate Marxist
2 7

0 McWhinney, The "New" Countries and the "New?" International Law: The

United Nations' Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States, 60 AM. J. INTL L. 1, 2 (1966) (footnote renumbered and rewritten).
2 08
Let us describe this kind of political decision-making in more detail. It is
decision-making through small or incremental moves on particular problems
rather than through a comprehensive reform program. It is also endless; it
takes the form of an indefinite sequence of policy moves. Moreover, it is
exploratory in that the goals of policy-making continue to change as new experience with policy throws new light on what is possible and desirable. In
this sense, it is also better described as moving away from known social ills
rather than as moving toward a known and relatively stable goal. In any
case, it is policy-making that chooses those goals that draw policies forward in
the light of what recent policy steps have shown to be probably realizable; the
utopian goal, chosen for its attractiveness without thought of its feasibility, is
not a heavy influence on this kind of policy-making. In the frequency with
which past moves are found wanting and new moves debated, it reveals both
man's limited capacities to understand and solve complex problems and an unsettled, shifting compromise of conflicting values. D. BRAYBROOKE & C.
LINDBLOM,

A STRATEGY

OF DECISION

71 (1963).

The disjointed incrementalistic strategy is the operational methodology for a high
integration index in information processing. See H. SCHRODER, K. DRIVER & S.
STREUFERT, HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING 22 (1967); Figure 1, at pp. 242-43
infra. The strategy and the four index levels of information processing are more fully
discussed in text accompanying notes 389-406 infra.
209 McWhinney, supra note 207, at 2.
210 d. See note 307 in!ra.
211 McWhinney, supra note 206, at 1-2. For a discussion of Soviet legal theorists'
ideological abhorrence to natural law theory, see note 51 supra.
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rules of dialectic development at this stage of history, the establishment of "new international Law" 2 ' between the Marxian-Socialist
and capitalist states is viewed currently by the Soviets as a necessary
result of the dialectical process. This position is elaborated in a
1967 Soviet textbook on international law by Grigori I. Tunkin,213
who rejects the school of thought that saw no possibility of creating
an operative international law because of the conflict between socialist and capitalist states. Tunkin sees the dialectical process in full
swing: the capitalist thesis is meeting the counter-thrust of the
Marxian-Sodalist antithesis, and a new synthesis is coming into being. "One need not wait until the achievement of the new thesis
to have international law: it is here already and it is progressive because it marks a transition from an outworn epoch of history to the
'
epoch of the future."214
Tunkin acclaims the development of the
"new" international law through consensus, but views the principal
impediment to an even speedier development in the policy of "from
positions of strength," which he attributes to the President of the
2 15
United States and to American legal theorists generally.
212 Professor Grigori I. Tunkin has insisted that what the Soviet Union is advocating is "new international Law" only, and that it has certainly called "neither for 'a new
international law' nor for a 'revolution' in international law." Tunkin, Letter to The
Times, London, Feb. 25, 1963, cited in McWhinney, supra note 206, at 3 n.10.
The actual basis for distinction between "new international Law" and "a new
international law" would appear, in the context in which Professor Tunkin
was discussing this question in his letter to The Times, to have been the distinction between, on the one hand, a species of more or less evolutionary international law-making that would accept the corpus of classical international
law doctrine as a necessary minimum starting point for legal innovation and
creative adaptation of old rules and principles, and on the other hand, some
more radical approach that would presumably consider classical international
law as per se outdated and without any juridical effect and significance in
present-day terms. McWhinney supra.
21
3 G. TuiNmK,
IDEOLOGICHESKAIA BOR'BA I MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO [IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW] (Moscow 1967); reviewed in Book
Review, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 209 (1968).
214 Book Review, supra note 213, at 209.
215 Id. For an example, see generally W. KINTNER, PEACE AND THE STRATEGY
CONFLICT (1968). Note also the following editorial comment:
The very day after Republicans had stalled Senate Foreign Relations committee action on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the House shouted down
an effort to slow up deployment of the Sentinel anti-ballistic-missle system.
The House then overwhelmingly passed a record $72.2-billion defense appropriation....
A House majority - Republicans and Democrats alike - apparently believes it is demonstrating America's determination to keep guard against world
Communism by giving the nuclear arms race a new upward spiral. In this
error it echoes not only Mr. Nixon but Defense Secretary Clifford, who contends that in deploying a light Sentinel system the United States will build
a position of strength for negotiations. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1968,
§ E, at 14, col. 1(emphasis added).
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The self-initiative function is another important aspect of the
"new" approach in the era of the East-West d~tente which bears
mentioning. In a rare interview with the Western press, Premier
Krushchev epitomized this aspect by the phrase: "politic of mutual
example."2 16 His reference was indeed an apt one to indicate that
category of international lawmaking which typically involves a unilateral initiative by either the Soviet or the Western bloc in the confident expectation that pressure from world public opinion will inevitably force the other bloc to follow suit.2 17 An early example of
this "self-initiative" aspect was the Moscow PartialTest Ban Treaty
of August 1963, which "simply ratified and concretized in certain particulars a fundamental accommodation or ditente that had
already occured de facto between the two systems. ' 218 The Western
initiative leading to the establishment of the "Hot Line" emergency
communications system between the Kremlin and the White
House,21 9 and the similar initiative leading to the Soviet-Western
accord on preventing the orbiting of nuclear weapons in space vehicles, which itself was embodied in a United Nations General Assembly resolution, 220 are two other examples.
The process of international lawmaking incorporated by the
"self-initiative" or "politic of mutual example" is also apparent "in
the rapidly successive Soviet and Western decisions as to reduction
in arms expenditure; as to the cessation of interference in each
other's radio propaganda programs; as to the reduction in uranium
221
production and even the dosing of nuclear reactor plants.
216 N. S. Khrushchev's Answers to Questions of H. Shapiro, Chief Moscow Correspondent of American Wire Service United Press International, Izvestia, Dec. 31,
1963, at 1; CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 22, 1964, at 24, cited in
McWhinney, supra note 206, at 8 n.26.
217 McWhinney, supra note 206, at 8.
218Id. at 1.
219 U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement for Direct Communications Link, White
House Statement, June 20, 1963, in 49 DEP'T OF STATE BULLETIN 50 (1963). See
also Text of Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Geneva, Switzerland, June 20,
1963, id., cited in McWhinney, supra note 206, at 1 n.1.
220 U.N. General Assembly, Resolution, Oct. 17, 1963 (U.N. Doc. A/C. /I.
324 (A/RES/1884 (XVIII)). See also U.N. Calls on States to Refrain from Orbiting Weapons, Statement by Ambassador Stevenson, 49 DEP'T OF STATE BULLETIN
753 (1963).
221
M cWhinney, supra note 206, at 8.
President Johnson avowed a "principle of mutual example" in attempting to provoke the Soviet Union into following the United States initiative in cutting back uranium production and in the closing of atomic reactor plants in 1964. Foster, U.S.
Proposes Curb on Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 50 DEP'T OF STATE BULLETIN 376,
379 (1964). The State of the Union, Address of the President to the Congress, Jan. 8,
1964, printed in 50 DEP'T OF STATE BULLETIN 110 (1964). See also President John-
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Other examples of the "new" international law of the ditente
era which reflect the step-by-step, or incremental, approach to resolution of Soviet-Western conflicts and the reliance on exemplary
unilateral action to effect mutual change, are the United StatesSoviet Consular Treaty of 196 5,22 the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,"a which
was signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27,
1967, the United States-Soviet Agreement on a Non-proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (January 18, 1968) ,224 and the recent5
2
steps toward a mutually advantageous East-West trade agreement:
son Urges Disarmament Conference to Take Further Steps Toward Peace, White House
Press Release, Jan. 21, 1964, printed in 50 DEP'T OF STATE BULLETIN 223 (1964).
When Premier Khrushchev replied to the Western initiative, it was "to announce
not merely a reduction in Soviet uranium production but also the immediate suspension
of the construction of two large new atomic reactors for the production of plutonium."
McWhinney, supra note 206, at 9, citing Statement of N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of
the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, Izvestia, April 22, 1964; reprinted in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, May 13, 1964, at 26.
222 Consular Convention with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, June 1, 1964.
The text of this convention is reprinted in 3 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 778 (1964).
See Note, The United States-Soviet Consular Convention, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 876
(1965).
223 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347 (effective Oct. 10, 1967). The text of this treaty is reprinted in 61
AM. J. INT'L L. 644 (1967); 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 132 (1967). See Wehringer, The
Treaty on Outer Space, 54 A.B.A.J. 586 (1968). See also Dembling & Arons, The
Treaty on Rescue and Return of Astronauts and Space Objects, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV.
630 (1968). See generally J. MORENOFF, WORLD PEACE THROUGH SPACE LAW
(1967); reviewed in Book Review, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 900 (1967).
For a discussion of the Soviet attitude toward space law, see Crane, Basic Principles
in Soviet Space Law: Peaceful Coexistence, Peaceful Cooperation, and Disarmament,29
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 942, 946-49 (1964); Crane, Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 685 (1962). See also Comment, Communist
China and the Law of Outer Space, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1135 (1967).
224 On January 18, 1968, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on the
complete draft of a nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19,
1968, at 1, col. 1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 19, 1968, at 5, col. 1-6. "The new
treaty is the first significant arms control measure that has been taken to curb the nuclear
arms race itself." N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1968, § 4, at 1, col. 7. The text of the draft
treaty is reprinted in 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 817 (1968).
The United States Senate
Foreign Relations Committee action on this treaty has been recently stalled. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 12, 1968, at 1, col. 3 (city ed.); see note 215 supra and notes 227 & 280
infra. See also Mallison, The Laws of War and the Juridical Control of Weapons of
Mass Destruction in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv.308 (1967);
Gilpatric, Are We on the Brink of Another Arms Race?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1967, §
6 (Magazine), at 32.
225 See, e.g., S.J. Res. 169, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (modifying certain controlling regulations and financing restrictions so as to permit "an increase in trade in peaceful goods between the U.S. and the nations of Eastern Europe"). See discussion of this
resolution in 114 CONG. REC. 85251 (1968). For an extended discussion on current
East-West trade, see 114 CONG. REC. E3825-37 (1968). See also Rajski, The Law of
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The ditente era of peaceful co-operation has greatly increased
amicable relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.
For the first time persons can fly direct from one country to the
other."' In the shifting and restructuring of world power conditions
in the emerging Third World, it appears that the Soviet Union and
the United States may eventually, once more, be allies. It could be
hypothecated at this point that ifthe Vietnam conflict were brought
to a "just and honorable peace," the Soviet Union might have the
following choice: (1) either to create a new focal point for emphasizing the frictions of a world polarized in its ideological convictions; or (2) to openly ally with the Western countries against the
supposed growing menace of Communist China.2 " While the
InternationalTrade of Some European Socialist Countries and East-West Trade Relations, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 125.
226 N.Y. Times, July 16, 1968, at 1, cols. 4-7 (city ed.). "The fact that the flights
could take place despite Soviet-American antagonism, particularly over the war in Vietnam, was a source of some encouragement to officials of both countries." Id. at 1, col.
4. See also Johnson Hopeful About a Detente by U.S. and Soviet, id. at 1, col. 3. For
the text of the international agreement which made the East-West air flights possible,
see Amendment to U.S-U.S.S.R. Civil Air Transport Agreement, May 6, 1968,
DEP'T OF STATE PRESS RELEASE NO. 94 (May 6, 1968); reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 571 (1968).
The text of the Civil Air Transport Agreement, Nov. 4,
1966, T.I.A.S. No. 6135, is reprinted in 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 82 (1967).
27
- The steady withdrawal of Great Britain from its positions of power throughout the world and its movement toward integration with Western Europe, including eventual membership in the European Common Market, will mean
the end of the Grand Alliance between Great Britain and the United States.
This development will be strengthened by the movement of Russia to economic integration with the West. For the economic development, and the
consequent power position, of Russia will be much more dependent upon interaction with the West than the East or South. Indeed, the East, in the form
of the growing nuclear threat of China to Russia's position in Asia, will inevitably drive Russia eventually to alignment with the West, including the
United States. Carlston, World Order and International Law, 20 J. LEGAL
ED. 127, 137 (1968).
The future threat of Communist China has been used to justify the elaborate "Sentinel" missile defense system in the United States:
The Sentinel system, moreover, was originally advocated by [the Secretary
of Defense] Mr. McNamara as a "light" defense against Chinese Communist
nuclear threats - not Soviet. Though the Soviet threat was cited in last
week's Senate debate more often than the Chinese as justification for the Sentinel system, the Administration's reasoning is that an agreement with Moscow
would reduce - but not obviate - the need for missile defenses. N.Y.
Times, June 28, 1968, at 12, col. 4.
See note 215 supra and note 280 infra.
One subtle problem with establishing China as our enemy is that if the rather shaky
Mao Tse-tung regime were overthrown by a more Western-type democratic government, the United States as a nation could not easily re-channel its fear. Even today,
the belief that China is our enemy may in itself be teleologically (see note 40 supra) effectuating that very situation. This effect could be latently dysfunctional. See notes
254 & 284 infra. "Curiously enough, Peking insists the Vietnam conflict is but part
and parcel of a Soviet-American conspiracy to share world dominance by 'collusion for
nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail."' Sulzberger, Foreign Affairs: The Three-
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actual choice would not be so dearly idiographic or concrete, 22 an
important general direction of the step-by-step process involved in
the development of new international relations could be established.
The recent "step in and step out" of the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia, and the possible revision of the Warsaw Pact (the Sovietled East European military alliance) to meet the Czechoslovak and
Rumanian demands are in vast contrast to the repression of East
Germany in 1953 and Poland and Hungary in 1956. These are a
concrete manifestation of the changing foreign policies of the Soviet
Union. 2 9 The Czechoslovakia affair is an example of the effective
application of the disjointed incrementalistic strategy.X0 On August 18, 1968, the Soviet Communist party expressed apprehension
"that the Czechoslovak leadership appeared to be losing control in
the country." 3 ' Two days later the Warsaw Pact troops were in
Prague and the Czech party leader, Alexander Dubcek, was linked
to "treacherous perfidy." ' 2 But within a week, the Soviets had reinstated the pro-Soviet government and had begun an astonishing
about-face on its invasionary tactics.3 3

It is still highly probable

that the Soviet Union will use the liberalized Czech government and
country as a stepping stone for furthering co-operation with the
Western Nations. - 4
Way Ploy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1967, at 42, col. 5 (city ed.). '"he ruling group of
China is trying to set the USSR and the United States on a collision course, to provoke a
nuclear conflict, and to take this opportunity to establish its domination in the international arena ...." Soviet News, June 4, 1968, at 1. It is difficult to discern the extent
to which China's current use of the United States as a "common unifying enemy" is
forcing American policy to view China similarly. On common unifying enemies, see
note 236 infra & accompanying text. See also Chin, Communist Chinas Attitude Toward InternationalLaw, 60 AM. J.INT'L L. 245 (1966).
228 The problem is a multivariate or polycentric one. "A problem is 'polycentric'
when it involves a complex of decisions judgment upon each of which depends upon
the judgment to be made upon each of the others." H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 669 (tent.
ed. 1958); also quoted in Lewis, The High Court: Final... But Fallible, 19 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 528, 561 n.138 (1968).
22 9
See Conquest, Communism Has To Democratize or Perish,N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,
1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 22.
23 0
See note 208 supra; text accompanying notes 357-77 infra.
231 N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1968, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.), citing Pravda, Aug. 18, 1968.
See also Kamm, Czechoslovakia: A Graceful Exit for Goliath, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11,
1968, § E, at 3, cols. 4-7.
232 N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1968, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.).
233 N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1968, at 1, col. 2, at 4, cols. 3-7 (city ed.); synthesized in
Kremlin Now Defends Dubcek, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Aug. 30, 1968, at 7, cols. 5-8.
234 "From the post-mortem of the Czechoslovak tragedy, a commendable public
consensus seems to be emerging which endorses a continued policy of d&ente and
bridge-building toward Soviet Russia and Communist East Europe in general." Borsody, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1968, at 46, col. 3 (city ed.). See also
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The first choice for Russia, as stated above, would ideologically
and functionally be the easiest. There are indications that various
geo-political areas are being kept "warm" for possible future conflagration.23 5 Such conflicts (Vietnam, Korea), and war in general,
have the functional effect of unifying peoples and nations against
a common enemy and for a common goal or cause ass "Capitalist
imperialism" has long been used as the common enemy for the communist peoples. Thus, it may be historically too early for the Soviet
Union to choose any other alternative. However, if Russia should
choose Communist China as the focal point for friction, then that
vast but internally disrupted socialist state might be used as a "common enemy" to eventually unify both the peoples of the United
States and the Soviet Union.as 7 The United States and the Soviet
Barmann, Cyrus Eaton Jr. Says Trade Is Un-Czeched, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Aug. 29,
1968, at 46, cols. 1-8.
235
, See, e.g., Middleton, The Arab World: Soviet Role Widens, N.Y. Times, July
16, 1968, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.); Middleton, The Arab World: U.S. Viewed As Friend of
the Enemy, Israel, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1968, at 1, cols. 1-2 (city ed.). See generally
F. KHoURi, THE ARAB-IsRAELI DILEMMA (1968). Arthur J. Goldberg has recently
stated:
America's necessary and understandable preoccupation with Viemnam has diverted our attention from the real dangers of a slide toward a new abyss of
war between the Arab states and Israel. In the next go-around there is no
assurance that the direct Soviet-United States confrontation avoided in June,
1967 will not take place. Goldberg, Mideast Could Set Showdown for U.S.,
Russia, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 9, 1968, at 1, col. 1 (from The Chicago Daily News).
Other potential "hot spots" are Korea, Nigeria-Biafra, Thailand, Indonesia, and the
Sudan.
26 War, through the medium of military institutions, has uniquely served
societies, throughout the course of known history, as an indispensable controller of dangerous social dissidence and destructive anti-social tendencies.
As the most formidable of threats to life itself, and as the only one susceptible
to mitigation by social organization alone, it has played another equally fundamental role: the war system has provided the machinery through which the
motivational forces governing human behavior have been translated into binding social allegiance. It has thus insured the degree of social cohesion necessary to the viability of nations. No other institution, or groups of institutions,
in modern societies, has successfully served these functions. REPORT FROM
IRON MOUNTAIN ON THE PossIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF PEACE 81
(1967) [hereinafter cited as IRON MOUNTAIN REPORT].

Similarly:
Another lesson from history is that much of the ideological unity within democracies is national rather than religious homogeneity. Patriotism has
bridged many gulfs and still does so. With this bond has often gone a unifying hatred of a common enemy .... H. MAYO, INTRODUCTION To DEMOCRATIC THEORY 304-05 (1960).
For a discussion of "militant enthusiasm," see K. LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 268 (M.
Wilson trans.); notes 326-28 infra & accompanying text.
237
See note 227 supra.
Substitutes for the Functions of War: Models
The following substitute institutions, among others, have been proposed

ti
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Union could once more be dancing partners.
It should be stressed that such a hypothetical choice, as stated

above, would be greatly affected by current Western international
political thought,238 not to mention many other possible impact variables.

The United States might react to the termination of the

Vietnam conflict by re-entering a period of national isolationism,
or the United States itself might seek another focal point for conflict.
Finally, admitting the obvious lack of a general world sophistication which might place intelligent men on a political level of effectuating a valid all-encompassing peace for the peoples of this
spaceship we call Earth,2 9 it has been suggested that "war" is an
innate characteristic of man 240 and that even when we are able to
for consideration as replacements for the nonmilitary functions of war...
1. Economic. a) A comprehensive social-welfare program, directed toward maximum improvement of general conditions of human life. b) A giant
open-end space research program, aimed at unreachable targets. c) A permanent, ritualized, ultra-elaborate disarmament inspection system, and variants of such system.
2. Political. a) An omnipresent, virtually omnipotent international police force. b) An established and recognized extraterrestrial menace. c) Massive global environmental pollution. d) Fictitious alternate enemies.
3. Sociological: Control function. a) Programs generally derived from
the Peace Corps model. b) A modern, sophisticated form of slavery. Motivational function. a) Intensified environment pollution. b) New religions or other mythologies. c) Socially oriented blood games. d) Combination forms.
4. Ecological. A comprehensive program of applied eugenics.
5. Cultural. No replacement institution offered (or necessarily needed].
Scientific. The secondary requirements of the space research, social welfare,
and/or eugenics programs. IRON MOUNTAIN REPORT, supra note 236, at
84-85.
Compare with J.CAMPBELL, AMERICAN POLICy TOWARD COMMUNIST EUROPE:
THE CHoICEs AHEAD (1965).
238 See, e.g., Alternatives for American Policy, in id. at 83-116.
23
9In the last few decades, mankind has been overcome by the most fateful
change in its entire history. Modern science and technology has created so
dose a network of communication, transport, economic interdependence and potential nuclear destruction - that planet earth, on its journey through
infinity, has acquired the intimacy, the fellowship, and the vulnerability of a
spaceship. B. WARD, SPAcEsIP EARTH at vii (1966); see note 336 infra.
Compare with: "Except for productive human labor, our globe is too small to support
the human population now upon it." A. KORzYBsKI, MANHOOD OF HUMANITy 7
(1921). The concept of a mankind perspective is discussed in text accompanying
notes 386-407 infra.
240 That man is an aggressive creature will hardly be disputed. With the exception of certain rodents, no other vertebrate habitually destroys members of
his own species ....

Although we may recoil in horror when we read in

newspapers or history books of the atrocities committed by man upon man,
we know in our hearts that each one of us harbors within himself those same
savage impulses which lead to murder, to torture and to war. A. STORR, HUMAN AGGREssION 1 (1968); reviewed in Ardrey, Accomplices to Violence,
N.Y. Times, July 14, 1968, § 7 (Book Review), at 1.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

20:141

neurologically control man's basically aggressive nature the peripheral effects would be so individually destructive that such action
24
could not be justified. '
Five years ago [1961] a Norwegian statistician set a computer to work
counting history's wars. The machine quickly, competently and a bit contemptuously announced that in 5,560 years of recorded human history there
have been 14,531 wars, or, as the computer pointed out, 2.6135 a year. Of
185 generations of man's recorded experience, the machine noted ... only ten
have known unsullied peace. And even as he always has, man these days is
fighting man. Time Essay, On War as a Permanent Condition, TIME, Sept.
24, 1965, at 30.
Compare with A. Toynbee, War is Not the Normal Condition of Man, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 7, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 122. Toynbee sophistically concludes that while "pugnacity and aggressiveness may well be built-in elements in human nature,"
[war can be waged only by states, and it takes at least two states to wage it.
In a world in which there is just one state - a world state embracing the
whole of society - international war is an impossibility. There can still be
civil wars, revolutions, insurrections, riots, disorders, because social justice is
never likely to be perfect, and because man is a pugnacious animal. Id. at
126, col. 5.
For an excellent comparative work, see K LORENZ, supra note 236. See also R. ARDREY,
THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE 288-305 (1966); Ryterband, Letters: The Naked Ape,
2 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Aug. 1968, at 10. For a collection of essays challenging LorenzArdrey pessimism, see MAN AND AGGRESSION (M.F.A. Montagu ed. 1968). See also
Raymont, Scientist Oppose Man is Bad View, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1968, at 60, col. 1.
241 As we move along from the more rigorous physiological evidence to the behavioral effects, we unfortunately can find no crucial, direct evidence that an
action on behavior is produced by any of these transmitters [acetylcholine,
norepinephrine, dopamine, serotonin] acting locally at specific sites. Most of
the evidence depends upon a large number of pharmacological studies, which
have utilized drugs as tools in studying behavioral effects of amines in the
central nervous system. It is important to bear in mind certain drawbacks of
this approach. No pharmacological agent produces only one effect, each has
both the desired effect and a host of side effects. Kety, The Central Physiological and PharmacologicalEffects of the Biogenic Amines and Their Correlations with Behavior, in THE NEUROScIENcES 444, 447 (G. Quarton, T.
Melnechuk & F. Schmitt eds. 1967).
For a discussion of latent dysfunctionality, see note 254 infra.
Aggression may be the perverted face of ambition or a "motivational" driving
power - an individually constructive attribute. K. LORENZ, supra note 236, at 43. If
aggression were biologically removed from man, the human race might become like
Tennyson's soporific Lotus-Eaters: "Surely, surely, slumber is more sweet than toil, the
shore / Than labour in the deep mid-ocean, wind and wave and oar; / 0 rest ye,
brother mariners, we will not wander more."
We do not know how many important behavior patterns of man include aggression as a motivating factor ....
What is certain is that, with the elimination of aggression, the "aggredi" in the original and widest sense, the tackling
of a task or problem, the self-respect without which everything that a man
does ... would lose all impetus; everything associated with ambition, ranking
order, and countless other equally indispensable behavior patterns would probably also disappear from human life. K. LORENZ, supra at 278.
See also Sears, Maccoby & Levin, The Socialization of Aggression, in READINGS IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 350 (E. Maccoby, T. Newcomb & E. Hardy eds. 1958). For a
discussion on the development of anti-aggression pills, see B. BARBER, DRUGS AND
SOCIETY 161-64 (1967); N.Y. Times, May 10, 1967, at 27, col. 1. See also Lewis,
supra note 228, at 568 n.169; Reinhold, Evolution Control: A Genetic Advance, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 8, 1968, § 1, at 1, col. 3; note 324 infra & accompanying text.
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Summary

Beginning with the Czars and continuing with the Soviet
Union, we have noted how both form and content of Soviet international law have changed with the major shifts in Soviet national
policy. Soviet jurisprudence has been the ready servant of Moscow's
propaganda, and the writings on international law by Soviet jurists
may often be read as merely political tracts.
Over the years, Soviet jurists have attacked from many angles
the dilemma of meeting the outside world in international intercourse under a system of law that has been basically unacceptable
to Soviet-Marxian ideology. It was not until 1956 and the writings
of Grigori I. Tunkin that a partial reconciliation was made by the
Soviet legal theorists. Only then did they recognize a compromise
of principles which would allow the theories of international law to
agree with the practices of international relations that had been
going on for many years between the capitalist and the socialist
countries.
The present Soviet-Western era of the ditente can be characterized by the "new" approach to international lawmaking, which
concentrates on the pragmatic, empirically based, problem oriented,
step-by-step

-

or disjointed incrementalistic

-

approach to con-

resolution.2 42

The "new" approach itself gains strength and
flicts
efficacy from the de facto acquiescence - through normative patterns of reciprocal deference and the "politic of mutual example" of both sides. Consensually-based rules of jurisprudence are the
focal points for this "new" international law.
[T]he new consensually-basedrules are at least founded on reasonableness, rather than (in positivistic terms) on any mere conformity to pre-existing authority; and the reasonableness of the rules is
necessarily in terms of both main competing systems, since reciprocal self-interest is the raison d'9tre of those rules. There may be,
prospect of the rules being observed, longtherefore, a greater 243
range, by both sides.
The Soviets still view and use international law as a tool, and
sometimes as a weapon, to further their own national interests.
The Western Nations, however, are not totally exempt from this
accusation either. 44 The Soviet dilemma is a reflection of the
notes 208-09 supra & accompanying text
McWhinney, supra note 206, at 14.
244 For example, the United States justification for intervention in Vietnam. Compare Memorandum of Lawyer's Committee, 111 CONG. REc. 24902 (1965), and
242 See
243

Meeker, Legality of United States Participationin the Defense of Viet-Nam, 60 AM. J.
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polarization of the world into two great socio-economic-political
systems. Change is an inherent variable in these systems. Still,
amid all the theoretical shifts concerning the Soviet dilemma in international law, there has been, and will continue to be, one constant
for the Soviet jurist: His government is always right.
The Soviet Union has not been the only nation faced with a
dilemma in meeting international situations that require actions
and justifications which are contrary to nationalistic ideology. The
United States has also been faced with a foreign policy dilemma.
A critical comparison can be made between the Soviet "hang-ups"
in effectuating a valid theory of international law and the inconsistency between the United States democratic ideals and American
international relations. This comparison will provide the basis for
suggesting an operational sociological approach based on a transcultural consensus coupled with the evaluative strategy of disjointed
incrementalism as a potential solution to the dilemmas in international jurisprudence which have been created by a pluralistic world
of polarized ideological beliefs and which increasingly threaten
the continuing existence of the human species.

VIII.

THE AMERICAN DILEMMA?:

AN INTERJECTION

Foreign policies demand scarcely any of those qualities which
are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient .... [A democracy] cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMocRAcY IN AMERICA (1835).245
INT'L L. 565 (1966), with Wright, Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Situation, 60 AM. J.
INT'L L. 750 (1966).
See also Murphy, Vietnam: A Study of Law and Politics, 36
FORDHAM L. REv. 453 (1968). See generally R. HULL. N J.NOVOGROD, LAW AND
VIET NAM (1967); reviewed in TIME, March 1, 1968, at 67; VIETNAM WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Falk ed. 1968).
For a discussion of the Soviet view of "wars of liberation," see Ginsburgs, "Wars
of Liberation" and the Modern Law of Nations - The Soviet Thesis, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 910 (1964).
245 Compare this statement with a similar observation by Dr. Hans Morgenthau,
also looking at foreign policy from a European point of view with special reference to
the United States:
It is the peculiar quality of the conduct of foreign affairs in the United States
that it maximizes the weaknesses inherent in the formulation and execution
of foreign policies under democratic conditions and that it aggravates these
inherent weaknesses by some unique constitutional devices and political practices. Morgenthau, Conduct of American Foreign Relations, 3 PARLIAMEN-
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On a somewhat superficial level of interpretation, the Soviet
dilemma has been the result of the Communists' dogmatic acceptance of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and refusal to compromise
their socio-political beliefs with the Western world. However, a
more integrative analysis shows that the dilemma results more from
the attempts of the Soviets to keep their Marxian ideology and at
the same time accept whatever portion of Western-oriented international law they view as not inconsistent with their socio-political
outlook. In other words, there is a problem of emphasis here,
and the Soviets to some extent can rightly argue that traditional international law, with its heavy Western orientation, is also dogmatic
ideology. In a sense the Western Nations have had to meet the
Soviet dilemma; but, as mentioned previously, the West sees that
most of the nations with whom it trades are still capitalistic. Therefore, the West has not had to compromise ideologically to any great
extent in meeting the Soviet dilemma. Of great importance, in this
respect, is the question of the extent to which Western Nations are
willing to compromise in the future in order to make international
law truly "international." There is also the further question of the
extent to which the Soviet and the American views of international
law can be synthesized.
The purpose of this interjection is not to disparage the United
States government or traditional American democratic theory, but
rather to show by a few brief examples that the United States, like
the Soviet Union, has faced a dilemma in attempting to effectuate
a valid and working foreign policy which is not inconsistent with
its basic national ideology and political theory. While the term
"An American Dilemma" has been used to refer to the inconsistency between American race relations and American democratic
ideals, 24 6 the term may also apply to the inconsistency between
American international relations and Western democratic ideals.24 7
In other words, the United States may also be faced with the diTARY AFFAIRS, No. 1 (1949); cited in Q. WRIGHT, PROBLEMS OF STABILITY
AND PROGRESS nT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 275 n.6 (1954).
See also G. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900-1950 at 73, 93 (1951).
246
G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944); Tannenbaum, An Azerican

Dilemma, 59 POL. SC. Q. 321 (1944).
24
7 See Q. WRIGHT, supra note 245, at 273. This raises the further question concerning the extent to which the United States is able to act consistently with the rules
of international law it helped to establish. By way of contrast, the Soviet problem
concerns the extent to which the Soviet government is able to accept rules which it
had very little part in formulating and rules which contain basic values quite different
from those of the Soviet state.
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lemma of having to meet world situations with actions that are inconsistent with her particular democratic ideology.
A.

American Foreign Policy and Mass Democracy

Democracy is both a political system and a theory to explain
and justify that system. Operationally, "a democratic political system is one in which public policies are made, on a majority basis, by
representatives, subject to effective popular control at periodic elections which are conducted on the principle of political freedom." 4 '
In a UNESCO sponsored study on democracy, after World War II,
which obtained the views of more than a hundred scholars, both
Eastern and Western, it was found that "there were no replies
adverse to democracy. Probably for the first time in history, democracy is claimed as the proper ideal description of all systems of
political and social organization advocated by influential propo2 49

nents."

Both Soviets and Americans profess their beliefs in general
democratic principles, but there is a conflict as to the "true" definition of those principles. This conflict gives rise to the differing
theories or ideologies used to explain or justify the particular Eastern or Western democratic political system.2 50 Admittedly then,
248

H. MAYO, supra note 236, at 70 (emphasis added).
Two similar definitions might be mentioned. Democracy is "the name for a form
of government by which the ultimate control of the machinery of government is
committed to a numerical majority of the community." J. MORLEY, ORACLES ON
MAN AND GOVERNMENT 29 (1923). Democracy is "government of the whole, by
the majority, generally through representatives elected by secret ballot of adults." E.
CARRITT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 150 (1957), cited in H. MAYO, supra
at 70 n.5. But see R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (1967).
249

DEMOCRACY

IN

A

WORLD

OF

TENSIONS,

A

SYMPOSIUM

PREPARED

BY

UNESCO 527 (R. McKeon ed. 1951), cited in H. MAYO, supra note 236, at 21 n.l.
The ideas of equality and brotherhood among men, which have existed in
varying forms since human society began - and which contemporary Communism theoretically accepts are principles which fighters for progress
and freedom will always try to achieve. To criticize these ideals would not
only be reactionary and ugly, but futile and foolish as well. The wish to
attain them for mankind is inextinguishable. M. DJILAS, THE NEW CLASS
at vii (1957).
250 For a discussion of Soviet "democratic" theory, see THE U.S.S.R. AFTER 50
YEARS 9-15 (S. Hendel & R. Braham eds. 1965). See also text accompanying notes
119, 150-51 supra.
Summarily, Soviet democratic theory is that of "democratic centralism" a communist system or principle of hierarchic organization that seeks to
combine democratic participation of the rank and file in the discussion of
policy and the election of officers, and of delegates to the next higher unit
with strict obedience by the members and lower bodies to the decisions of
the higher units and with absolute authority residing in fact at the apex of
the hierarchic structure . . . .

DICTIONARY 600 (3d ed. 1961).
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the definitional conflict is a necessary correlate of the pluralistic
world value systems, for international intercourse may affect and
change ethnocentric value systems and even give birth to a relatively new ideology.
The political system and theory of a nation or group of nations
may also undergo a metamorphic change or development within
the particular democratic state. For example, the United States,
which was founded on the governmental theory of republicanism,251
is currently undergoing a cataclysmic social revolution which is effectuating a tremendous change in the American democratic theory
and system. 52
A large part of the American foreign policy dilemma emanates
from the failure to understand the culturally differing attitudes,
attributes, and levels of structural-intellectual developmentea of the
peoples of foreign nations.
In regard to democratic government, it is dear that such a government, if operated by a people wholly unprepared to understand
the sources of social evils and the effects of proposed reform, may
enact policies which produce chaos and result in reactions toward
Democratic centralism is "authoritarian" in the Soviet Union to the extent that political power is concentrated in the hands of the Politburo, a small autocratic elite which
is not directly responsible to the body of the people. See J. TRISKA & D. FiNLEY,
supra note 68, at 61, 72-73.
251Yet even as late as the latter part of the 18th century, democracy was
not thought well of by most people, and certainly not by most of the educated
or ruling classes. For the most part, it was also used with disapproval by the
Founding Fathers of the American Constitution, who preferred republicanism as a word and a theory of government, though some of them occasionally
gave the name "republicanism" to what would often be called "democracy"
today. H. MAYO, supra note 236, at 25.
See note 259 infra & accompanying text.
252 The Negroes' assertion of the right to equality and the effort to establish a minimum annual wage are only two manifestations of the current American social revolution. It is interesting to note that Alexis de Tocquevilie, writing in 1835, stated:
If ever America undergoes great revolutions, they will be brought about
by the presence of the black race on the soil of the United States; that is to
say, they will owe their origin, not to the equality, but to the inequality of
condition. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEmOCRACY iN AMERICA 314-15 (H.
Reeve trans., F. Bowen ed., 4th ed. 1864).
See generally W. BRINK & L. HARRs, THE NEGRO REVOLUTION IN AMERICA
(1964); Hoover, Violence in American Society - A Problem of Critical Concern,
36 GEo. WAs-L L. REV. 407 (1967).
253 See generally C. LevI-STRAUss, STRucruRAL ANTHROPOLOGY (C. Jacobson & B.
Grundfest trans. 1963).
[LMvi-Strauss] rebels against Western society's smug habit of imposing its
standards on the rest of the world. He notes that so-called primitive societies represent perhaps 99 per cent of the total experience of humanity.
He refutes the traditional notion that these societies are barbaric, or less
rational than our own. They are merely different. There are no superior
societies. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 28, 34, col. 4.
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absolutism and tyranny. 254 For this reason Aristotle questioned
the value of pure democracy.2 55 History is full of the ill effects
of premature popular institutions. Effective democracy, in the
sense of popular participation in government, depends upon adequate preparation in the society of means of communication, of
social understanding,
of economic opportunity, and of political
2 56
toleration.
254

Latent dysfunctionality may arise in all policies which attempt to solve polycentric social problems. Success in a democratic government must be concerned with
multidimensional effects. No social catalyst produces only one effect;, each has both
the desired effect and a host of side effects. The latent dysfunctional problem is to
control and direct future sequential effects. For a recognition of this problem in the
area of the physiological sciences, see note 241 supra.
Sociological and behavioralistic analysis may provide the understanding necessary to
control and direct future sequential effects.
Sociology need not make men wise or even prudent. But, through its
successive uncovering of latent social problems and through its clarification
of manifest social problems, sociological inquiry does make men increasingly
accountable for the outcome of their collective and institutionalized actions.
There is a further use of this distinction between manifest and latent
social problems, between the social conditions currently judged by designated
categories of men in society to be undesirable and the social conditions that
would be so judged, were their multifarious consequences known. Among
other things, the distinction helps sociologists themselves recognize how they
can move beyond prevalent social beliefs, practices, and judgments without
entering upon the misplaced career of trying to impose their own values

upon others.

Merton, Social Problems and Sociological Theory, in CON-

TEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 697, 710 (R. Merton & R. Nisbet eds.
1961), citing G. MYRDAL, supra note 246, at 1035-64; G. MYRDAL, VALUE
IN SOCIAL THEORY (1958).
See also Schmeck, U.S. Urged to Rely on the Behavioral Sciences, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3,
1968, at 16, cols. 2-4 (city ed.) (discussing a report by a committee of the National
Research Council); Loftus, Political Scientists Back a Policy Role, N.Y. Times, Sept.
5, 1968, at 38, cols. 1-3 (city ed.).
For a Soviet example of latent dysfunctionality because of only unidimensional
success in socially engineering a change in female mobilization in Central Asia, see
Massell, Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu:
The Case of Soviet Central Asia, 2 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 179, 221 (1968). For a discussion of latent dysfunctionality in democracies preparing to meet a "common enemy,"
see note 284 infra.
2-5 See Barker, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE at liii-iv (E. Barker
trans. & ed. 1962). "Democracy is liable to change from the older and more moderate
forms to a new and extreme type. This is largely due to the courting of the people by
eager candidates for office." Id. at 214.
256 Q. WRIGHT, supra note 245, at 168 (footnotes added), citing DEMOCRACY IN
A WORLD OF TENSIONS, A SYMPOsIuM PREPARED BY UNESCO, supra note 249.
On the other hand, optimistic doctrines of the historical inevitability

of democracy must be rejected. There is no guarantee of success or failure
for any political system, and so democracy, too, must be regarded as a "calculated risk." And democrats will merely fall into the same pit of irrationality as any fanatic if they adopt the dogma that evolution will underwrite
the values of democracy. "W~e can feel no assurance that the peculiar arrangements that define the American system will hold some special place in
the affections of an indulgent Province." [D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 535 (1951).] Yet although there need be no such implied

belief as Tocqueville's -

that democracy is inevitable -

the democrat must
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Hence, on a rather sophisticated and abstract level, it might be
operationally questioned whether the American people themselves
are adequately prepared for what can be termed "utopian democracy" on a national or domestic scale - let alone an international
or supranational scale. Domestic policy within the United States
continues to reflect and, in a sense, perpetuate the mass American
white middle class prejudices which tend to be only quasi- if not
blatently anti-democratic.257 The rigid stratification of social classes
within the United States is itself a paradox to the mouthed unrestrained egalitarian theory.2 5 8 Furthermore, the Electoral College
and the state-qua-state, as opposed to population ("one man, one
obviously believe democracy possible and even probable, and that men are
capable of it. H. MAYO, supra note 236, at 308 (foomote inserted).
257 See, e.g., RE3PORT OF TiE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DIS-

ORDERS (1968).

The basic and frightening conclusion of this monumental report is

this: "Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white - separate
and unequal." Id. at 1. "Within two decades, this division could be so deep that it
would be almost impossible to unite .......
Id. at 225. See also Katz, Municipal
Courts Another Urban Ill, 20 CASE W. RES. L REv. 87 (1968) (this issue),
where empirically based distinctions are drawn between the judicial treatment afforded
the black person as opposed to that afforded the white person at the municipal court
level; Steel, Nine Men in Black Who Think White, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1968, § 6
(Magazine), at 56, where the author criticizes the Supreme Court in recent years for
having "waltzed in time to the music of the white majority - one step forward, one
step backward and sidestep, sidestep." Id. at 122.
Note also the following statement:
In the context of the Vietnam War, America's internal colonial tendendes become more pronounced.... The dominant white attitude is opposed
to integration, or pro-integration only when the kind and degree is determined by whites. With the preoccupation of foreign war, the white response
to Negro demands is becoming more hollow and irritable. It is difficult
to conceive of this society being mobilized internally for full racial equality
while being bogged down abroad in wars against nonwhite people. It is
more likely that a white backlash will grow at home when it is rampant in
American foreign policy. . . . And as the American presence in Vietnam
becomes completely colonialist in effect, the colonial status of the ghetto is
bound to be reinforced at home. The riots and "Black Power" ideology are
more like anticolonial movements than like the integrationist civil rights
movement of the early sixties. Hayden, in Symposium: What's Happening
to America, 34 PARTISAN REv. 13, 21 (1967).
258Note, however, that behavioralistically there may be a universal necessity for
stratification in any social system. If this is true, then perhaps America's "pure"
egalitarian theory should be modified to reflect functional-structural reality. Compare Davis & Moore, Some Principles of Stratification, 10 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV.
242 (1945), with Tumin, Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis, 18
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 387 (1953). But see Davis, Reply, 18 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL
REV. 394 (1953); Moore, Comment, 18 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 397 (1953). See
generally B. BARBm, STRATIFICATION (1957); Davis, Gardner & Gardner, The Class
System of the White Caste, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 371 (1958);
Converse, The Shifting Role of Class in Political Attitudes and Behavior, in id. at 388;
Bronfenbrenner, Socialization and Social Class Through Time and Space, in id. at 400.
For a discussion of the rigidity of "class" structure within the Negro community, see
E. FRA IER, BLACK BoURGEOISiE (1962).
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vote"), apportionment in the United States Senate remain as patent
vestiges of historical republicanism in this supposed era of enlightened democracy.2 59
Under the ill-defined principles of modern democracy, success
in American foreign policy is measured by the degree of fulfillment
of three primary goals: "the absence of military conflict throughout the world; the development of foreign governments and institutions in the light of, or at least not antagonistic to, American
ideals and values; land] the continued assurance of our domestic security. '260 The growing problem in the United States, which reflects the maturation of public opinion since World War II and of
which the populace is becoming increasingly aware, concerns the
extent to which the public can control foreign policy and participate
in policy formulation for achieving the above mentioned goals.' 61
259 For a succinct, critical discussion on the Electoral College, see ABA COMM.
ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM (1967); partially reprinted in 53 A.B.A.J. 219
(1967); reviewed in, Practicing Lawyers' Guide to the Current Law Magazines (A.
Keeffe ed.), 53 A.B.A.J. 478 (1967). See also Banzhaf, Reflections on the Electoral
College - One Man, 3,312 votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College,
13 VILL. L. REV. 303 (1968); Feerick, Electoral College: Why it was Created, 54
A.B.A.J. 249 (1968); Practicing Lawyers' Guide to the Current Law Magazines (A.
Keeffe ed.), 53 A.B.A.J. 287 (1967).
The United States Supreme Court has held that both state legislative houses must
be apportioned on a population basis. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964). In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Supreme
Court stated:
The system of representation in the two Houses of the Federal Congress
is one ingrained in our Constitution, as part of the law of the land. It
is one conceived out of compromise and concession indispensable to the establishment of our federal republic ....
The fact that almost three-fourths of
our present States were never in fact independently sovereign does not detract
from our view that the so-called federal analogy is inapplicable as a sustaining precedent for state legislative apportionments. Id, at 574.
See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (the equal protection issue raised respecting state legislative apportionment plans presents a justiciable issue); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963) (the county unit system used in the State of Georgia for the
nomination and election of United States Senators and statewide officers is invalid
under the equal protection clause); Westberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (Article
I of the Federal Constitution requires Congressional seats to be apportioned equally
on a population basis so far as practicable); Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966)
(if provided by statute, then state legislature may elect the governor when in a general
election no candidates received a majority of votes); Avery v. Midland County of Texas,
390 U.S. 474 (1968) ("one man, one vote" applies also to the municipal corporation
level). See generally R. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF
EQUAL REPRESENTATION (1965).
On "republicanism," see note 251 supra & accompanying text. In light of the
1968 National Conventions, it might be cogently argued that these too are institutions
of another era. See NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1968, at 24-50.
260 Ellenport, American Foreign Policy and Mass Democracy, 36 AM. SCHOLAR
589 (1967).
261 Id.; E. LEFEVER, ETHICS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 162-80 (1957).
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Since World War II, three "publics" have, in effect, emerged within
the United States. The first group maintains only a minimal interest in foreign affairs, and thus either acquiesces in the President's
actions without thought or deems his program to be correct. Another group of the populace remains concerned with foreign policy,
but has collectively resigned itself to the fact that mere citizens can
do nothing. Even though members of this group often sense that
a different approach should be taken on certain problems, they refrain from action. The third group is highly concerned about
America's foreign policy. Significantly, this last group is steadily
growing in numbers and volume, on both wings of the political
spectrum, and is attempting to affect policy operations directly. 62
Playing the game of big power politics or "from positions of
strength"2 63 can no longer suffice in America's attempts to achieve
her three basic goals in foreign policy. "Direct dealing with small
nations and regions are replacing the old spheres of influence.
This is reason enough even without third public 'idealism' for asserting that cultural and sociological understanding of foreign af2
fairs must be incorporated into foreign policy formulation."
See generally E. ScHATTscHNEIDER,THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW
OF DEMOCRAcY IN AMERIcA (1960).
262
G. ALMOND, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND FOREIGN POLICY 231-34 (1950);
Ellenport, supra note 260, at 590. See Feuer, The Elite of the Alienated, N.Y. Times,
March 26, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 22. See also J. ROSENAU, THE ATTENTIVE PUBLIC
AND FOREIGN POLICY (1968); J.ROSENAU, PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY
(1961).
2 63
See note 215 supra & accompanying text.
2
64 Ellenport, supranote 260, at 592-93. The author concludes:
If mass democracy has no direct role to play in controlling foreign policy,
the executive has a duty, a commitment, to represent American ideals and
values in its policies. The government should profit from some criticism
instead of denouncing all dissent To help find success, the government
must adopt measures to insure a creativity and generosity on its part, to
humanize its power and programs abroad, to win friends and not just influence peoples. Id. at 593.
But note, the "duty" of the Executive may be shaped by his own teleological selfprediction:
Yes, it makes a difference who is in the White House - and particularly
in the area of foreign policy ... On -the domestic front, what is possible
is determined by the relative political strength of the contending interests
and the President will look like a fine leader if he has an absolute majority
for his programs ....
But there is no such precision of alignment when
it comes to international questions and the President can create, rather than
obey, his consensus. Harrington, in Symposium: What's Happening to America, 34 PARTISAN REV. 13, 17 (1967).
On the methodological problems of prediction, optimal decision, and determination
of human values, see C. CHURCHMAN, PREDICTION AND OPTIMAL DECISION: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES OF A SCIENCE OF VALUES (1961). For a definition of teleology
as used in the above context, see note 40 supra.
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As noted above, until quite recently the American public had
made relatively no effort to control or directly guide foreign policy. Furthermore, the American populace is not exonerated by
merely saying that they have been uninformed or misinformed, or
that American foreign policy has not been shaped by any democratic process, or that, so far as foreign policy is concerned, the
American democratic process has been suspended. "The majority
of American citizens have been too concerned with their own private affairs to notice, much less to protest against, being manipulated rather than consulted. 2 65 The United States Senate itself has
recently demanded a greater voice in determining foreign policy
commitments.
If the American people had been given or had
demanded a voice in shaping their government's postwar foreign
policy, "instead of suffering themselves to be indoctrinated and led
like sheep, the resulting postwar policy might not have been much
wiser at the beginning, but its unwisdom would probably not have
' 267
become frozen into inflexibility for so long a period.
In a manner of emphasizing the American dilemma, one writer
Note also the following statement by Gunnar Myrdal:
After two decades of continuous study, I have come to the conclusion
that foreign-policy decisions are usually less well-founded on the available
facts and alternatives than domestic-policy decisions; that they are, in general,
much more influenced by irrational motives. In my opinion, this is true in
all countries. But the consequences are much more damaging, of course,
when less than rational foreign-policy decisions are taken by a superpower
like the United States, which feels responsible for (and is interfering with)
developments all over the globe. Myrdal, "With What Little Wisdom The
World Is Ruled," N.Y. Times, July 18, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 20, 20-21.
265
J. WARBURG, THE UNITED STATES IN THE POSTWAR WORLD 290 (1966).
266 114 CONG. REc. S2360 (daily ed. March 7, 1968); see Demand for a Voice,
TIME, March 15, 1968, at 14. See also Finney, '67 Congress Sought to Exert
ForeignPolicy Role, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1967, at 64, cols. 2-5.
The resolution which emerged from the recent hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expresses a similar sentiment:
Resolved, That a commitment for purposes of this resolution means the
use of, or promise to a foreign state or people to use, the Armed Forces of
the United States either immediately or upon the happening of certain events,
and
That it is the sense of the Senate that, under any circumstances which
may arise in the future pertaining to situations in which the United States
is not already involved, the commitment of the Armed Forces of the United
States to hostilities on foreign territory for any purpose other than to repel
an attack on the United States or to protect United States citizens or property
properly will result from a decision made in accordance with constitutional
processes, which, in addition to appropriate executive action, require affirmative action by Congress specifically intended to give rise to such commitment. S. Res. 187, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
See generally Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771 (1968).
2 7
6 J. WARBURG, supra note 265, at 290.
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has made the following suggestion for including the third public in
the foreign policy-making structure:
The real answer lies in internal changes within the policy-making structure. Basically it lies in eliciting and employing a new
body of foreign policy formulators, a group of professionals embodying minimally the traits of those who are often called to
Washington for their thoughts and advice. This elite will have to
be less rigid and narrow in its views than the present State Department officials are; it must be capable of resisting manipulation.
It must, in short, be based on more than the services of that temporary, wel1-meaning, yet amateur adviser-analyst-policy maker. 268
The United States adherence to the Domino Theory as the rationally deductive principle for determining foreign policy in Southeast Asia and the United States refusal to sign the international human rights treaties are examples of the American foreign policy dilemma.
B.

The Domino Theory: An Exercise in Rational-Deductive
Thinking

The inappropriateness of America's rigid adherence to the Domino Theory can be more fully understood by the analytical technique
of game theory. Game theory provides interesting insights and analogies for analyzing the effectiveness of various approaches to decision-making in foreign policy.2 69 Basically, game theory is the study
268

Ellenport, supra note 260, at 592. Such a body of foreign policy formulators
has been suggested in the past:
Insisting that [President) Johnson would have to declare his decision not
merely to reevaluate but also to "redirect" the commitment to Viet Nam,
[Senator Robert Kennedy] suggested that the President should then appoint
a commission for the purpose of proposing a new policy. Kennedy's suggested members for the group included himself and such men as Yale President Kingman Brewster, former Ambassador Edwin 0. Reischauer, former
Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Generals Lauris Norstad and
Matthew Ridgway.
[Defense Secretary Clark) Clifford carried the proposition to Johnson,
who immediately objected that 1) it was the kind of political deal that no
President could or should enter into; 2) it would say, in effect, that he had
been wrong, and Hanoi would thus receive an immeasurable lift, 3) the
President would be surrendering his responsibilities to a committee; 4) the
names Kennedy proposed constituted a "stacked deck"; and 5) in any event,
he had already heard the views of some of those on Kennedy's list. TIME,
March 22, 1968, at 18.
See also Loftus, supra note 254; Schmeck, supra note 254.
269 It is understandable why, in the period following the close of World War
II, when so much attention was paid, especially in the United States, to the
impending power struggle between the Communist and the non-Communist
worlds, the appearance of game theory on the scientific horizon was hailed
with enthusiasm and with great expectations.
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and analysis of conflict relationships. Much depends on the choice
of values, criteria, notions of what is "rational," and the communications and relationships established with other parties of the "game."
These choices themselves have relatively little connection with the
particular game being played. "They are not strategic choices, i.e.,
choices rationalized in terms of advantages they bestow on [the parties] in a particular conflict. Rather they are choices which we make
because of the way we view ourselves, and the world, including the
other players. ' 2 0 'Game theory presumes at least two players, that
choices as to moves will be "rational" and in accordance with certain prescribed rules, and that the utilities - or that which is gained
2 71
or lost - are measurable on some scale.
War, or war-like conflict relationships, can often be analyzed as
a zero-sum game.172 Thus, the United States implementation of its
foreign policy in Southeast Asia might be viewed through the application of game theory. It must be kept in mind, however, that
while such an analogy may lend insight to the policy analysis, the
imposition of a zero-sum construct on such intra-specific aggression
can be criticized as intellectualizing what might be viewed as "irrational" behavior, as not accounting for "desire" or "bluff" or other
nonstrategic choice variables, as not accounting for multiple configurations and the inter-play with other actions or conflict relation73
ships, and as falling prey to the reductionistic fallacy.
People had witnessed the increasing abstruseness of the sciences geared
to military applications. World War II was called the physicists' war. Toward its final phases, World War II was rapidly becoming a mathematicians'
war with cybernetic devices and electronic computers beginning to play a
decisive role. It is assumed in many quarters that World War III (which
many feel to be a matter-of-fact culmination of existing trends) will be
truly a mathematicians' war. A. RAPOPORT, Two-PBRSoN GAME THEORY:
THE ESSENTIAL IDEAS 189 (1966).
See also SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND POLICY PLANNING (E. Quade & W. Boucher eds.
1968).
270
A. RAPOPORT, supra note 269, at 214.
271 See generally A. RAPOPORT, supra note 269; E. VENTTSEL, AN INTRODUCrION
To THE THEORY OF GAMES (J. Wristian & M. Slater trans. 1963); Rapoport, Use
and Misuse of Game Theory, SCIENTIFIC AM., Dec. 1962, at 108. For a discussion
of ordinal, ordinal with natural origin, interval, and ratio scales, see W. TORGERSON,
THEORY AND METHODS OF SCALING 15-21 (1958).
272 "A game is called a zero-sum game if the sum of the payoffs is zero, that is, if
one side loses exactly as much as the other side wins. In zero-sum games, the interests
of the players are completely opposed." E. VENITSEL, supra note 271, at 2.
273 The reductionistic fallacy is the falsification of knowledge and theoretical concepts through oversimplification. The other extreme is reification or "thingifying."
See note 62 supra & accompanying text (example of Marxian reductionism); note 319
infra ("rattamorphism").
Furthermore, the analogy may be fallacious if the Viemnam conflict is not a zero-
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Arguably then, the Domino Theory in American foreign policy 274 and the generalized fear of an international communist movement are premised on the assumption that the East and West are
playing a zero-sum game, that the "game" itself will not be changed
or abandoned, and that the players (East and West) will not compromise or co-operate but will play until there is an ultimate loss
75
which terminates the conflict situation.
The Domino Theory in America's foreign policy is an example
of rational-deductive thinking as opposed to the high integration
index of the disjointed incrementalistic strategy.2 7 6 With the rasum game.

See T. SCHELLING, ARMs AND INF.UENcE (1966).

A nonzero-sum

game analysis might then be appropriate - but inherently more "complex. "
274 The Domino Theory, in American foreign policy, posits that a communist takeover in one country among a group of relatively neutral nations will, by force of
physical and psychological pressures, inevitably lead to successive communist takeovers in all neighboring countries - the other nations will fall, like a row of dominoes,
under communist domination. (Note, however, this definitional attempt may be an
exercise in reductionism, for the Domino Theory may be only a small rationally deductive segment of some larger disjointed incrementalistic strategy.)
275 Conversely, both sides would play until there was a "win."
But the word "win" is another of our leathery words which can stand
reexamination for precision of meaning. In one connotation the word "win"
is used to suggest a comparison of the immediate postwar position of a
country with its prewar position. In this sense none of the initial contestants
"won" in the First World War or in the Second World War. It is probable
that no one could "win" a third world war, in the sense of being richer,
happier or better off after such a war than before it, even if no atomic weapons were used. If atomic weapons were used in all-out, city-to-city attack by
both sides the conclusion is certain.
In another connotation the word "win" is used to suggest a comparison
of the postwar position of one of the adversaries with the postwar position of
the other adversary. In this sense it is quite possible that in a general nuclear
war one side or the other could "win" decisively. Even a small initial imbalance in relative capabilities, other things being equal, could grow rapidly
into a decisive imbalance as the war progressed. Nitze, Atoms, Strategy
andPolicy, 34 FoREIGN AFFAmS 187, 189-90 (1956).
Similarly, both sides might play until a "draw" or "stalemate." For this discussion, the
possibility of a change in "payoffs" and the creation of a new "saddle point" will be
omitted. But see note 273 supra.
276The disjointed incrementalistic strategy has been described in note 208 supra.
When we speak of disjointed incrementalism as a strategy for analysis, we
mean only to describe one set of practices that, however subtly and idiosyncratically each mind works, represents a point of convergence for policy analysts in their adaptations to the difficulties of problem solving and evaluation. The set of adaptations is relatively simple, crude, almost wholly conscious, and public; it can be discussed with the same concepts and language
that were employed in discussing the synoptic ideal. We do not need to use
the language, for example, of sensor-motor coordinations, perceptive organizations, or concept formation (as psychologists study it). D. BRAYBROOKE & C. INDBLOM, supranote 208, at 82 (emphasis added).

The "adaptations" mentioned in the quote above are discussed in text accompanying
notes 357-60 infra. The "synoptic ideal" is the attempt at all-comprehensiveness in
problem solving.
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tional-deductive approach, one aspires to construct a set of principles sufficient to generate an answer to each evaluative problem.177

The Domino Theory establishes naive principles concern-

ing the necessity of the United States to imperialistically intervene
in the internal affairs of foreign countries in an effort to protect
her own territorial imperative. These naive principles delimit the
structural content of the United States foreign policy and impose,
to some extent, a rational-deductive approach on our foreign policy
decision-making processes.
Without questioning the moral and legal aspects of the role of
the United States in Vietnam, 78 it can be argued that the naive priorities

79

or glorified rational-deductive approach in our foreign pol-

icy decision-making should be changed. Such a change would not
necessarily mean that present goals would be changed, but if the
change were to a more highly integrative evaluative method, then
at least the goals would not necessarily have to be used to justify
the means. To assume the all-conclusiveness of the Domino Theory
is to make the same flight into fantasy as is made when assuming a
Comprehensiveness is often seen as logically necessary for rational choice;
in fact, rational choice comes close to being defined as a choice that, inter
alia, responds to a comprehensive consideration of all relevant variables.
Herbert A. Simon has written, "Rational choice will be feasible to the extent
that the limited set of factors upon which decision is based corresponds, in
nature, to a closed system of variables - that is, to the extent that significant
indirect effects are absent."
It is generally conceded, of course, that such comprehensiveness is an ideal
rather than an achievement. Id. at 39, citing H. SIMoN, ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR 83 (1959); see note 357 infra.
The synoptic ideal and its adaptive failures are discussed in text accompanying notes
357-60 infra.
2
77 D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 208, at 31-32.
Let ultimate values be expressed in general principles satisfactory to
everybody who is ready to attend to the arguments identifying them - or,
if there is no hope of that, satisfactory at least to those who are now undertaking a specific job of evaluation. Let these principles, which may embody
notions of happiness, welfare, justice, or intuitive notions of goodness, be
stated so exactly that they may be arranged intelligibly in an order of priority that indicates precisely which principles govern the application of others
and when. Then derive within the limits of such a system intermediate
principles that are suitable for application in particular cases, and that allowing for rare cases of equality in net benefits - will indicate unambiguously which of alternative policies is to be chosen, according to the values
they would promote. Id. at 9.
This rational-deductive approach is suitable for problems involving a moderately high
integration index of information processing. See H. SCHRODER, M. DRIVER & S.
STRUFERT, supra note 208, at 20; Figure 1, at pp. 242-43 infra; text accompanying
notes 398-401 infra.
278 But see note 244 supra.
279 The naive priorities and naive criteria methods for policy determination are
discussed in note 306 infra.
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zero-sum game construct on war and war-like conflicts. The principle criticism of the rational-deductive approach is that it does not
allow for structural change and is ill-suited for games, or problemsituations, of imperfect information. In war-like conflicts there is
not only imperfect information but there is not even clear knowledge as to the prediction of future moves by either party. The Vietnam conflict, for example, has sequentially snow-balled into an
ever-increasing political dilemma for the United States government.
This dilemma may have been intensified because of shifting policy
determinations which were caused by continuous reinterpretations of
the imperfect information input and which had been constrained to
the deductivism of the Domino Theory.
Certainly, the irony of a rigid adherence to the rational-deductive Domino Theory is apparent when one envisions the political
theorists of the communist countries sitting around a table discussing Vietnam or, better, Czechoslovakia's liberalization efforts in
terms of forestalling successive Western victories. Still, the United
States continues to exude concrete manifestations of its total submission to naive priorities and rational-deductivism. Although the
American government did voice its respect for the Czech efforts, in
so doing it seemed to ignore any consideration of mankind's precarious position, for at the same time the United States Congress
blocked approval of the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Treaty and quickly supported, to the tune of $5.5 billion, the dangerous folly of the (ineffective) Sentinel anti-ballistic missile sys280
tem.
The apparent use of simplistic evaluative approaches is espe280 Concerning the Czechoslovakian situation, see notes 231-34 supra & accompanying text. On the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, see note 224
supra & accompanying text. On the anti-ballistic missile system, see notes 215 and
227 supra & accompanying text. See also Coffey, The Anti-Ballistic Missile Debate,
45 FOREIGN AFFAmS 403 (1967); Inglis, The Anti-Ballistic Missile: A Dangerous
Folly, SATURDAY REV., Sept. 7, 1968, at 26.
The plain fact is that the only long-haul safety for the United States
and for the world, including the Soviet Union - lies in extending the
kind of careful negotiations that produced the nuclear test-ban treaty in 1963
and the nonproliferation [draft] treaty this year. The Sentinel defense not
only will not improve American security - the testimony of scientific experts
is massive on this point - but it will destroy the prospects for those vital
negotiations, in addition to plating in jeopardy the progress represented by
those two treaties. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1968, § E, at 14, col.
1.
"The weaponry of the past is no longer relevant, for man's battle in this era of
overkill is for social improvement. He must arm himself accordingly." Gavin, The
Weapons of 1984, SATURDAY REV., Aug. 31, 1968, at 13 [the author is Lt. Gen.
James M. Gavin, USA (Ret.)].
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dally fallacious in light of our professed democratic ideology, unless
that ideology is meant only for domestic consumption. War itself
is antithetical to basic democratic theory, which stresses humane and
potentially universal principles and values - especially those of
peace, order, compromise, and political equality - extending beyond the Western tradition out of which democracy grew.
Other bodies of modern thought - secular humanitarianism,
Marxism, socialism - regardless of how internationalist their principles, have also been unable to prevent war. Neither, for that
matter, has religious unity or theology been able to do so. (It is,
of course, open to anyone to argue that some or all of these systems of thought do in fact contain recipes for permanent peace if
only men would choose to apply them.) 28' The principles and
values of democracy, however potentially universal, are dearly not
enough to ensure peace, even if all the countries of the world became democracies. 2 82 It is possible for a democracy to be national283
istic and aggressive as well as internationalistic and pacific.

Indeed, democracy has been criticized as being inherently warlike and, therefore, prone to the creation of conflicts in international
relations. Exponents of this criticism argue that war and international conflicts are necessary to preserve a democratic state. In Sir
Robert Filmer's words:
As [democracy) is begot by sedition, so it is nourished by arms:
it can never stand without wars, either with an enemy abroad, or
with friends at home. The only way to preserve it is to have some
powerful enemy near . ..for the common danger of an enemy
2 84

keeps them in better unity than the laws they make themselves.

281 For a possible reason why man has not chosen to apply these peace recipes,
see discussion on human aggression in notes 236-37 supra & accompanying text.
282 Compare this statement with Professor Arnold Toynbee's sophistical, yet relatively naive, statement in note 240 supra.
28
3H.
MAYO, supra note 236, at 296.
28 4
J. LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 247 (T. Cook ed. 1947), cited in
H. MAYo, supra note 236, at 296 n.10. See note 245 supra.
But there are latent dysfunctional effects which arise from the preparation to meet
the "common enemy":
This preparation . . . tends to convert the democracies themselves into

dictatorships. Rising expenditures tend to governmentalize the economy, to
centralize government - thereby reducing the degree of local autonomy and
individual freedom - and to augment the position of the executive, especally that of the defense department, at the expense of the legislature and the
courts. The increasing role of the military, and its consciousness of the
needs of security and the dangers of subversion behind the lines, tend to
reduce civil liberties, to block channels of information, to broaden the inquisitions of investigatory agencies, to reduce the influence of public opinion
and parties, and to create an atmosphere of secrecy and suspicion. Freedom
of communication, of science, of economic enterprise, of social relations is
likely to be diminished. By this process the need for defense, if serious
and protracted, tends to convert free societies into "garrison states." Q.
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In our search for some common unifying enemy, 8 5 too often
our foreign policy is directed against some mythical "demagogic"
state personification, the fear of which justifies attempts at neoimperialism and geo-political domination by force. 86 This incongruence of the American foreign policy dilemma is best stated on
the protestor's button: "Kill for Peace," and more existentially:
"Love Hate Not War."
To recapitulate, in one sense the Domino Theory imposes a
zero-sum construct on America's Vietnam policy by establishing a
general monolithic principle which dictates unambiguously the policy or strategy to be followed in a particular conflict-situation, without allowing for the fact that the information inputs in the policymaking process are imperfect and the fact that structural variables
may change, thus necessitating a change or shifting of goals. 8 7 The
United States, in an effort to meet the inadequacies inherent in its
deductive rationality,2 88 has recently adopted an open option policy
WRIGHT, supra note 245, at 274, citing Lasswell, The Garrison State, 48
AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 455 (1941).
See also Lasswell, The Interrelations of World Organization and Society, 55 YALE
L.J. 889 (1946).
285 For further discussion of common unifying enemies, see note 236 supra & accompanying text. Note, however, that this "search" is historically difficult to justify,
e.g. America's century of isolationism as opposed to her "tradition of violence."
286 [O1ur foreign policies will lead us - in Asia and in Latin America into an increasing neo-imperialist role. The cant will be different from
that of nineteenth-century imperialists - though not all that different but the result will be persistent attempts to manage the political and economic directions of the underdeveloped countries. Hentoff, in Symposium:
What's Happening to America, 34 PARTIsAN REv. 13, 25 (1967) (emphasis added).
A leading Soviet physicist, Andrei D. Sakharov, has recently issued a plea for
worldwide rejection of "demagogic myths" in an urgent program to avert nuclear war
and famine. TIME, Aug. 2, 1968, at 26; Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 11, 1968, at
19, cols. 4-6; Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 22, 1968, at 6, cols. 1-8. Sakharov's prognosis was rebutted in an Izvestia article by the Soviet economist, Dr. Viktor A. Cheprakov. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1968, at 1, cols. 6-8 (city ed.). For the full translated
text of this rebuttal, see id. at 12, cols. 2-7.
287 It might be argued that it is the existing zero-sum game condition or viewpoint which superimposes the monolithic principle. If the communists were in fact to
view international policy as a zero-sum game, then it might appear that the Domino
Theory is a fairly accurate reflection of reality.
Concerning changes in the structural variables, note that:
Some game theorists will probably feel that "inductive game theory" is properly not game theory, any more than experimental mathematics deserves the
name of mathematics. The crucial factor to be introduced is that of an environment (including the other player) which is not given at the outset but
which is to be found out in the process of playing the game, whereby one
reacts to what one learns and by these reactions modifies the environment.
A. RAPoPORT, supra note 269, at 144.
A distinction between structuraland content variables is made in note 402 infra.
288 Rationality may bifurcate into individual rationality and collective ration-
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to allow for change in the effectuating means without restructuring the professed end-goals. As one writer has stated:
The open option policy may possibly be viewed as a restatement of America's earlier practice of waiting and finally reacting
to foreign affairs. Nevertheless, it has proved itself unable to
achieve the consistency basic to any foreign policy. Such a lack is
seen in the appearance since 1964 of a credibility gap created by
contradictory official statements or demonstrably false ones. This
has resulted from [President] Johnson's effort to substitute a rhetorical consistency for a real one in foreign policy. This in turn
has led to another unique aspect of this Administration, namely,
that it is finding itself committed to its publicly stated policies and
promises whether these are its real
s9 goals or not (for example, true

democracy in South Vietnam)

Using the disjointed incrementalistic strategy on the international level would at least allow the government to shift goals to
reflect structural change. The United States might then want to,
and at least would be able to, stop playing "Vietnam" and play
"Africa" instead.29 9 If the United States government were not, in
fact, participating in what has the appearance of a zero-sum game,
then its initiation of the Paris Peace Talks in an effort to solve the
Vietnam crisis could indeed be viewed as another example of "politic of mutual example." ' 1 But peace talks and peace movements
ality, and so unambivaent intuitively acceptable normative solutions are no
longer available.
Once "rationality" acquires more than one meaning, we must specify
context. ...
[We] shall define an inductive rationality, as contrasted with
deductive rationality on which the entire formal theory of games has been
based.
Classical logic distinguishes between deductive and inductive reasoning
as follows: the former proceeds from general principles to particular instances, while the latter proceeds in the opposite direction. A. RAPOPORT,
supra note 269, at 146.
See discussion of rational choice and comprehensiveness in note 276 supra.
2 89
Ellenpo, supra note 260, at 591 (emphasis added).
200 It can be cogently argued that if the rational-deductive Domino Theory is a
viable principle, then it exists perhaps to an even greater extent in Africa, with the
fulcrum presently centering on the Biafran-Nigerian civil war. See Garrison, The
"Point of No Return" For the Biafrans, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1968, § 6 (Magazine),
at 29. See also Fellows, The Unknown War In the Sudan, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22,
1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 25.
291
See text accompanying note 216 supra.
Despite the wearying lack of progress so far, leaders of the American delegation to the Paris peace talks still believe the Vietnam war will be settled
here.
After five months of the talks, there would seem to be every reason for
[the American delegates] to feel ennui and frustration. But the air the [sic]
project remains one of determined optimism.
The reason is evidently their belief, unchanged by these propagandistic
months that the North Vietnamese really do think it is in their interest to
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in a self-initiated zero-sum game, such as dominoes or war, are of
little value, except for the ideological propaganda they may provide
for either or both sides.292
Finally, an incremental approach to foreign policy conflicts
might allow for more craftsmanship in gaining the popular support
for a national war effort by allowing policy feedback in the on-going morphogenetic decision-making process.293 Certainly, the need
stop the fighting. Lewis, After 5 Months of Paris Talks, U.S. Negotiators
Keep Hoping,N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1968, at 8, col. 1 (city ed.).
Compare U.S. Aides in Paris Said to Urge Halt [to Bombing], N.Y. Times, Oct. 6,
1968, at 1, col. 2, with PresidentReady to Let Successor Resolve the War, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 9, 1968, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.).
292 Ordinarily, one thinks only of nonzero-sum games as negotiable. It would
seem that since in the zero-sum games the interests of the players are
diametrically opposed, there is nothing to negotiate. However, in the larger
context of negotiation, namely that of joint analysis of the situation, zerosum games can also be "negotiated."
As an example, imagine a situation in a game of Chess in which one
player clearly sees that he must win. If his opponent is a sufficiently competent Chess player, then he, too, will agree that inevitably victory must go
to the first player. At this point it seems futile to continue the game.
In the days when war was the "sport of kings," negotiated settlements
were the rule rather than the exception. Often the strategic potentialities
open to the contending forces were taken into account in the negotiations.
Even in our days of total and ideological wars, demands for surrender are
sometimes coupled with appeals to humanitarian rationality, e.g., "to avoid
useless bloodshed." These appeals are bids to recognize the nonzero-sum
character of the conflict. If defeat of one side is inevitable, it often seems
(especially to the prospective victor) that both sides ought to take advantage
of a rational appraisal of the outcome and to avoid useless losses. A. RAPOPORT,

supra note 269, at 212.

The long, drawn-out Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam and the stalemated peace talks in
Addis Ababa on the Nigerian-Biafran conflict may be viewed as examples of fruitless
efforts to negotiate peaceful settlements in zero-sum games. Concerning the resolution of the Vietnam conflict, one commentator has stated:
The war in Vietnam will come to an end, not through the efforts of the
peace movement, but because Realpolitik in either Washington, Hanoi or
Peking demands it.
The ddtente with Russia will then proceed at a faster rate and result in
significant disarmament moves.
Within the United States, the outbreak of relative peace will be the
occasion for a fierce debate on economic and social policy. Harrington,
supra note 264, at 19 (emphasis added).
But see Lewis, Hope for Detente Wanes it Europe, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1968, at

4, col. 3 (city ed.).
Karl Deutsch has termed this aspect goal-changingfeedback:
[Goal-changing feedback] . . . includes feedback readjustments . . . of those
internal arrangements which implied [the system's] . . . original goal, so
that the net will change its goal, or set itself new goals which it will now
have to reach if its internal disequilibrium is to be lessened. Deutsch,
Some Notes on Research on the Role of Models in the Natural and Social
Sciences, 7 SYNTHESE 506, 515 (1948-1949).
See also 0. LEWIS, supra note 40, at 34; note 333 infra (positive and negative feedback); text accompanying notes 403 and 406 infra. Morphogenetic is defined in note
333 infra.
293
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for such an approach is apparent, for the United States is seen now
through the eyes of the world as a perpetrator of basically "undemocratic" actions in its international policies and its determination of
those policies. Refusal to approve the international human rights
treaties has only served to perpetuate this image and is another ex-

ample of the American foreign policy dilemma.
C. InternationalHuman Rights Treaties:
Why Won't the United States Sign?
On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly,
responding to American initiative and American leadership, approved overwhelmingly the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.'
Only a few countries abstained - the Communist bloc,
Saudi Arabia, and the Union of South Africa. Today, 20 years
later, only three of the original 51 United Nations members have
failed to ratify more than one of the dozen or more conventions
embodying the basic principles included in the Declaration of 1948.
These three are Spain, the Union of South Africa - and the United
2 5
States. 1
The principal arguments given for the United States refusal to
sign international human rights treaties, and the rebuttals to these
arguments,29" are as follows:
History reveals that the problems which the Executive Department is now facing
are not new:

As to the mode of terminating the war and securing peace, the President is
equally wandering and indefinite. First, it is to be done by a more vigorous
prosecution of the war in the vital parts of the enemy's country; and after

apparently talking himself tired on this point, the President drops down into
a half-despairing tone, and tells us that "with a people distracted and divided
by contending factions. . . [we) may fail to secure a satisfactory peace."
A. LINCOLN, Speech in the United States House of Representatives, Jan. 12,
1848, in COLLECED WORKS 107 (J. Nicolay & J. Hay eds. 1894).
294 U.N. Doc. No. A/810, Gen. Ass. Off. Rec., 3d Sess. (I), Resolutions at 71 (Dec.
10, 1948); reprinted in W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
270 (2d ed. 1962). See Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 4
INT'L J. (CANADA) 351 (1949); Kunz, The United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 316 (1949); Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1948 BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 354.
295 The United States Senate has given its advice and consent to the Supplemental
Slavery Convention, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, T.I.A.S. 6418, Sept. 7, 1956
(entered into force with respect to the United States on Dec. 6, 1967).
296 For other arguments and rebuttals, see Gardner, A Costly Anachronism, 53
A.B.A.J. 907 (1967); Korey, Human Rights Treaties: Why is the U.S. Stalling?, 45
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 414 (1967); Luini del Russo, International Law of Human Rights:
A Pragmatic Appraisal, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 749 (1968). See generally THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTS (E. Luard ed. 1967); A. ROBERTSON, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1968); THE RULE OF LAw
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(1) A Covenant of Human Rights which did not go as far as
the constitutional Bill of Rights would be unconstitutional if ratified by the United States and could reduce the internal effectiveness
of the constitutional guarantees.2 9 7 Such a covenant, however,
could be viewed as stating minimal standards and would not prevent any nation from giving more liberty to its citizens.2 9
(2) Permission given to sovereign states by an international
covenant allowing exceptions to individual freedoms beyond those
exceptions permitted the federal government by the Constitution
would enlarge the powers of Congress. This argument is also refutable, for Congress' power to implement a treaty obligation of
the United States299 does not permit Congress to legislate in violation of established constitutional guarantees."' 0
(3) An international covenant on human rights may impose
higher standards than those required by the Federal Constitution.
If this were the case, then "[u]ndoubtedly the United States could
properly be critized diplomatically or in the United Nations if individuals were denied in this country rights guaranteed to everyone
by a Covenant of Human Rights ratified by the United States."3 0°
(4) There is a constitutional issue in drawing the line between treaty provisions which are self-executing and those which
are not, but the courts have considered treaty provisions defining
individual rights to be in the former class. 302 If the United States
is to participate effectively in international legislation especially on
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS (Int'l Comm'n of Jurists 1966);
K. VASAK & WAIKLEE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (1967); Special
Issue: International Year for Human Rights, 9 J. INT'L COMM'N OF JURIsTS, pt. 2, at
1-154 (1968). See also I. SZABO & I. KOVACS, SOCIALIST CONCEPT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (1966).
297
"Q. WRIGHT, supra note 245, at 282, citing ABA COMM. REPORT ON PEACE
AND LAW THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS 26

(1951).

298 Insistence by the United States that its standards must be accepted in such
a covenant would prevent general acceptance of the covenant and furthermore would manifest a failure of the United States to appreciate that much
variation in the relation of the individual to the state exists in different parts
of the world, and complete uniformity is neither to be expected nor desired.
Q. WRIGHT, supra note 245, at 282, citing Mead, World Culture, in THE
WORLD COMMUNITY 51, 58, 66 (Q. Wright ed. 1948).
299 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
300 See Q. WRIGHT, supra note 245, at 283.
301 Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
302 Fujii v. California, 217 P.2d 481, rehearing denied, 218 P.2d 595 (1950) (the
Supreme Court of California sustained the court of appeals, but on the ground that
the 14th amendment of the Federal Constitution, and not the United Nations Charter,
forbade the discriminatory land law). See Wright, National Courts and Human Rights,
The Fujii Case, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1950).
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subjects such as the protection of human rights, normally within
the power of the states,
the supremacy of treaties over state law
3 03
should be maintained

(5) "Treaties should be designed to promote United States interests by securing action by foreign governments in a way deemed
advantageous to the United States." 30 4 This long-standing regulation of the Department of State has been put forth as an ultimate
reason why the United States should not sign human rights conventions. 3 5 Such an argument seems overly naive, for the United
States interests can be advantageously promoted by such internal
changes in foreign countries. 30 6
The dilemma of a nation which seeks to proselytize other nations and peoples to a democratic theory based on human rights yet
which refuses to sign international human rights treaties is, to say
the least, diplomatically embarrassing. The human rights treaties
can be viewed as attempts at a minimal codification of principles
denouncing those crimes against "higher laws of humanity" for
which men were prosecuted at the Nuremberg trials.30 T Moreover,
303 Q. WRIGHT, supra note 245, at 284 (emphasis added, foomote renumbered
and rewritten). See Note, The United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the
Domestic Law of the UnitedStates, 48 BOsTON U.L. REv. 106 (1968).

304 U.S. FOREIGN SERvIcE MANuAL § 311 (1966).
305 Raymond, Don't Ratify the Human Rights Conventions, 54 A.B.A.J. 141
(1968).
306 In evaluative theory, such an argument would fall into the naive criteria or
naive priorities approach: "One primitive approach that might be called 'the naive
criteria method' holds that merely announcing a few general values - 'security,' 'employment,' and 'price stability,' perhaps - supplies enough evaluative machinery to
propel descriptive knowledge toward definite recommendations." D. BRAYBROOKE
& C. LINDBLOM, supra note 208, at 6.
A common gesture toward improving the naive criteria method - but
one that is itself dearly defective - takes the form of "the naive priorities
method." This method takes the difficulty about conflicting values into account. Its defect is that it goes no further than merely ranking all the values
considered in order of priority. It may put "freedom" ahead of "economic
growth" and "economic growth" ahead of "equality"; or "combatting unemployment" ahead of "combatting inflation" and both of them ahead of "restoring competition." Id. at 7.
The naive criteria and naive priorities methods compare with the low integration
index and the moderately low integration index, respectively, in general information
processing systems. H. SCIRODER, M. DRIVER & S. STREUFERT, supra note 208, at
15 and 18. Compare these methods with the disjointed incrementalistic, supra notes
208 and 276, and the rational-deductive, supra note 277. See Figure 1, at pp. 242-43
infra; text accompanying notes 390-405 infra.
307 In relation to the Nuremberg trials it is interesting to note that:
The fact that a defendant had acted under an order of his government or of
a superior was not to free him from responsibility for having carried it out,
although superior orders could be considered in mitigation of punishment
if the tribunal decided that such would be in the interest of justice. In
this provision the charter of the tribunal took care of what was certain to be

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:141

embarrassment in the conduct of its international policy is not the
only undesirable by-product of the United States abstention from
ratifying the treaties. Such abstention has also foreclosed the possibility of our registering an actionable complaint against any ratifying power which fails to implement the convention, or worse,
grossly abuses the principles promulgated thereunder. "Only those
who are contracting parties to a convention are in a position to
'blow the whistle' on violations of treaty obligations by an acceding
8 08
state."
Failure to sign the human rights treaties, however, is but one,
a chief defense of many of the accused. A clause expressly prohibiting the
carrying out of inhuman or illegal orders had prudently been inserted in the
military manuals of the British and American armies only a year before. Up
to that time the accepted doctrine of both armies had been that a soldier
must obey the orders of his superiors whether he liked them or not. With
the trials coming up, the regulations were changed to provide that no order
that offended a soldier's conscience need be carried out. (Curiously, the
German Army had a similarly phrased order. The German soldier in World
War I and even under the Nazis was told in his book of military law that
he was not to carry out orders he knew to be illegal.) E. DAVIDSON, THE
TRIAL OF THE GERMANs 20 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
Compare Case of Dithmar and Bolt ["the Llandovery Castle case"] 16 AM. J. INTL L.
708 (2d Crim. Sen., Imperial High Ct. of Germany, 1921) (officers who followed
orders of superior found quilty for machine-gunning lifeboat survivors), with Case of
Commander Karl Neuman ["the Dover Castle case"], 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 704 (1922)
(accused found not guilty for torpedoing hospital ship in obedience to superior orders).
See also S. GLUEcK, WAR CRIMINALS: THEIR PROSEcUTION AND PUNISHMENT 153
(1944).
Compare United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (No. 15,383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842)
(accused threw persons off lifeboat, sentenced to six months hard labor and fined $20),
with United States v. Carr, 26 F. Cas. 306 (No. 14,732) (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1872) ("A soldier
is bound to obey only the lawful orders of his superiors." Id. at 308).
Article 90 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1952), provides that any member of the armed forces who "willfully disobeys a lawful command
of his superior officer" is subject to the death penalty in time of war and "by such
punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct," in time of peace. "A
person cannot be convicted under this article if the order was illegal; but an order
requiring the performance of a military duty or act is presumed to be lawful and is
disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate." MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES 9 169, at 321 (1951). See Y. KAMISAR, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS ch. II, at 35-38 (tent. ed. 1967). See also Mora v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 1024 (1967) (questioning the
constitutionality of United States military activity in Vietnam presents political questions beyond the jurisdiction of the Court).
08 Korey, supra note 296, at 414. The United States has also refused to sign the
United Nations Convention Against Genocide. For the text of the Genocide Convention, see Res. No. 260 (III) A, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 3d Sess. (I), Resolutions,
at 174; U.N. Doc. No. A/810; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 3416 (1949); 45
AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 6 (1951).
On genocide and the Genocide Convention, see Q. WRIGHT, supra note 245, at
284-85; W. BISHOP, supra note 294, at 475-77. On United States constitutional
aspects, see McDougal & Arens, Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 683 (1950); Kuhn, The Genocide Convention and States Rights, 43 AM. J.
INT'L L. 498 (1949).
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albeit major, manifestation of how the introspective policy outlook
of the United States has culminated in the American Dilemma.
Our difficulty is that we have not understood the complexity of
the problem. We have been too much obsessed with our own culture and our own Constitution when we have thought of a lawgoverned world. We have tended to think of the ideal institutions
of the world as our institutions made universal. We have been too
prone to think that a world "safe for democracy" means a world
all of which is democratic as we interpret the term.
We must think, instead, of the American society and the world
society as two entities, which are distinct, though they cannot be
separated because one contains the other, and which consequently
must mutually adapt to one another if either is to be secure. We
must ask how the world constitution may be modified to give
greater assurance that international law will be just and will be observed, and how our Constitution must be modified in order that
we may preserve our basic institutions and may make our appropriate contribution to the maintenance of such a world.30 9

Perhaps a possible solution to the Soviet and American dilemmas,
as well as the general dilemmas of a pluralistic world, would be to
base international law on underlying sociological, "critical morality," 310 standards. If we can believe Professor Marshall McLuhan,
the world - or this spaceship earth - is becoming one large retribalized village, due to the total integration of extensional cybernetic processes and the mass electronic communications media.3 1 '
a09 Q. WRIGHT, supra note 245, at 277. 'To our Western ideological heritage
also belongs the belief that [American] political democracy is the right road to progress and that progress will strengthen democracy."

G. MYRDAL, AN INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMY 159 (1956). For a criticism of this view, see note 256 supra.
310 Morality is a term that may refer to that which is desired or that which is
desirable, to a "practical socio-cultural fact in respect to matters of right and
wrong, good and evil, and [to] ...theories about the ends, standards, principles according to which the actual state of affairs is to be surveyed and
judged."

J. DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 19-20 (Mentor

ed. 1950). Professor Hart proposes that we call the existing mores of any
given social group "positive morality," and those general moral principles
or ideals used as criterion for evaluation of positive morality and other social
institutions "critical morality."

ELL.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORAL-

ITY 20 (1963). Abraham and May Edel use a similar dichotomy in their
conclusion that "the general lesson of our inquiry would seem to be that
ethical concepts, no matter how detached they are felt to be in consciousness,
have cultural roots and cultural functions, and their meaning is to be found
in the offices they perform. And criteria would seem to have a similar
character. The criteria in any evaluation of virtues, goals, ideals, needs, and
so on, are other virtues, goals, ideals, needs, more abstract or more concrete,
which have become enlisted on behalf of the ethical concepts to carry out
their office in the given context." A. EDEL & M. EDEL, [ANTHROPOLOGY
AND ETHICS 226 (1959)].
0. LEwis, MODERN SYSTEMS THEORY AND
JUDICIAL BEHAViORALiSM 67 n.328 (tent ed. 1968).
See C. CHURCHMAN, supra note 264, at 21, 370-71; L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF

LAW 13-19 (1964).

On the possible bifurcation of rationality, see note 288 supra.

31nM. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENsIONs OF MAN 24 (5th
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At some not too distant date, international law, or what the Hon.
Phillip C. Jessup, the United States representative at the Hague,
calls "transnational law,"' 12 or perhaps "supranational law," may
have to be based upon simplistic tribal norms.813
A possible effectuating or operational sociological solution to
the existing dilemmas of international law might be that of a transcultural consensus.

IX.

TRANS-CULTURAL CONSENSUS:

SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

To

A SUGGESTED

INTERNATIONAL LAW

No man is an Hand, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the
Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the
Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a Promontorie were, as well
as if a Mannor of thy friends or of thine owne were; any mans

death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; And
therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for

thee.
JOHN DONNE,
DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS, XVII (1623).
ed. 1966); M. McLuHAN & Q. FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE 63 (1967). The
term "cybernetic processes" is used here in the sense of an internal systems extension,
i.e. content variables may be expanded but structural variables remain basically unchanged. This will later be defined as an example of the "first" cybernetics. See
note 333 infra. On structural and content variables, see note 402 infra. It should be
noted, however, that these "integrative processes" are the basis for a morphogenetic
process the distinguishing differentiation being the role of feedback. See note
333 infra. For a comprehensive discussion of McLuhan's theories, see McLUHAN: PRO
AND CON (R. Rosenthal ed. 1968).
312p. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); Jessup, Political Expediency and
the International Rule of Law, CASE & COMMENT, May-June 1967, at 8, 9. See also
W. BISHOP, supra note 294, at 260; P. HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL
LAW ORGANIZATIONS (1966); Hay, Supranational Organizations and United States
Constitutional Law, 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 195 (1966).
313 For a discussion of the tribal norms of the Tiv and Barotse tribes and the role
of cultural anthropology in law, see Gluckman, The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia, in JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY AND
RESEARCH 90 (G. Schubert ed. 1964); Bohannan, Justice and Judgment Among the
Tiv, in id. at 110. See also E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 3-66 (1954)
(employing Hohfeldian terminology and analysis); W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (W. Wheeler ed. 1964).
Professor Harry W. Jones has suggested the following four jurisprudential theorems which, if true with respect to the actual functioning of law in any national society,
may provide needed clues as to what must be done to put law and the idea of law to the
fall service of the community of mankind: Theorem I, The unique task of law is the
resolution of the conflicting interests, competing demands, that are inevitable in any
society; Theorem II, In the establishment and maintenance of a legal order, disputesettling machinery is prior to and more important than substantive rules and principles; Theorem III, Compromise - the reasoned accommodation of opposed points
of view - is a central and indispensable technique in the practical operation of a
legal order; Theorem IV, In any form of adjudication, the judges are even more important than the legal doctrines on which they draw for decision. Jones, Law and the
Idea of Mankind, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 759-70 (1962).
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The Problem: On Aggression and the TerritorialImperative

Every man is a product of two complex heritages - his genetic
and his socio-cultural. In general, nonetheless, man is under fewer
phylogenetic constraints than lower level adaptive systems. "The
behavior of other animals is primarily determined by genetic coding whereas in the case of man ontogenetic mapping is much more
determinative."3 14 Due to the very fact that man is so little constrained by his genetic heritage and the fact that man's past experience influences his present behavior, so much so that "the child is
father of the man" and culture is the mother, he can plan for his
future not on the basis of what he is but of what he can become.3 15
Indeed, it may soon be possible for man to alter his genetic constraints. Unfortunately, however, man will still lack the superhuman prescience necessary to determine what genetic changes are desirable, except within the context of his immediate socio-cultural
constraints.116 Genetic manipulation and neurological controls will
not provide an easy means for programming man's basic nature to
317
circumvent his probable species self-annihilation.
314 0. LEWIS, supra note 310, at 37. Walter Buckley has made this point as follows:
[JUust as biological evolution represents the phylogenetic mapping of the
variety and constraints in the physical and biological environment into the
physiological structure of species via genetic coding, and learning represents
the ontogenetic mapping in somewhat greater detail of this variety via neurological coding, so human cultural development and group socialization represents the extrasomatic mapping in much greater detail and potential fidelity of the physical, social and psychic variety in the environment via symbolic coding. This latter, by virtue of its extrasomatic component is thus freed
from many biological constraints, and underlies the phenomenon emphasized
in Mead - man as an interpreting, defining, choosing, deciding being.
Buckley, Self-Regulation and Self-Direction in Psychological Systems, in
MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARcH FOR THE BEHAvIoRAL SCaENTIsT

315, 316 (W.

Buckley ed. 1968).
See 0. LEwIs, supra note 310, at 38 and 42.
316 Id. at 37-38. The prescience required would be that which would anticipate
the ethical demands of the new culture produced by genetic manipulation. This is
reflected in Churchman's definition that X ought to do A on ethical grounds as "A
is what X would do if he knew the consequences of his acts, and if he knew what
future men will want." C. CHURCHMAN, supra note 264, at 22 (1961). Note the
parallel between this statement and the duty to a "higher law of humanity" required
at the Nuremberg trials discussed in note 307 supra.
Konrad Lorenz argues that the socio-cultural and genetic heritages of man are
complementary:
[Man's whole system of innate activities and seactions is phylogenetically
so constructed, so "calculated" by evolution as to need to be complemented
by cultural tradition.... The equipment of man with phylogenetically programmed norms of behavior is just as dependent on cultural tradition and
rational responsibility as, conversely, the function of both the latter is dependent on instinctual motivation. K. LORENZ, supra note 236, at 265.
317 For a discussion of aggression and its control, see note 241 supra. See also
3 15
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The two current aspects of international relations which provide the greatest obstacles to world peace, namely nationalism and
regional collective security,3 18 can be viewed phylogenetically as
overt manifestations of man's intra-specific aggression and territorial imperative social patterns. In order to more fully comprehend
and attempt to constructively change the prevailing societal behavior as evidenced by these phylogenetic traits, one must first acquire
an understanding of man's basic animalistic instincts. 19
Konrad Lorenz has noted that animals, man included, tend to
be far more aggressive toward their own species than toward any
other.3 2 0 Lorenz defines this intra-specific aggression as "the fighting instinct in beast and man which is directed against members of
the same species." 3'
Normally, intra-specific aggression fulfills an
important species-preserving function, 2 and for this reason it has
Reinhold, Evolution Control: A Genetic Advance, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1968, § 1, at 1,

cols. 3-5.
318
It is a tragedy of our time that nationalism has become a compelling
slogan again, that the charismatic leaders of the emergent countries of Africa
and Asia are nationalists and rarely libertarians. In the perspective of mankind, nationalism, regionalism, and emotional patriotism are forces working
against the possibility of an international rule of law. Jones, supra note 313,
at 756.
On the role of nationalism in world affairs, see A. GYORGY & G. BLACKWOOD, IDEOLOGIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 169-90 (1967); E.REvES, THE ANATOMY OF PEACE
(1967). On the historical sociology and the future of nationalism, see E.HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE 464-75 (1964). See also Reves, National Sovereignty Bar
to World Peace, Letter to Editor, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1968, § 4, at 15, col. 1.
"The prevailing pattern of twentieth-century nationalism is its power orientation.
In effect, there seems to be a fairly direct ratio between the totalitarian characteristics
of the government and the relative virulence of its people's nationalism." A. GYORGY
& G. BLAcKWOOD, supra at 174.
319 We must be careful, however, in contrasting man with other animals, to realize
that the respective mechanisms and inherent attributes are quite different. See Figure
1, at pp. 242-43 inIra. To suggest that they are the same is to commit the zoomorphic
[see L. VON BERTALANFFY, ROBOTS, MEN AND MINDS 15 (1966)] or rattomorphic
[see A. KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION 560 (1964)] fallacy, the converse of the
anthropomorphic fallacy whereby human attributes are ascribed to lower forms of life.
See 0. LEwIS, supra note 310, at 81 n.429.
a20 K. LORENZ, supra note 236, at 18, 23-24. Lorenz equates this intra-specific
aggression with Darwin's "the struggle for existence." Id. at 23.
321 Id. at ix.
322The danger of too dense a population of an animal species settling in one
part of the available biotope and exhausting all its sources of nutrition and
so starving can be obviated by a mutual repulsion acting on the animals of
the same species, effecting their regular spacing out, in much the same manner as electrical charges are regularly distributed all over the surface of a
spherical conductor. This, in plain terms, is the most important survival
value of intra-specific aggression. Id. at 31.
With the exponential population explosion, such spacing will become increasingly
more difficult and may lead to the venting of new aggression unless, of course, the
food supply diminishes to the point (as in India today) that the people are virtually
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become phylogenetically programmed into man as a norm of social
behavior. 23 However, with man this aggressive force could lead to
total annihilation of the human species. Due to rapid and widespread technological advancement, man has become the only animal, it seems, to have lost (or never evolved) an instinctive inhibition to terminate aggressive action before the particular species is
made extinct. 24 All other animals have such an instinct which is
commensurate with their killing power. The remoteness of modern weaponry in distancing the button-pusher from the gore of his
"kill" enhances further the danger of inherent inhibitions being
ineffective in controlling man's intra-specific aggression. 2 5
In the modern community there is no legitimate outlet for aggressive behavior. "To keep the peace is the first of all civic
too weak to kill one another. See Lelyveld, Can India Survive Calcutta?, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 13, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 58 ("In this tragedy, political analysists see... at stake
...the future of democracy throughout the entire subcontinent."
Id.). See also note
337 infra.
323K. LORENZ, supra note 236, at 253. For citation to criticism of LorenzArdrey pessimism, see note 240 supra.
3 24
1n human evolution, no inhibitory mechanisms preventing sudden manslaughter were necessary, because quick killing was impossible anyhow;
the potential victim had plenty of opportunity to elicit the pity of the aggressor by submissive gestures and appeasing attitudes. No selection pressure
arose in the prehistory of mankind to breed inhibitory mechanisms preventing the killing of conspecifics until, all of a sudden, the invention of artificial weapons upset the equilibrium of killing potential and social inhibitions. When it did, man's position was very nearly that of a dove which,
by some unnatural trick of nature, had suddenly acquired the beak of a
raven [or, one might add, hawk]. K. LoRENz, supra note 236, at 241.
Professor Ivo Feierabend, who has analyzed internal political violence in 84 nations over an 18-year period, reported recently on the apparent "relationship between
aggressiveness on the one hand, and rapid socio-economic development and unsatisfied
wants on the other," in testimony before the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence. Loftus, Aggression Tied to Global Wants, U.S. Panel Told,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1968, at 38, cols. 1-4 (city ed.).
325 Ifmoral responsibility and unwillingness to kill have indubitably increased,
the ease and emotional impunity of killing have increased at the same rate.
The distance at which all shooting weapons take effect screens the killer
against the stimulus situation which would otherwise activate his killing
inhibitions. The deep, emotional layers of our personality simply do not
register the fact that the crooking of the forefinger to release a shot tears
the entrails of another man....
The same principle applies, to an even greater degree, to the use of modem remote-control weapons. The man who presses the releasing button is
so completely screened against seeing, hearing, or otherwise emotionally realizing the consequences of his action, that he can commit it with impunity even if he is burdened with the power of imagination. K. LoRENz, supra
note 236, at 242.
"The obverse of this phenomenon is responsible for the principal combat problem of
present-day infantry officers: the unwillingness of otherwise 'trained' troops to fire at
an enemy dose enough to be recognizable as an individual rather than simply as a
target." IRON MoTNTAIN REPORT, supra note 236, at 45 n.9.
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duties, and the hostile neighboring tribe, once the target at which
to discharge phylogenetically programmed aggression, has now
withdrawn to an ideal distance, hidden behind a curtain, if possible
of iron. '3 6 Thus, man has been forced to acquire redirected activities of intra-specific aggression. The most sociologically disruptive manifestation of such redirections is termed "militant enthusiasm" - a specialized form of communal aggression 2 7 whereby instinctive appreciation for life and the instinctive inhibitions against
hurting or killing a member of one's species become superseded by
the "higher" duty to destroy those designated as enemies."2 It is in
this collective aggression of one community (or nation) against
another that Lorenz finds the greatest danger to the survival of the
3 29
human race.
Interrelated with man's collective aggression is his territorial
imperative - that behavior pattern evolved as a kind of defense
mechanism emphasizing the necessity of protecting a specifically
bounded area from external hazard. According to Robert Ardrey,
man's territorial imperative is culturally determined and is the
foundation for human morality.83 0 He sees an inverse relationship
between the fall of hazard and the rise of enmity. "Perhaps it has
merely been that with growing control over our physical environment we have been left with more free time for killing each
other." ' '
The elimination of natural hazard compels, it would
K. LORENZ, supra note 236, at 253.
827Id. at 268.
328
Militant enthusiasm is particularly suited for the paradigmatic illustration
of the manner in which a phylogenetically evolved pattern of behavior interacts with culturally ritualized social norms and rites, and in which, though
absolutely indispensable to the function of the compound system, it is prone
to miscarry most tragically if not strictly controlled by rational responsibility
based on causal insight. Id. at 268.
Note the relationship between militant enthusiasm and the "ritualized" common enemy
discussed in note 236 supra & accompanying text.
329 K, LORENZ, supra note 236, at 157. See note 318 supra.
330 [Tlhe territorial imperative . . . is the biological law on which we have
founded our edifices of human morality. Our capacities for sacrifice, for
altruism, for sympathy, for trust, for responsibilities to other than selfinterest, for honesty, for charity, for friendship and love, for social amity
and mutual interdependence have evolved just as surely as the flatness of our
feet, the muscularity of our buttocks, and the enlargement of our brains,
out of the encounter on ancient African savannahs between the primate
potential and the hominid circumstance. Whether morality without territory
is possible in man must remain as our final unanswerable question. R
ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE 351 (1966).
See also Errington, The Phenomenon of Predation, 51 AM. ScIENTIST 180 (1963).
On morality, see discussion in note 310 supra.
331 R. ARDREY, supra note 330, at 349.
3286
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seem, the necessity for common unifying enemies; but this gives
rise to a further predicament:
The human predicament contains two forces: On the one hand
that balance of terror, the pax atomica, compels a general peace,
or at the least insists that a general peace be observed until accident
or cynicism end it. In any event, war as we have known it has
become both an impractical outlet for our innate psychological
needs and an impractical external pressure enforcing our [intercommunal] social amity. But on the other hand man's cultural
achievements have long since pressed him beyond a point of possible return, and if he is to survive on his irreversible course of
technological mastery, specialized skill, and consequent interdependence, then he becomes with every passing year, every passing
day, more at the mercy of social amity and mutual co-operation.P2

Assuming there is functional validity in the concept of man's
intra-specific aggression and territorial imperative (at least as manifested in nationalism and regional collective security), then as international relations become totally integrated and man's external
morphogenetic processes 3 become inter-circuited through the mass
Without doubt our superb technological achievements have presented us
with superb opportunities for wholesale murder denied the ancient world.
But even making proper allowance for the manifold inducements, temptations, and opportunities more grandly expanding our natural satisfactions
derived from mutual massacre, I cannot eliminate from my estimates the
necessity for enemies which falling hazard compels.
And so we must face the unanswerable question: What will happen if
the control which we exert over our physical environment ever totally eliminates natural hazard? Will man become the temperamental opposite of
the emperor penquin? When hazard approaches zero, will enmity approach
infinity? Id.
3321d. at 249-50. See also Berkner, Can Technology Be Used To Achieve Social
justice? - The Challenge to the Law, in Symposiua: Science Challenges the Law,
19 CAsE W. REs. L REv. 98 (1967); Wald, The Evolution of Life and the Law, in
id. at 17.
33
3Magoroh Maruyama has distinquished a "first" cybernetics concerned with morphostasis (deviation-counteracting mutual causal relationships) from the "second cybernetics which is also concerned in addition with morphogenesis (deviation-amplifying
mutual causal relationships). Maruyama, Morphogenesis and Morphostasis, 48
METHODOS 12 (1960).
The deviation-counteracting mutual causal systems and the deviationamplifying mutual causal systems may appear to be opposite types of systems.
But they have one essential feature in common: they are both mutual causal
systems, i.e., the elements within a system influence each other either simultaneously or alternatingly. The difference between the two types of systems
is that the deviation-counteracting system has mutual negative feedbacks
between the elements in it while the deviation-amplifying system has mutual
positive feedbacks between the elements in it. Maruyama, The Second
Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal Processes, 51 AM. ScIEN-nST 164 (1963).
While negative feedbacks appear to be deductive in that they are structure maintaining, positive feedbacks allow for end-goal or structural change. It is, therefore, onlywith the deviation-amplifying mutual causal processes that you arrive at the highest
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media of communications, several alternatives for international and
world power domination will arise. First, the United States and the
Soviet Union might divide the rest of the world and its resources
virtually between themselves. Such a bipolarized state of existence, coupled with the exploitation of lesser powers, is not too far

distant from the present day state of world affairs. Second, smaller
nations might continue to combine into regional defense organizations, such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact group, and the Organization of American States, thus pooling their respective powers and

resources.

In effect this alternative is not unlike the first, for if

the multitude of sovereign states eventually merged their defense
systems into only two or three collective defense mechanisms, "corresponding to the super-states of Orwell's 1984, national sovereignties would be correspondingly reduced in number, but the change
would be from the power balances of numerous big and small national states to the more massive and potentially more destructive
3 34
balance of power between two or three blocks of super-Powers."
A third alternative, which would also theoretically meet man's
behavioral patterns of collective aggression and territorial imperative, would be to "territorialize" the entire world, or this spaceship
earth, against some externalized enemy such as mythical or real
invaders from outer spaceY 5 A fourth alternative, similar to the
integration evaluative level. On goal-changing feedback, see note 293 supra and text
accompanying note 406 infra. For a graphic comparison of the complexity levels of
morphogenetic and ("first") cybernetic models, see Descriptive Models for high integration index and moderately high integration index, in Figure 1, at pp. 242-43 infra.
See also 0. LEWIS, supra note 310, at 20 n.116 (discussing the first and second law
of thermodynamics in relation to information processing); N. WIENER, CYBERNETICS
50 (1948) (defining feedback as "output information" in place of "output energy");
Deutsch, Toward a Cybernetic Model of Man and Society, in MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 387 (W. Buckley ed. 1968) ("Positive feedback adds to the input signals, it does not correct them." Id. at 399 n.2); Wiener,
Cybernetics in History, in id. at 31.
334 W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 139, at 258. On regionalism, see text accompanying note 264 supra. Note also the following statement:
[The "spheres of influence" doctrine] is a device for keeping the great
powers from getting into critical disputes in areas where one or the other feels
it must risk war to defend its vital interests. It is not a fair doctrine, for it
puts the small neighbors at a serious disadvantage...." "Recognition of
spheres of influence," Walter Iippmann wrote several years ago, "is a true
alternative to globalism. It is the alternative to Communist globalism which
proclaims a universal revolution. It is the alternative to anti-Communist
globalism which promises to fight anti-Communist wars everywhere ...
[It] has been the dominant foundation of the d6tente in Europe between the
Soviet Union and the West. Eventually it will provide the formula of coexistence between Red China and the United States." Reston, Spheres of
Influence or Spheres of Domination?,N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1968, at 46, cols.
3-6 (city ed.).
3 35
See note 237 supra.
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third, would be for the entire world to join in "war" against the
common unifying enemy of an insufficient amount of oxygen, water,
and food for the exploding world population 31 From a Malthusian point of view, the sheer lack of space may force the total infusion of the seething world masses, making it virtually impossible to
3 37
define territorial boundaries.
33
6 Professor Paul Ehrlich, among many others, has emphasized that the "time of
famines" is upon us and will be at its worst and most disastrous by 1975. "The first
move must be to convince everybody to think of the earth as a spaceship that can
carry only so much cargo. When we have determined the proper size of the crew
then we can design the environment to suit." Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 17, 1967,
at 12, cols. 4-5. See also Millions to Starve, Biologists Told, Cleveland Plain Dealer,
Sept. 4, 1968, at 20, cols. 1-2 (Report of 19th Annual Meeting, American Institute of
Biological Sciences, Ohio State Univ., Sept 4, 1968); World Food Crisis Is Reaching
CriticalStage, Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 23, 1968, at 53, cols 1-8. On water pollution and the water crisis, see Reitze, Wastes, Water, and Wishful Thinking: The
Battle of Lake Erie, 20 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 5 (1968) (this issue); Book Review,
20 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 315 (1968) (this issue). On the limited nature of the
earth's air envelope and air pollution, see THE Am WE BREATH (S. Farber & R. Wilson eds. 1968); R. SCORER, AIR POLLUTION (1968).
See generally R. CARSON,
SILNr SPRING (1962).
Man's ability to adapt to the "quality" deterioration of his environment has ominous implications:
[Tihe worst pathological effects of environmental pollutants will not be
detected at the time of exposure; indeed they may not become evident until
several decades later. In other words, society will become adjusted to levels
of pollution sufficiently low not to have an immediate nuisance value, but
this apparent adaptation will eventually cause much pathological damage in
the adult population and create large medical and social burdens. Dubos,
Adapting to Pollution, ScitmETST AND CITIZEN, Jan.-Feb. 1968, at 1, 3.
See also Reitze, supra at 84 nA36.
337 Exponentially viewed, it will not be long before the earth's surface is
packed solid with humans, the whole mass standing in individual refrigerated capsules on a thick layer of immovable automobiles. Babies will
issue from this mass in a constant stream to stand on the shoulders of their
parents. Suddenly, atomic fusion is achieved by the central computer which
runs this horror and the mass dissolves into a small exploding universe of
positive and negative electrons, neutrinos and antineutrinos, baryons and leptons, all moving apart at relativistic speeds. Before this, of course, we shall
have all killed one another off by the exponential rise in the crime rate, by
radiation diseases, and, lacking all exercise, by dying shortly after birth from
the ultimate pollution, namely, the inability to move away from our own
excrement. Cowan, Law and Technology: Uneasy Leaders of Modern Life,
19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 120, 122 (1967); also cited in Lewis, The High
Court: Final . . . But Fallible, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 528, 539 n.46
(1968).
Note also the following statement concerning Marx versus Malthus and the threat of
hunger:
In its preoccupation with the doctrine of Karl Marx, the United States
has until recently all but overlooked the more relevant Malthusian specter.
In the face of mounting hunger, the United States has permitted the war
against communism to bring it into alliance with feudal, land-owning oligarchies, where it should have been insisting upon land reform as a condition
for American aid. If the war against hunger is lost, it will not be for lack
of knowledge as to how it could be won; it will be because of lack of cooperative effort on the part of the developed nations which, in turn, has been
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As the essential elements for survival become more scarce, it
may be realistically questioned whether "democracy" in the American sense as a political form and a means for effectuating policy
can remain a functionally operative system for allocating the limited
life-sustaining resources."' s Inherent in the unrestrainedegalitarian
tenet of majority democracy (with its concept of total consensus) is
the basic disadvantage which is also found in species "herding":
We know that the drive forcing the animals together is a tremendously strong one, and that the attraction exercised by the herd
over the individual or over smaller groups of individuals increases
with the size of the herd, probably in geometrical proportion.
Thus in many animals, for example bramblings, a deadly vicious
circle may arise. Under the influence of fortuitous external conditions, such as a particularly good beechnut harvest in a certain
area, the flocking together of these birds may far exceed its usual
extent, the avalanchelike swelling of numbers may exceed the

ecologically supportable limit, and the birds may starve in masses.3s 9

The purely quantitative, and in a sense democratic, action of
the herding process called "social induction" by sociologists means
largely though not wholly due to American preoccupation with a crusade
waged with the wrong means and in the wrong places. J. WARBURG, supra
note 265, at 209.
Similarly:
The war system makes such an abstracted response possible in nonmilitary
contexts as well. A conventional example of this mechanism is the inability
of most people to connect, let us say, the starvation of millions in India with
their own past conscious political decision-making. Yet the sequential logic
linking a decision to restrict grain production in America with an eventual
famine in Asia is obvious, unambiguous, and unconcealed. IRON MOUNTAIN
REPORT, supra note 236, at 45.
See generally P. EnRLicH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968).
3 8
3 See text accompanying notes 333-34 supra and 343 infra.
3

9 K. LORENZ, supra note 236, at 141.
As to consensus, the extreme of "too little" consensus raises the danger of
the destruction of democracy from within by social, economic, cultural, and
other conflicts. The other extreme of a "complete" consensus is a social conformity that makes liberties meaningless. Democracy hovers forever between these two poles. In most of the existing democracies the danger is
perhaps greatest, in a time of international crisis like this, from too much
stress on consensus and unity. One thinks, for instance, of the damaging
effects of self-conscious "Americanism" upon liberties during the last decade.
At any rate, we do well to fear that we may be reading our own future in
the features of totalitarian states, whenever, like them, we stress unity at the

expense of freedom. So it is not out of place to deplore the frenzied search
for a unifying creed in the democracies. H. MAYO, supra note 236, at 30809.
Note also Raymond Aron's statement that: "The free world would be guilty of a fatal
error if it thought that it possessed a unique ideology comparable to Marxist-Leninism." R. ARON, THE OPIUM OF THE INThLLECTUALS 316 (1957).
For a view

greatly differing from Mayo's majority democracy, namely that of pluralistic democracy, see generally R. DAHL, supra note 248.
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that a mass group is less resolute the more individuals it contains
and, correlatively, its herd instinct becomes stronger. 40 Because
this same behavior is readily observable in human groupings,3 41 one
might assume a pessimistic outlook on the future of mankind as the
world population continues its exponential explosion. However,
it should be noted that the intra-specific aggression and the herd
attraction work as counteracting forces so that a balance or societal equilibrium is maintained. The important effect of intraspecific aggression, namely the dispersing and spacing out of the
animals of a species, is essentially opposed to that of herd attraction.
"Strong aggression and very close herding exclude one another, but
less extreme expressions of the two behavior mechanisms are not
342
incompatible."
In sum, "pure" democracy on a world level, without some authoritarian variable such as the trans-cultural concensus (which will
be suggested later), would run the risk of subjecting the entire human species eventually to a slow "rationed" death as the diminishing life-sustaining resources were divided equally among all persons. Such a result assumes, of course, that the herd instinct would
have become so ingrained that anarchy and the suppression of the
3 43
weak by the strong would not subvert the "democratic" process,
and that typically undemocratic programs such as eugenics and survival selection would not be instituted. 44 Democracy on such a
world scale would mature into a monster and collapse from the ineluctable modality and logic of its own laws.
B.

The Obligation: Responsible Morality

It is the unique adaptive characteristic of man that he can "timebind"3 45 his past and present knowledge in accretive socio-cultural
processes 346 so that he can plan for his future not only on the basis
3

40 K. LoRENZ, supra note 236, at 145.
341 See generally E. WALKER & IL HEYNS, AN ANATOMY FOR CoNFoRlMTy
(1962).
342 K. LoRENz, supra note 236, at 146. See also discussion of social stratification
in note 258 supra.
343 On an individual level, the moral hypothetical can be raised as to what a man
should do in a nuclear attack if there were only enough food in the bomb shelter for
the persons who were already in it and another person or persons knocked at the
door. See discussion of morality in note 310 supra. See also discussion of the "calculated risk" nature of democracy in note 250 supra.
344
See note 237 supra.
3
45A. KoRtZsSa, MANHOOD OF HUMANITy 91-93 (1921) (discussed in note
10 supra).
346 Just as traditional jurisprudence has been greatly concerned with the con-
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of what he is but of what he can become. "Aggressive behavior
and killing inhibitions represent only one special case among many
in which phylogenetically adapted behavior mechanisms are thrown
out of balance by the rapid change wrought in human ecology and
sociology by cultural development. '8 41 It is the function of responsible morality to reestablish a tolerable equilibrium between man's
phylogenetic instincts and the requirements of a culturally evolved
social order. In a sense, man's unique time-binding ability imposes
a rational responsibility on man to plan his future so as to prevent
the self-destruction of the species.
A distinction should be made here between positive international law and morality. It has been argued that moral obligation
to obey international law is the "foundation" of that law.8 48 On
the other hand, it is recognized that there is an international morality distinct from law, "violation of which gives no formal ground
sistency of legal doctrine, so too have scientists been primarily interested in
the elaboration of a coherent, systematic, and consistent set of scientific concepts. Professor Barber has observed that the function of scientific reports
is necessarily accretive in that they supplement the existing body of scientific knowledge. The scientists who write these reports do not indicate therein how they arrive at their conclusions. [See Barber & Fox, The Case of the
Floppy-eared Rabbits: An Instance of Serendipity Gained and Serendipity
Lost, 64 AM, J. SOCIOLOGY 128 (1958).]
Very little has been accomplished by scientists, including behavioralists, to ascertain the extent to which
the cultural matrix in which a scientist is embedded, or his personal attitudes,
influence the growth and elaboration of scientific theory, [see Merton, Foreword to B. BARBER, SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 7, 9 (rev. ed. 1962)]
although it is clear that these factors do affect scientific behavior. [See R.
DuBoS, Louis PASTEUR ch. VIII (1950); E. NAGEL, Naturalism Reconsidered, in LOGIC WITHOUT METAPHYSICS 3, 5 (1956); Barber, Resistance by
Scientists to Scientific Discovery, 134 SCIENCE 596 (1961); Barber & Fox,
supra at 253.]
Another obvious similarity is that just as legal doctrine provides a topoi,
or point of departure, for judicial reasoning, [see Stone, Reasons and Reasoning in Judicial and Juristic Argument, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 757, 775
(1964); Tammelo, Syntactic Ambiguity, Conceptual Vagueness, and the Lawyer's Hard Thinking, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 56, 58 (1962),] so too does scientific
innovation and progress involve extrapolation from existing scientific knowledge. It is this accretive process that moved Newton to paraphrase Bernard
of Chartes's statement: "We are like Dwarfs sitting on the shoulders of
giants." Kuhn has said that "Normal science" means research firmly based
upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements for a time as
supplying the foundation for its further practice.
[T. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (1962). For an analysis of
the mental processes involved, see S. FREUD, Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS 60-61 (1925).] Book Review, 20 RUTGERS
L. REV. 162, 163 (1965) (original footnotes incorporated into quote).
8
47 K. LORENZ, supra note 236, at 246.
848
See Lauterpacht, Introduction to J. BlIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW at xviii (H. Lauterpacht & C. Waidock eds. 1958); J. BRIERLY,
id. ch. I. But see criticism of this view in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
225-26 (1961). On morality, see note 310 supra.
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of complaint, however odious the action of the ill-doer may be." '49
The latter proposition may appear, at first glance, to be an overstatement of the definitional dichotomy; but it does seem to represent the position closest to practical reality. Professor H.L.A. Hart
gives the following reasons for not classifying the rules of international law as "morality": (1) "[S]tates often reproach each other
for immoral conduct or praise themselves or others for living up to
the standard of international morality. No doubt one of the virtues which states may show or fail to show is that of abiding by international law, but that does not mean that that law is morality." 5 0
(2) "The rules of international law, like those of municipal law,
are often quite indifferent."' a5'
(3) "Though the effect of a law
requiring or proscribing certain practices might ultimately be to
bring about changes in the morality of a group, the notion of a leg85
islature making or repealing moral rules is . . .an absurd one.

2

(4) Finally, in discussing the foundations of international law, the
opinion has often been expressed that any set of basic rules must
rest, in the last analysis, "on the conviction of states that there is a
moral obligation to obey them; yet, if this means more than that
3

49

E HALL, A TREATISE ON ITERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (8th ed. 1924).
Positive law can, for instance, stipulate an obligation to render military service, which implies the duty to kill in war, whereas morality, that is to say,
a certain moral order, unconditionally forbids killing. Under such circumstances, the jurist would say that "morally, it may be forbidden to kill, but

that is irrelevant legally."

I.

KLSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 425 (1952).
See cases cited and discussed in note 303 supra. See also J. AusTIN, Lecture V, in
TtE PROViNCE OF JUiSPRUDENCE DETERIaNE
125-29, 141-42 (H.L.A. Hart ed.
1954) (discussing "positive morality") (reprint of 1st ed. 1832).
35
0H.L.A. HART, supra note 310, at 222.
Claims under international law are not couched in such terms though
of course, as in municipal law, they may be joined with a moral appeal.
What predominate in the arguments, often technical, which states address
to each other over disputed matters of international law, are references to precedents, treaties and juristic writings; often no mention is made of moral
right or wrong, good or bad. Id. at 223.
351 Id. at 223.
A rule may exist because it is convenient or necessary to have some clear
fixed rule about the subjects with which it is concerned, but not because any
moral importance is attached to the particular rule. It may well be but one
of a large number of possible rules, any one of which would have done
equally well. Id.
32 Id. at 224.
A legislature cannot introduce a new rule and give it the status of a moral
rule by its fiat, just as it cannot, by the same means, give a rule the status
of a tradition, though the reasons why this is so may not be the same in the
two cases. Accordingly morality does not merely lack or happen not to have
a legislature; the very idea of change by human legislative fiat is repugnant
to the idea of morality. Id.
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the obligations which they recognize are not enforceable by officially organized sanctions, there seems no reason to accept it."353
It is, therefore, the task of men exercising their responsible morality to create and maintain in a future-directed fashion accretive
socio-cultural inclinations which will effectively control natural instincts that might otherwise become self-destructive. Representative of an approach to this task are the growing number of "welfare" functions which have been added to the bulk of traditional
inter-state relations. 5 4 A new body of social international law has
been created because of increasing needs in the areas of health,
food, transportation, and conservation of life-sustaining resources.
Concurrently, a totally new field of international economic development aid has been thrust into being by a rising apprehension over
the minimum standards of living on an international, as opposed to
a national, scale. "The administration of all these new international interests has produced a multitude of public international organizations, the internal administration of which requires a fastdeveloping body of international administrative law." 55 These recent manifestations of a broadening perspective and concern over
the welfare of all men provide the basis for a qualified avowal of
optimism.
Nonetheless, in attempting to fulfill his rational responsibility,
man's approach must be self-consciously eclectic. Too much specialization leading to compartmentalized learning has occurred. The
need today is for more integrative analysis. Erwin Schr6dinger has
succinctly stated the problem as follows:
We have inherited from our forefathers the keen longing for uni353ld. at

225.

354 See B. RMLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED SOcIETY

(1960).

Planning for welfare is ubiquitous. Egalitarian norms inspire it, and
state intervention is, in fact, universally recognized as the agent for attaining
it. But international integration suffers in proportion to the success of national welfare planning. What integrates each nation around the ideal and
the processes of successful planning causes global patterns of competition,
discrimination, and inequity. E.HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FuNcTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 461 (1964).
Gunnar Myrdal has given the following prescription:
The plain fact is this: When once the national Welfare State has come into
existence and built its moorings firmly in the hearts of the peoples who in the
democracies of the Western world have the political power, there is no alternative to internationaldisintegrationexcept to begin, by internationalcooperation and mutual accommodation, to build the Welfare World. G. MYRDAL,
BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE 176 (1960) (author's emphasis).
355 W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 139, at 191, citing C. JENxs, THE PROPER LAw
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, pt. 2 (1960). See, e.g., E. STEIN & P. HAY,
LAw AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIc AREA (1967).
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fLied, all-embracing knowledge. The very name given to the highest institutions of learning reminds us, that from antiquity and
throughout many centuries the universal aspect has been the only
one to be given full credit. But the spread, both in width and
depth, of the multifarious branches of knowledge during the last
hundred odd years has confronted us with a queer dilemma. We
feel dearly that we are only now beginning to acquire reliable material for welding together the sum total of all that is known into
a whole; but, on the other hand, it has become next to impossible
for a single mind fully to command more than a small specialized
portion of it.
I can see no other escape from this dilemma (lest our true aim
be lost forever) than that some of us should venture to embark on
a synthesis of facts and theories, albeit with second-hand and incomplete knowledge of some of them - and at the risk of making
fools of ourselves.8 56
With Schr6dinger's point in mind, an operational sociological approach based on a trans-cultural consensus and employing the strategy of disjointed incrementalism can now be suggested as a potential means for solving the dilemmas in international jurisprudence,
which have been created by a world of polarized ideological beliefs,
and as a potential means for effectuating a future "world democracy."
C.

The Strategy: Disjointed Incrementalism

The search for a strategy which would allow for optimal decision in the evaluation and choice of policies is not new. But today
the need of such an approach for international conflicts resolution
and for preserving the welfare of mankind in general has reached
ominous proportions. The ideal strategy would be synoptic, allcomprehensive, totally integrative, and account for all variables
(even future) and all changes (linear and extensional, as well as
structural). The synoptic ideal is, however, only an ideal.8 57 In85BE. SCHR6DINGER, WHAT IS LIFE at vii (1949), also cited in

0.

LEwis, supra

note 310, at 42-43. Note also Glendon Schubert's recent statement:
The most general projection that one would make, on the basis of present
trends, is that beyond the frontiers of judicial research lies the field of behavioral jurisprudence: empirical in its approach toward data collection;
quantitative in its methods of data manipulation; edectic in its intradisciplinary ties within political science; pandisciplinary in its theoretical orientation; and cross-cultural in the scope of its interests. Schubert, Behavioral
Jurisprudence, 2 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 407, 428 (1968).
8 57
D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 208, at 49, see note 276 supra.
Even electronic computers are unable to provide practical synoptic solutions.
A. L Samuel's checkers-playing machine would require 1021 centuries, supposing that it worked as fast as the fastest imaginable computer, to explore
every possible path leading to the end of a game of checkers. [Samuel, Some
Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers, 3 I.B.M. J. RE-
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evitably, failures in adaptation lead to failures of any proposed
synoptic strategy. Messrs Braybrooke and Lindblom have discussed the following eight adaptive failures: The synoptic ideal is
not adapted to (1) man's limited problem-solving capacities, (2)
the inadequacy of information, (3) the costliness of analysis, (4)
failures in constructing a satisfactory evaluative method (such as
a rational-deductive system),358 (5) the closeness of observed relationships between fact and value in policy-making, (6) the openness of the systems of variables with which it contends, (7) the
analyst's need for strategic sequences of analytical moves, and, (8)
the diverse forms in which policy problems actually arise. 59 The
failure to adapt to teleological variables and also latent dysfunctionality might also be added to this list. 6 °
Bentham's utilitarian felicific calculus of the "greatest happiness for the greatest number" can be viewed as an example of the
synoptic, or all-comprehensive, strategy for decision-making. 3 61 The
intelligibility of utilitarianism - that doctrine in which the useful
is the good and the determining consideration of right conduct
should be the usefulness of its consequences - has been criticized
for failing to encompass all functional variables. 6 2 More specificalSEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 211-12 (1959), cited by Wantanabe, in DIMENSIONS OF MIND (S. Hook ed. 1960).] Hence calculation would not be practical unless it departed from synoptic principles. D. BRAYBROOKE & C.
LINDBLOM, supra at 49 and n.18 (footnote partially inserted).
Similar findings have been recently published by other I.B.M. researchers:
The speed with which the fastest com[pjuters do their job has increased a
thousand-fold during the last 15 years, from 16,000 to 16 million additions
a second. Their logic circuits process electrical signals about 2.5 million
times faster than does a human nerve cell with all its processes.
But even this is not fast enough for certain computing tasks - weather
forecasting, for example. It takes 12 hours for a computer to produce a 24hour forecast. By the time it is finished, half the forecast period is gone and
the situation has changed. N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1968, at 57, col. 1.
358 The rational-deductive approach is defined in note 277 supra.
359 D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 208, at 47-57.
360 On teleology, see note 40 supra. On latent dysfunctionality, see note 254
supra.
361

The attempt at all-comprehensiveness of the synoptic ideal is discussed in note

276 supra.
3 62
See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 1-31 (1907) (reprint of 2d ed. 1823).
The felicific calculus, it will be recalled, presumes that the utility of an action
(or policy) can be reduced to the "value of a lot of pleasure or pain." The
value of a lot is to be measured by first taking each pleasure and pain that
the action will produce and considering, for each person affected, its intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity,
and purity, and then considering the number of persons to whom it extends.
The plus measurements of the pleasures in the lot and the minus measurements of the pains are combined to reach an algebraic sum or "balance,"
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ly, several general objections to this approach have been posited: the
lack of a definite interpersonal calculus (in spite of Bentham's proposals) ,3 1 the lack of a rule for cutting off accounts of consequences, 3 " and the lack of a rule for specifying the reference group
for which consequences are to be considered. 65
Furthermore, utilitarianism can be sharply criticized as being
end or goal dependent. "While the conventional view of problem
solving is that means are adjusted to ends (policies are sought that
will attain certain objectives), it is a significant aspect of policy
analysis as actually practiced that, in certain specific ways, the reverse adjustment also takes place. ' 360 Thus, Nagel has stated the
doctrine that "goals or ends of activity are dynamic agents in their
own realizations." 367 Messrs Braybrooke and Lindblom note that,
"[s]ince the reverse adjustment is superimposed on the conventionally conceived adjustment of means to end, the net result is a reciprocal relationship between means and ends or between policies and
values that is different from that envisaged in the synoptic ideal. '368
It can be suggested that the end goal in Bentham's synoptic calculus
of the "greatest happiness for the greatest number" could only be
"which, if on the side of pleasure,will give the general good tendency of the
act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals concerned;
if on the side of pain, the general evil tendency, with respect to the same
community." Thus in principle, every policy in any set of alternative policies
can be ranked vis-a-vis all the rest according to the score that the calculus
assigns to its consequences. D. BRAYBROOKE & C. IJNDBLOM, supra note
208, at 214.
30 It might be asked what the functional use of such a calculus would be if in
fact it could be made definite. It would first be necessary to draw attention to the
difference between specification or description of the problem-solving strategy, on the
one hand, and of a solved problem on the other, and, perhaps for the simple reason
that the strategy is a part of the process itself, it cannot be made functionally definite.
For example:
..Michael Polanyi calls attention to the difference between specification...
and [on the other hand) a solved problem.... To ride a bicycle, he says, it
is necessary at any given angle of unbalance for the rider to give a turn to
the front wheel that is by some measure inversely proportional to the square
of the speed at which he is proceeding. If this method specifies a solution
for the cyclist, would anyone try to ride by making these calculations? D.
BRAYBROOKE & C. I1NDBLOM, supra note 208, at 44-45, citing M. POLANYI,
PmSONAL KNowLEDGE 49-50 (1958).
364 This would necessitate closing the value system so that inputs will stabilize for
processing and the decision itself can in fact be made. The policy-proposals as well as
the policies themselves are constantly changing - being superseded or reshaped.
3 65
D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 208, at vii.
366 Id. at 93.
367 B. NAGEL, THE STRucTuRE or SciENc 402 (1961). See note 40 supra.
3 68
D. BRAYBROOKE & C. IlNDBLOM, supra note 208, at 93. "Although there is
a fundamental sense in which ends govern means, there is an equally fundamental
sense in which the proximate ends of public policy are governed by means." Id.
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attained by equally humane means, since the operational methodology employed to effectuate a policy will necessarily have an intrinsic effect upon that very policy. " ' The Soviet Dilemma can be
viewed as an example of this teleological phenomenon.
A basic tenet of Marxian ideology is that the end justifies the
means, 70 but "[ilf the end must be used to condone the means, then
there is something in the end itself, in its reality, which is not
worthy. That which really blesses the end, which justifies the efforts and sacrifices for it, is the means: their constant perfection,
humaneness, increasing freedom. 8 37 - The revolutionary government
in Russia was able to overthrow one form of society and despotically
set up another.
At first it was guided by the most beautiful, primordial human
ideas of equality and brotherhood; only later did it conceal behind these ideas the establishment of its domination by whatever
means.... Thus, by justifying the means because of the end, the

end itself becomes increasingly more distant and unrealistic, while
the frightful reality of the means becomes increasingly obvious and
intolerable.372
Although this criticism is somewhat naive,87 it can also be levelled
369 Throughout history there have been no ideal ends which were attained

with non-ideal means, just as there has been no free society which was built
by slaves. Nothing so well reveals the reality and greatness of ends as the
methods used to attain them. M. DJILAs, supra note 147, at 162.
Note, however, that a valid and "just" means for attaining an ideal goal, such as
equality of the sexes, may be dysfunctional to the extent that it encourages hopes that
it cannot satisfy or precipitates cataclysmic retaliation to the specific change. An
example on point is the use of law as an instrument of social change in traditional
Islamic societies under Soviet rule in the late 1920's. Massell, Law as an Instruaent
of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu: The Case of Soviet Central Asia, 2
LAW & Soc'Y 179, 221-26 (1968).
3 70
See text accompanying notes 5 0-52 supra.
37 1
M. DJILAS, supra note 249, at 162. See also notes 52 and 147 supra.
37 2
M. DJILAS, supra note 249, at 163. Milovan Djilas also states:
The ultimate results of a social struggle can never be of the kind envisaged by those who carry it out. Some such struggles depend on an infinite and complex series of circumstances beyond the controllable range of
human intellect and action. This is most true of revolutions that demand
superhuman efforts and that effect hasty and radical changes in society. They
inevitably generate absolute confidence that the ultimate in human prosperity
and liberty will appear after their victories. The French revolution was
carried out in the name of common sense, in the belief that liberty, equality,
and fraternity would eventually appear. The Russian revolution was carried
out in the name of "a purely scientific view of the world," for the purpose
of creating a classless society. Neither revolution could possibly have been
created if the revolutionaries, along with a part of the people, had not believed
in their own idealistic aims. Id. at 32.
373 See discussion of naive criteria and naive priorities approaches to decisionmaking in note 306 supra.
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at the Soviets' pragmatic use of international law to achieve their
purportedly ideal ends.
The criticism does, however, reemphasize the need for an effectuating strategy which would facilitate an adjustment of the
ends or objectives of policies to the means. Similarly, it can be
argued that nationalistic goals, such as regional supremacy and
ideological implantation, may have to be adjusted or foregone to
new goals, such as species preservation, if the means for achieving the new goal can be operationally established. In the final analysis, such a change will come about only if parochial attitudes and
naive values are replaced with a mankind perspective. Even if the
world were viewed as a spaceship with limited resources for sustaining the crew, survival of the human species8s 4 would still depend upon some means of decision-making which is in turn founded
on a complex and high level of integrative evaluation.
Messrs Braybrooke and Lindblom have convincingly argued
that the disjointed incrementalistic strategy for decision-making, 75
874

In recent years nearly every literate person has become cognizant of the
"quality" deterioration of our environment. However, this knowledge has
not been translated into the meaningful societal actions necessary to halt the
fouling of our habitat. This destruction of our environment was at one time
an aesthetic problem. Today it involves the survival of mankind as a species.
Man has been on earth for a very short period. His technological changes
involve only a little more than a century so that his myopic view should not
obscure the insignificance of their span of time. Assuming he survives his
radiological, biological, and chemical war toys, he still must face the long
term effects of pesticides, air pollution, destruction of the soil, etc. Man
should not be sanguine. Address of Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. at the Research
Conference on Nucieation, Precipitation and Solidification, sponsored by the
U.S. Dep't of Interior, Cleveland, Ohio, Sept 23, 1968; see Reitze, supra note
336, at 85 n.447.
See also G. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB (1968); B. WARD, SPACESHIP
EARTH (1966); note 239 supra.
"Pollution may well be the nation's most broadly based and democratic effort."
Galbraith, The Polipollutionists,ATLANnc, Jan. 1967, at 52, 54.
Our ecological crisis is the product of an emerging, entirely novel, democratic culture. The issue is whether a democratized world can survive its
own implications. Presumably we cannot unless we rethink our axioms....
What people do about their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them. White, What Hath Man Wrought?,
155 SCIENCE 1203, 1204-05 (1967).
See also Yeager, Technology vs. Liberty, 54 A.B.AJ. 759 (1968).
To meet the cost of mankind planning, Barbara Ward has suggested a progressive
international income tax by which all advanced nations would contribute 1 to 2 percent of their annual national income. Ward, To Widen the Base of World Wealth,
N.Y. Times, March 14, 1954, § 6 (Magazine), at 11; see J. SPANIER, AMERICAN
FOREIGN PoLIcY SINCE WORLD WAR 11187 (2d rev. ed. 1965).
375The disjointed incrementalistic strategy is defined in notes 208 and 276 supra.
Compare with naive criteria and naive priorities evaluative methods, defined in note
306 supra, and the rational-deductive method, defined in note 277 supra. See also
Figure 1, at pp. 242-43 infra.
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whereby marginal dependent or incremental choices are decided
singularly in an on-going but reversible order, is the best suited for
such polycentric and multivariate problems.y6 This incremental
strategy seems able to accomplish what the synoptic ideal could not,
for it is not only remedial and serial, but also has the advantage of
being exploratory. In other words, the incremental strategy can
overcome the general objections which have been offered to refute
the synoptic ideal insofar as it directs policy toward specific ills
(remedial), provides for segmented and long-term change (serial),
and its goals can be adjusted to reflect new experience (exploratory) .377
D.

The Methodology and Point of Departure:
A Trans-CulturalConsensus

As was discussed earlier, the emerging "new" approach to international lawmaking, in our pluralistic world of legal value systems,
concentrates on that same pragmatic, empirically based, problem
oriented, step-by-step - or disjointed incremantalistic - strategy for
conflicts resolution. 378 Soviet foreign policy is typically carried forward by endless small moves; and the recent step-in and step-out
of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops is a clear example of
the adaptability of the strategy,3 7' albeit by subverted means to accomplish a subverted end.
Peaceful (or, better stated, nonviolent) consensual change is
the operational methodology of the "new" approach to international lawmaking in this era of the ddtente. Significantly, Messrs
Braybrooke and Lindblom have suggested overcoming the peremptory objections to utilitarianism by abandoning Bentham's felicific
376 D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 208, at 111-43. For a discussion
of polycentric and multivariate problems, see note 228 supra.
377 Inherent in the disjointed incrementalistic strategy are a number of adaptations
which overcome the adaptive failings of the synoptic ideal. These failings are discussed in text accompanying notes 358-60 supra; see D. BRAYBROOKB & C. LINDBLOM,
supra note 208, at 47-57. The adaptations inherent in the strategy are: (1) margindependent choice, id. at 83; (2) restricted variety of policy alternatives considered, id.
at 88; (3) restricted examination of consequences for any given policy, id. at 90; (4)
adjustment of objectives to policies, or ends to means, id. at 93; (5) reconstructive
treatment of data, id. at 98; (6) serial analysis and evaluation, id. at 99; (7) remedial
orientation of analysis and evaluation, id. at 102; and (8) social fragmentation of
analysis and evaluation, id. at 104.
378 See text accompanying notes 205-06 supra.
3 79
See text accompanying notes 229-34 supra. "In the Soviet system ... [floreign
policy, for example, is typically carried forward by endless small moves; economic
planning too is a process of unending calculation and step-by-step adjustment." D.
BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 208, at 69.
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calculus for the notion of a felicific census in alliance with the
strategy.

80

Under the strategy, evaluators express their concern with meliorative themes without necessarily, or even usually, formulating
rules to embody the themes. Likewise, they express concern with
distributive themes without formalizing their procedures to the
point of exhibiting rigorous deductive arguments.... The general
form of a conclusive distributive test is that of a census - a comparative census when what is to be tested is whether one group of
people exemplifies a given distributive property to a higher degree
than another group, a prospective census when what is to be compared is the state of a given group with respect to a distributive
theme under one policy with its predicted state under another 381
Thus, to determine what distributive test (the census notion or
some other) should be employed to determine policy, the policymakers of any given nation should resort to a national value consensus. This would be established in the form of a minimum agreement on the "fundamental" attitudes which may be necessary in
order that the governing system may work smoothly, or work at all.
On a national scale, one basic tenet of mass democracy is that the
value consensus must in fact play an effective role in the determination of foreign and domestic policy.a "On a deeper level the national value consensus defines the limits within which the government must act and sets the goals which our leaders are morally obligated to pursue."3
But, that which is regarded as "fundamental"
changes through time; and it is for this reason, among others, that
the disjointed incrementalistic strategy, with its inherent ability to
adapt to structural changes, is well suited for an alliance with the
consensus approach.
We have now only to make the next logical step and suggest
that a trans-cultural consensus is the means by which a "world
democracy" can be sustained. A trans-cultural consensus necessarily implies a mankind perspective - a view of the earth as a space380Id. at 217-2 3.
In his doctoral thesis (Cornell, 1953), Braybrooke had explicated the notion of
a felicific census, which, he argued, serves as an effective substitute for Bentham's unrealized project of a felicific calculus. It was offered as a model,
closer to practice than any calculus, of how utilitarian considerations are actually brought to bear on disputes about policy. Id. at vii.
381Id. at 177-79. The census is prospective, just as the felicific calculus was a
prospective calculus. For example: If happiness is the given distributive theme, then
a felidific census is offered in the place of the felicific calculus.
382 Congress has recently asked for a greater voice in the determination of our
foreign policy. See note 266 supra. See also H. MAYO, supra note 236, at 298-309.
383E. LEFEvER, E'rmcs AND UNTED STATES FoREIGN PoLicy 166 (1957).
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ship with all peoples as the crew and with a limited supply of food
and oxygen. In a sense the functional logic of such a consensus
has already been successfully applied through international welfare organizations affiliated with the United Nations. The present
d~tente era of East-West relations has itself given rise to a "new"
international law which in effect employs a limited trans-cultural
38 4
consensus.
At this point it should be stressed that the immediate national
value consensus and, on the man qua international society level, the
trans-cultural consensus are merely points of departure. Their
normative and prescriptive content is subject to change as the determining units of inquiry (persons, groups, communities, nations)
change. Only from this perspective does the final dialectical step
acquire its functional validity.
The object of man's quest is now a comprehensive trans-cultural
consensus. But in our analysis it must be kept in mind that, while
such an achievement would be, perhaps, the only viable means for
effectuating a "world democracy,"3 85 the question still remains as to
whether man's intra-specific aggression and territorial imperative
can be redirected to insure the stability of such a democracy.
E. Mankind Perspective: An Avowal of Optimism
In light of man's phylogenetic behavior patterns, his means for
mass destruction, the equally destructive population explosion, and
the exhaustion and pollution of the limited life-sustaining resources,
one might assume a pessimistic outlook on the future of man as a
continuing species. If carried to its logical conclusion, such pessimism would necessarily lead to the fatalistic realization that no action employed to abate the onslaught of human species annihilation
could be either worthwhile or ultimately effective. Why, then,
don't we all become hippies and yippies and espouse an international carpe diem philosophy of life, or take Schopenhauer's advice
and stop procreating and bring this whole farce to an end?"" The
answer lies in the simple fact that any espousal of a pessimistic outlook, with its resulting fatalism, may teleologically predicate the
See text accompanying notes 208-11 supra.
suggesting an implementation of the fourth and highest information integrative index level of disjointed incrementalism, through means of a trans-cultural
consensus, the writer feels that he has documented his presentation sufficiently so that
he will not be attacked for arriving at a solution via the naive criteria or naive priorities approach.
3 86
See W. DURANT, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY 258 (1953).
384

385 In
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doom which it avows. Given this fact, we should realize that it
may be possible to utilize the same teleological phenomenon in an
avowal of optimism. If an optimistic avowal is based on some
cogent underlying rationale, it might then be used to effectuate that
which is relatively positive - namely the accretive socio-cultural
development of the human species.
Education has been used as an effective cultural equalizer and
as a means for instilling nationalism and for purging our pluralistic society of ethnocentric values and beliefs which might question
the all-conclusiveness of American democracy 87 Since man's phylogenetic behavior patterns of intra-specific aggression and the territorial imperative are culturally determined, it is only logical to
postulate that they can also be culturally terminated. Education
as our cogent underlying rationale - can be used to effectuate an
international consensual (and species-saving) democracy by orienting both the American and the world populace toward a mankind
perspective. 8 8
Nationalism has heretofore been a necessary and viable concept in the preservation of opposing Nation States which have operated under culturally determined, and rationally deductive, value
systems. Now, however, international situations and conflict relationships have become too complex and too integrated to be comprehensively handled by such simplistic evaluative methods. Nationalism and that methodology under which it both operates and
serves to perpetuate must be sacrificed in the interests of species
preservation, lest all mankind fall victim to the inexcusable failure
to employ the more integrative and selectively open evaluative
3 87

The United States Supreme Court itself has prohibited ethnic prayers and instruction in public schools and has been instrumental in racially integrating these same
schools. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, Murray v. Curlett, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading without comment in public school violates first amendment); Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial discrimination in public
education is unconstitutional). Compare McCollum v. Board of Ed., 333 U.S. 203
(1948) (use of public school building and school time for religious instruction unconstitutional), with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) ("released time" from public school for religious instruction does not violate Federal Constitution). See also
Lewis, The High Court: Final ...But Fallible, 19 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 528, 573-76
(1968).
388 Cf. Cavers, Legal Education in Forward-Looking Perspective, in LAW IN A
CHAINGiG AMERICA 139 (G. Hazard ed. 1968). Children can be most easily edu-

cated toward a mankind perspective before parental prejudices are firmly implanted.
Cf. R. MCHALE, R MCARDLE, M. HIMES & R. MURRAY, SPELLING 3 (The New
Laidlaw Spelling Series 1967) (compares Roman, Greek, Russian, German, Arabic,
and Hebrew alphabets and words). "It is even possible that electronic systems will
help create a single human and machine speech, better than Esperanto.
...N.Y.
Times, Jan. 2, 1968, at 23, col. 2 (city ed.) (from an interview of Viktor Glushkov,
vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which was published in Pravda).
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method of which it is capable and which is most suited for optimal
decision and prediction.
As shown on Figure 1, man has the unique capacity which enables him to process information on a high integration index level.38
The problem is that he seldom employs the highest and most comprehensive evaluative method for policy determination. Failure to
capitalize on his unique potential is most evident on the international scale, where the inherent complexity of problem situations
requires a method, such as the disjointed incrementalistic strategy,
which operates on the high integration index level. National value
determinations have heretofore constrained man in the area of international policy determinations to operation on only a moderately
high integration index level,39 ° thus resulting in a "refusal" to employ the higher methodology. Only on the high integrative plane
can man hope to reach optimal decisions, which are necessary for
ultimate species preservation and adaptation. A brief explanation
of all the index levels and their representative evaluative methods
and analytical models will reveal the efficacy of operating on the
highest integrative level. Furthermore, it will illustrate the ability
of the disjointed incrementalistic strategy to transcend cultural determinations in its evaluative approach to the necessary optimal decisions.
"There exists a continuum of adaptive systems ranging from a
low to a high degree of openness, differentiation, and interdependence." ' ' For analytical purposes it is possible, however, to identify
four benchmarks along the continuum at which man is capable of
functioning - the high, the moderately high, the moderately low,
389 The difference between man and higher-order animals lies not so much in
the ability to learn or to utilize the meanings of a large number of stimuli,
but rather in the ability to learn and to utilize alternate meanings of the same
stimulus and to build up and use different patterns of interrelationships
within the same set of meanings. This change, from lower to higher levels
of thought, is a matter of degree, paralleling the evolutionary scale across
species and developing with age (to an upper neurological limit under optimal environmental conditions) within species. H. SCHRODER, M. DRIvEar
& S. STREUFERT, supra note 208, at 5.
390 It should be stressed that an existing national value consensus is only a point
of departure (PoD). See Figure 1, at pp. 242-43 supra. Such a consensus is subject to
change as the determining culture itself changes. For an excellent work on cultural
change, see D. MARTINDALE, SOCIAL LIFE AND CULTURAL CHANGE (1962). The
consensus may also be affected by an enlightened overview of the immediate problemsituation, thus raising it toward a trans-cultural consensus. See also Schubert, The
Rhetoric of ConstitutionalChange, 16 J. PUBLIC L. 16 (1967).
On the constraining nature of nationalism, see note 318 supra.
3910. LEWIS, supra note 310, at 28.
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and the low integration index levels.3 92 At the man qua man level
of relationship-complexity, where the perspective is generally egocentric or self-referent, each individual seeks, over and above his
biological needs, his own integrity and destiny. However, when he
employs the naive criteria evaluative method with its inherent low
integration index, he necessarily limits his analytical model to that
of a closed system with fixed responses and little deviation (equilibrium).193 Intra-species aggression and the territorial imperative
are examples of phylogenetic behavior patterns which operate at
this low integration index level; and, characteristically, an individual's dogmatic and narrow-minded thinking is done at this naive
criteria level.
At the moderately low integrative index level, man acts with
less dependance on his environment and mentally fixed responses,
and, concurrently, with more differentiation in his thought processes. The naive priorities evaluative method with its ranking
order methodology is characteristic at this level of information processing, and the appropriate analytical model is the homeostatic or
simple cybernetic3 9 4 This level differs from the low integration
392 These four levels are identified and discussed in H. SCHRODER, M. DRIVER &
S. STREuFERT, supra note 208, at 15-23. See also 0. LEWIs, supra note 310, at 28
n.144.
39

3 At this level the adaptive system is minimally open to the environment

and exhibits a low degree of differentiation and interdependence, although
there is a high degree of order, few degrees of freedom, and concomitantly
the behavior of the system is quite predictable. The constrained variety of
the environment (dimensions or perspectives) are ordered in a static or fixed
way and minimally affect the system's information processing operations.
0. LEwIS, supra note 310, at 29 (foomote omitted).
There is an obvious parallel between this level of thought (or lack thereof) and the
behavior of molecular interaction. "Lower order organisms, such as insects - bees,
ants - operate at this level, as do brain damaged humans most of the time, and the
rest of us, hopefully, only some of the time." Id. at 32, citing Tinbergen, The Curious
Behavior of the Stickleback, Sco3NTIFic AM., Dec. 1952, at 22; Schneirla & Piel,
The Army Ant, SCIENTIFIC AM., June 1948, at 19; von Frisch, Dialects in the Language of the Bees, SCIENTIFIC AM., Aug. 1962, at 79; Krogh, The Language of the
Bees, SCIENTIFIC AM., Aug. 1948, at 18. Even the lowly amoeba (amoeba Dictyostelium discordeum) fits in this category. See Bonner, Differentiationin Social Amoeba,
SCIENTIFIC AM., Dec. 1959, at 152. See generally Deutsch, Toward a Cybernetic
Model of Man and Society, in MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH FOR THE BEHAVIoRAL
SCIENTIST 387 (W. Buckley ed. 1968).
39 4
See Figure 1, at pp. 242-43 supra.
The term "homeostasis" was coined by Walter Cannon, for whom it signified
"a condition - a condition which may vary, but which is relatively constant."

W. CANNON, TIE WISDOM OF THE BOnY 24 (1939).

He rejected

the term "equilibrium," explaining that "1the constant conditions which are
maintained in the body might be termed equilibria. That word, however,
has come to have fairly exact meaning as applied to relatively simple physicochemical states, in closed systems, where known forces are balanced. The
coordinated physiological processes which maintain most of the steady states

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:141

index level insofar as a structural variable is added here which enables the system to generate alternate organizations of the constrained variety of information inputs. 39 5 It should be noted, however, that there is still no way "to relate the different content variables, other than rough integrating rules based on conditionality." 96
As Messrs Schroder, Driver, and Streufert have pointed out, "[tjhis
does not involve the simultaneous use of schemata by superordinate rules other than conditional principles. In this sense, once a
rule is engaged, moderately low integration index structure functions much like low integration index structure except that other
' 97
schemata are available.
The next level of complexity is that of the moderately high integration index. This level permits comparison, combination, and
other manipulations of the content variable organizations. Thus,
the system is self-reflexive: various thought-patterns can be used to
reach the same decision. Moreover, by use of this system, the decision-maker can simultaneously take several points of view and,
therefore, can "observe the effects of [its] . . . behavior . . . and
weigh the effects of taking different views. '3 98 "The internal processes take on a more significant role at this level, and the system
becomes more autonomous and less predictable with the increase in
degrees of freedom."399 At this level the rational-deductive approach to policy determination, which is characterized by its comparative coherence, is appropriate. Due to the inherent limitations
of processing information on a moderately high integration index
scale, the rational-deductive method does not allow for structural
change. 400 An example of this method of integration would be a
in the organism are so complex and so peculiar to living beings - involving,
as they may, the brain and nerves, the heart, lungs, kidneys and spleen, all
working cooperatively - that I have suggested a special designation for these
states, homeostasis." Id. at 24.
See also 0. LEWIS, supra note 310, at 6 n.26.
95
3
See Descriptive Model for moderately low integration index, in Figure 1, at
pp. 242-43 supra.
8960. LEwiS, supra note 310, at 32.
97
3 H. SCHRODER, M. DRivER & S. STREUFERT, supra note 208, at 18. However,
the alternate organizations do "usher in the problem of choice and probability." Id.
at 19. See also 0. LEWIS, supra note 310, at 33. Examples of relatively complex
machines that operate at this level are servo-mechanisms and thermostats. See Figure
1, at pp. 242-43 supra.
39
8 H. SCHRODER, M. DRIVBR & S. STRBEUFERT, supranote 208, at 21.
399 0. LEWIS, supra note 310, at 33. See Descriptive Model for moderately high
integration index, in Figure 1, at pp. 242-43 supra.
400 However, structural change could be effected at this level by an ad hoc or an
irrational decision to make such a change. There is obviously an inherent risk of
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simulation-programmed computer which does not allow for endgoal change, and the analytical model is that of the first cybernetic.4 °1
Finally, the high integration index level is identified by its increased interdependence, differentiation, selective openness, and degrees of freedom. A further integrative step emerges at this level
for generating complex conceptual relationships and thus altering
structural variables 02 Here we have what Karl Deutsch has termed
goal-changing feedback - readjustments of the internal structural
variables which implied the system's original goal, so that the system as a whole will change its goal, "or set itself new goals which
it will now have to reach if its internal disequilibrium is to be lessened."4 03 The analytical model which describes transactions at this
high integration index level is the" systems or morphogenetic
model4 04 As has been discussed earlier, the disjointed incrementalistic strategy, with its ability to direct policy toward specific ills
error when making such a decision with such a limited integration index.

See

Diagram 2, D. BRAYBRooKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 208, at 78.

401
See Figure 1, at pp. 242-43 supra. For differentiation between "first" and "second" cybernetics, see note 333 supra. Simulation-programmed computers may have
the capacity, given sophisticated programming, to behave at the highest integrative
index level. Recently an electronic machine was invented by British engineers which
simulates human learning processes. "Hope was expressed that, subjected to figurative
rewards, inhibitions and punishments, the machine might learn to exercise foresight." Artificial Brains Luring Inventors, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1968, at 21, col. 1.
See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1967, at 56, col. 1 (computer being "raised" like a child);
McKay, Towards an Information-Flow Model of Human Behavior, 47 BRITISH J.
PSYCHOLoGY 30, 40 (1959) (outline for programming self-organizing computer system capable of growing in complexity "at a rate comparable with that of the learning process in human infancy").
It may eventually be possible for simulation-programmed computers to transcend
those structural variable constraints which are inherent in man's symbol systems, for
in reality man's "time-binding" characteristic limits his decision-making to an on-going
and theoretically reversible process. A computer with no memory or cultural heritage
might be able to construct new structural variables without being affected by man's
"time-binding" constraints. Such new structural variables would allow for alternate
options which would not otherwise be readily perceived by man whose eyes are cataracted by his own social matrix. See also note 406 infra.
402
See Descriptive Model for high integrative index, in Figure 1, at pp. 242-43
supra. Structuralvariablerefers to the program or set of rules for dealing with information, in contrast with content variable which refers to the substance (the manner of acquisition, magnitude and direction) of information (fact, norm, attitude, etc.). 0.
LEWIS, supra note 310, at 29.
40 3
Deutsch, Some Notes on Research on the Role of Models in the Natural and
Social Sciences, 7 SYNrHEsE 506, 515 (1948-1949). See also note 293 supra &
accompanying text (goal-changing feedback); note 333 supra (positive and negative
feedback); text accompanying note 377 supra (goal-changing nature of the incremental
strategy).
40 4
See discussion in note 333 supra. See also Easton, A Systems Analysis of

Political Life, in MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARcH FOR THE BEHAVIORAL ScIENTIsT 428

(W. Buckley ed. 1968).
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(remedial), provide for segmented and long-term change (serial),
and adjust its end-goals to reflect new experience (exploratory), is
the most appropriate for policy determination at the high integrative index level.4 °0
Although man's cognitive system can operate at all levels of the
continuum, in attempting to solve polycentric or multivariate problems, such as those which arise on the international or transnational
level and which affect the future of the entire species, man has the
affirmative obligation to use the highest level of evaluative method
in order to reach optimal decisions. On the man qua international
society level, a trans-cultural consensus can be employed as the
operational methodology for the incrementalistic strategy. Note,
however, that this consensus is not existential in its existence. Its
utility lies in the fact that it is merely a point of departure: the consensus itself may structurally change during the decision-making
process as a result of end-goal feedback and internal changes in the
content variables. 06
Man's accretive socio-cultural processes, which we have termed
"time-binding,"40 allow him to control not only his present condition but also his destiny and the destiny of his species.
It is clear that most human institutions were created and exist to
fulfill [the] neurophysiological need of the human brain for certainty and meaning, for orientation in time and space. It is this
characteristic of human mind which makes the probability of
thermonuclear war so great. Only by the most radical break with
tradition and the past, only by the most intense, sustained human
efforts to create a new human institution, to produce a human
synthesis based on the concepts of organic evolution and the objective analysis of human history and social evolution,[ 408 only by
these heroic and demanding efforts to unite all men, women and
children across national, ideological, religious, racial, and economic
40 5

See text accompanying note 377 supra.

406 For a distinction between structural and content variables, see note 402 supra.

See also note 287 supra.
Note, however, it might be said that the evaluative approach or evaluative structure along with the information inputs teleologically (see note 40 supra) determines
the end-goal feedback and therefore the ultimate decision which will be made. The
high integrative index evaluative method would then be subject to the deterministic
criticism of the lower integrative levels. This of course raises the perplexing problem
of an infinite regress that confronts all deductive conceptual analyses that aspire to
complete comprehensiveness. See E. NAGEL & J. NEWMAN, GODEL'S PROOF 6 (1960).
See also 0. LEwIs, supra note 310, at 16 n.84. Such an attack can be rebutted by the
fact that the information in the system is imperfect and therefore it is impossible to
determine the essentially nonpredictable deviations.
407 See note 10 supra;text accompanying note 345 supra.
40SSee, e.g., discussion of phylogenetic behavior patterns in text accompanying
notes 314-44 supra.
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barriers and conflicts can the disastrous World War III be pre409
vented.
But do we care enough to educate our children and the general
populace in this manner?
The ability of any individual human brain to relate to another
person is influenced by the input of years of experiences indelibly
inscribed in millions of complex reverberating neuron circuits, and
the problems of world brotherhood and peace are directly related
to solution of the problem of the education and family training of
children in the broadest most realistic and truthful world view.
Whether an American child can relate himself to a Chinese or
Russian child as a fellow human being to work with or as an
"enemy" to be hated, feared, and destroyed depends upon the
authorities who define values for the child, the authorities who
condition him....
Whether a capitalist's child can relate to a Communist's child as a fellow human being or as belonging to the
"bad people" involves the same neurophysiological mechanisms. 410

A trans-cultural consensus is beginning to permeate the area of
international relations, and an avowal of optimism can be made that
we will realize the necessity of applying this "time-binding" ability
by using the means of education to lift our children's eyes to a
MANKIND PERSPECTIVE.
X.

CONCLUSION

The delineation of the changes in the dominant theory of pub-

lic Soviet international law and the critical comparison of the Soviet "hang-ups" in effectuating a valid theory of international law
with the inconsistencies between the United States democratic ideals
and American international relations have provided an exemplar
for applying modern decision-making theory as an analysis tool for
understanding differing approaches to international conflicts resolution. As our world becomes more like a spaceship earth and as decisions on the man qua international society level increasingly continue to affect the future of mankind as a species, the need for a decision-making process with a high level integration index becomes
more compelling. It has been suggested that the disjointed incrementalistic strategy coupled with a trans-cultural consensus may be the
necessary operational approach for determining the solutions to the
dilemmas which have been created by a world of polarized ideologies and which increasingly threaten the continuing existence of the
human species.
409 Brewer, Political Effects of the Material Basis of Human Thought, 9 AM. BEHAVIORAL SciENTIsT, June 1966, at 9, 14.
410 Id.
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The Bell is tolling. The time for a mankind perspective is now
- we have the technology and ability to control the quality and
destiny of our world environment, but unless we begin programming our social, political, and economic relations to include all of
mankind, the day after tomorrow will not belong to us.
JAMEs L. HILDEBRAND

